Great Britain and naval arms control: international law and security 1898-1914 by Keefer, Scott Andrew





Great Britain and Naval Arms Control:  





Scott Andrew Keefer 
A thesis submitted to Department of International History of the London School of 
Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
International History, London, December 30, 2011  
 1
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other 
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the 
extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified 
in it).   
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.  Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgment is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent.   
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights 
of any third party.   
 





Abstract:   
 
This thesis traces the British role in the evolution of international law prior to 1914, 
utilizing naval arms control as a case study.  In the thesis, I argue that the Foreign 
Office adopted a pragmatic approach towards international law, emphasizing what 
was possible within the existing system of law rather than attempting to create 
radically new and powerful international institutions.  The thesis challenges standard 
perceptions of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 which interpreted 
these gatherings as unrealistic efforts at general disarmament through world 
government, positing instead that legalized arms control provided a realistic means of 
limiting armaments.   
This thesis explores how a great power employed treaties to complement maritime 
security strategies.  A powerful world government was not advocated and was 
unnecessary for the management of naval arms control.  While law could not 
guarantee state compliance, the framework of the international legal system provided 
a buffer, increasing predictability in interstate relations.  This thesis begins with an 
account of how international law functioned in the nineteenth century, and how states 
employed international law in limiting armaments.  With this framework, a legal 
analysis is provided for exploring the negotiations at the Hague Conferences of 1899 
and 1907, and in the subsequent Anglo-German naval arms race.   
What emerges is how international law functioned by setting expectations for future 
behaviour, while raising the political cost of violations.  Naval arms control provided 
a unique opportunity for legal regulation, as the lengthy building time and easily 
verifiable construction enabled inspections by naval attachés, a traditional diplomatic 
practice.  Existing practices of international law provided a workable method of 
managing arms competition, without the necessity for unworkable projects of world 
government.  Thus failure to resolve the arms race before 1914 must be attributed to 
other causes besides the lack of legal precedents.   
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 The historian’s art lies in conveying how those in the past perceived their 
present and imagined their future.  The history of arms control before 1914 reveals 
more about what statesmen expected from the future than how that future unfolded.  
To the British Foreign Office, the limitation of naval armaments was a realistic 
possibility, and a way of removing a significant contention with an increasingly 
erratic and aggressive Germany.  To understand how these statesmen perceived their 
world, the historian must seek a fuller comprehension of the strategic situation, and 
the tools at the disposal of policy-makers.  While the diplomacy of the pre-war era 
has been exhaustively studied, as have many of the tools of policy-making, such as 
naval strategy and war planning, one crucial element remains neglected – 
international law.   
Without this foundational knowledge of law, our understanding of treaties – 
from arbitration and arms agreements to alliances, guarantees of state neutrality, and 
rules of war – reflexively reverts to commonplace misunderstandings about how law 
functioned.  In turn, if historians fail to grasp how statesmen expected law to work, 
then arguments built around key treaties lose critical theoretical foundations.  
Mistaken impressions about international law arise honestly, as often international 
lawyers, comfortable working within their discipline, assume an understanding of 
core legal concepts and omit them in their discussions.  But the absence of discussion 
of these core concepts has left historians to speculate about the nature of law.  When 
candidly expressed, historians’ misconceptions significantly undermine the validity 
of their claims, as when Avner Offer summarized the exclusive three functions of 
law in wartime as offering pretexts for war, justification for atrocities, and 
rationalizations for punitive peace treaties.1   
More often, historians equate the international legal system with its domestic 
counterpart by focusing on legislative, judicial, and executive institutions.  Thus, 
when analyzing a treaty, historical accounts often seek evidence of a world court or 
international police powers for enforcement, and assume that no treaty could 
function as law in their absence.  In discussing disarmament at the First Hague Peace 
Conference, Arthur Marder judged “[t]here was no possible means of guaranteeing 
                                                 
1 Avner Offer, “Morality and Admiralty:  ‘Jacky’ Fisher, Economic Warfare and the Laws of War,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 114-15.   
5 
 
that such a self-denying ordinance would be observed, except perhaps through an 
army of international inspectors, and this would lead to friction.”2  Similarly, a 
leading historian of arms limitation, Merze Tate, wrote “[i]n the European society of 
the nineteenth century, without an international executive to enforce engagements on 
recalcitrant states, disarmament was impossible.”3  In reality, statesmen were 
perfectly comfortable working without such a safety net.   
What the layman seeks in courts and cops, the international lawyer metes out 
in prose and cons.  Beneath the florid language of treaties lay assumptions of 
political costs and power relationships.  By going to the trouble of formalizing an 
agreement in a treaty, vested with symbolic significance and an aura of permanence, 
statesmen increased the political costs of violations, making breaches less likely.  Yet 
violations remained possible and good lawyers anticipated them.  While law could 
not eliminate the possibility of violations, it could make behavior more predictable.   
Additionally, law could enshrine national interests.  Under sweeping 
statements of universal humanitarian sentiment, more often than not lurked cold 
calculations of national interest.  Well-crafted treaties betrayed little of these 
calculations, appearing more as moral platitude than diplomatic bargains.  Within all 
treaties lay estimations of power, questions of who could enforce what obligations 
under which set of circumstances; and legal instruments provided a veneer of 
legitimacy to these machinations.  Law is a struggle for power, and states engaged in 
treaty-making to legitimize their national interests.  “[T]he majestic equality of the 
laws . . . forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, 
and to steal their bread.”4  Law functioned as an element of foreign policy-making, 
employing recognized diplomatic practices for resolving disputes and pursuing 
national interests.  International law, as understood and practiced by statesmen in the 
nineteenth century, functioned without powerful legal institutions.   
This thesis aims to correct some of these misassumptions about international 
law and its role in foreign policy decision-making.  In doing so, it argues that law 
was employed by statesmen in order to advance national goals, and when utilized 
pragmatically, recognizing its limitations, law could contribute to national security.  
                                                 
2 Arthur J Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power:  A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, 3rd Edition 1972 ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1940), 342. 
3 Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion:  The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907, 2nd 
ed. 1971 ed. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1942), 347.   
4 Anatole France, The Red Lily (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1917), 75.   
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The Foreign Office acted rationally by acknowledging that law alone could never 
guarantee security, but in the words of one statesman, could serve as “an obstacle 
rather than a barrier.”   
Arms limitation presents a unique case study, highlighting an effective role 
for law in strengthening national security.  Unlike prior studies of arms limitation, 
the focus here is squarely upon rational state interest, rather than popular pacifist 
movements or other non-state actors.  While nineteenth-century academic legal 
writing provided much of the basic source material, these writers often served as 
government legal advisors, writing from practical experience.  Moreover, the Foreign 
Office regularly quoted these scholarly works as authoritative statements of 
international law, and founded British negotiating positions upon these doctrines.   
As the emphasis will be on British interests in arms limitation, the primary 
emphasis will be on naval rather than land armaments.  Several scholars in the past 
decade have studied the European land arms races, including David Stevenson and 
David Herrman.  Stevenson’s work Armaments and the Coming of War:  1904-1914 
provided limited coverage of international legal issues relating to arms control and 
discussed the 1907 Hague Conference, but retained a focus on the continental land 
armaments race.5  Herrman also exclusively covered the land arms race and did not 
concentrate on arms control.6  Jonathan Grant’s Rulers, Guns, and Money:  The 
Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism should also be mentioned.  Grant 
shifted away from the core European great power competition to the Balkan, South 
American, and Russo-Japanese arms races, tracing the manner in which imperialism 
and technology diffusion contributed to these races.7  However, Grant did not detail 
the use of international law in these cases, with only occasional references to treaties 
such as the one resolving the Argentine-Chilean arms race in1902.8   
 
International Law and Arms Control in the Pre-War Era 
 
International law and arms control efforts assume only a subsidiary role in 
most diplomatic and naval histories of the 1899-1914 era.  The main accounts 
                                                 
5 David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War:  Europe 1904-1914, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 105-11, 417.   
6 David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
7 Jonathan A. Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money:  The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 6. 
8 Id., 133-34. 
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usually mention the attempts to limit armaments at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, 
noting the utopian and impractical nature of the schemes.  No author writing on the 
Anglo-German naval arms race has treated the efforts in depth.  In earlier histories, 
this may be in part due to a lack of source material, while later historians have tended 
to relegate international legal negotiations to specialist works devoted to the topic of 
legal history.  The result is a gap in the literature:  Legal histories offer little coverage 
of arms control, and histories of the arms race provide limited space to discussions of 
international law.   
 General accounts of the Anglo-German naval arms race by E. L. Woodward 
and Arthur Marder mentioned the Hague Conferences, but provided little discussion 
of international law.  Woodward was the first to utilize the diplomatic record in 
British Documents on the Origins of the War and Die Grosse Politik series, in his 
Great Britain and the German Navy, published in 1935.9  The chapters in his 
narrative largely paralleled the volumes of Gooch and Temperley, indicating a heavy 
reliance upon one source.  He stressed the inadvertent nature of Anglo-German 
conflict, providing a fatalistic account of efforts to halt the race.  Because of both 
British and German misunderstandings, the Second Hague Peace Conference failed 
to restrain the burgeoning arms race.10  Woodward extensively discussed subsequent 
Anglo-German negotiations, but did not detail the legal efforts.  In discussing this 
conference, he made no mention of the course of negotiations on arms control, 
finding the initiative doomed from the outset, and of little importance to his central 
account of Anglo-German naval rivalry.11   
 Marder used unique access to Admiralty records to produce his history of 
Anglo-German naval rivalry, providing a counterpoint to Woodward.  While Marder 
wrote from Admiralty documents and drew little from the Foreign Office record, 
Woodward utilized published Foreign Office documents while lacking access to 
Admiralty papers.  Neither author had the full record at their disposal when writing 
their accounts.  Marder published several volumes on British naval policy, including 
The Anatomy of British Sea Power, which covered events between 1880 and 1905, 
and the five-volume successor work on British policy from 1905 through 1919, From 
                                                 
9 E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1964).   
10 Id., 5.   
11 Id., 134.   
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the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow.12  While the second series detailed the Anglo-
German arms race in Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, its predecessor 
provided greater information on the nature of naval armaments in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, explaining more fully the arms race phenomenon.  In 
his work, the author stressed the likelihood of war given the characteristics of 
international politics at the time.13   
Marder mentioned international law, discussing the effectiveness of law in 
times of war and the lack of enforcement mechanisms, but his account was limited 
by a lack of understanding of law.  Like many, his conception of international law 
focused on the creation of utopian institutions while ignoring practical forms of legal 
regulation.  While he discussed the Hague Conferences, Marder placed the efforts at 
legally managing the arms race in the context of an inexorable slide toward war, 
chronicling them alongside other futile initiatives.   
 General histories of international law have devoted little space to arms 
limitation.  However, such works often develop larger themes and explore trends 
evolving over centuries, making it difficult to focus upon discrete topics.  Wilhelm 
Grewe Arthur Nussbaum provided standard accounts, tracing the history of 
international law back to the Middle Ages in Grewe’s Epochs of International Law, 
and back to antiquity in Nussbaum’s History of International Law.14  Both works 
were targeted towards international lawyers, and assumed a familiarity with key 
concepts of law while providing evidence of trends and chronology.  Both authors 
discussed the role of the Hague Peace Conferences in the evolution of international 
law, with the creation of international institutions and the formalization of a regular 
global forum for discussing legal issues, yet neither focused upon armaments.   
 The Hague Peace Conferences have received the greatest coverage of any 
international legal topic of the era, due to their ambitious scale and agenda, as well as 
the hopes they engendered.  The conferences included nearly all recognized nations 
of the world, making them a de facto world congress.  Delegations at the conferences 
were drawn from the highest circles of military and diplomatic affairs, with 
                                                 
12 Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power; Arthur J Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa 
Flow, 3rd Edition ed., Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1972):  Volume 1, 1904-14:  The 
Road to War.   
13 Marder, Dreadnought:  Volume 1, 1904-14:  The Road to War, (1961) viii, 5.   
14 Wilhelm G.  Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, trans. Michael Byers (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2000); Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan 
Co., 1947).   
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numerous international lawyers in attendance.  These delegates prepared the first 
generation of histories of the conferences, some autobiographical in nature, others 
recitations of the conference proceedings, interspersed with commentary.  The works 
of Joseph Choate, Andrew D. White, Karl von Stengel, Frederick W. Holls, and 
James Brown Scott fall into this category.15  Even Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan 
published an account of his experiences with disarmament at the Hague, giving a 
military perspective on the value of law in wartime.16  James Brown Scott and A. 
Pearce Higgins provided more thorough accounts, producing massive books on the 
negotiations, with Scott translating multiple volumes of the conference travaux into 
English.17   
While most of the works by international lawyers expressed cautious 
optimism about the pre-war development of law, a distinct minority utterly opposed 
arms limitation.  Besides Mahan, German delegate Karl von Stengel wrote two 
scathing accounts of the dangers of disarming in the midst of potential enemies.18  
However, the support of German international lawyers for the Hague project even 
surpassed their Anglo-American colleagues, with Walter Schücking and Hans 
Wehberg expressing unreserved confidence in law.19  Schücking championed the 
cause of “progressive codification of international law” through regular conferences 
like those at the Hague, while Wehberg prepared the most extensive account of arms 
                                                 
15 Joseph Choate, The Two Hague Conferences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 
Frederick W. Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague and Its Bearing on International Law and 
Policy (London: Macmillan and Co., 1900), James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 
1899 and 1907:  A Series of Lectures Delivered before the Johns Hopkins University in the Year 1908, 
2 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), Karl von Stengel, Weltstaat Und 
Friedensproblem (Berlin: Verlag Reichl, 1909). Andrew Dickson White, The First Hague Conference 
(Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1912).  The accounts of Holls and Choate also tended toward self-
congratulation, exaggerating their roles in crafting compromises.   
16 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration:  Or, The Place of Force in the International 
Relations of States (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1912).   
17 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907; James Brown Scott, ed., The Proceedings 
of the Hague Peace Conferences:  Translation of the Original Texts:  Conference of 1899 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1920); A. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences and Other 
International Conferences Concerning the Laws and Usages of War:  Texts of Conventions with 
Commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909).   
18 Stengel, Weltstaat Und Friedensproblem, 134-37.  See also Karl von Stengel, Der Ewige Friede 
(Munich: Carl Haushalter, 1899).   
19 Walther Schücking, The International Union of the Hague Conferences, trans. Charles G. Fenwick 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918); Hans Wehberg, Die Internationale Beschränkung Der Rüstungen 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1919).  Works by non-lawyer Alfred H. Fried, a noted peace 
activist, should also be included in the discussion of the conferences.  Alfred H. Fried, Die Zweite 
Haager Konferenz:  Ihre Arbeiten, Ihre Ergebnisse, Und Ihre Bedeutung (Leipzig: B. Elischer 
Nachfolger, 1908).   
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limitation prior to 1914.20  While these works reflected a range of opinion, they 
generally failed to reflect state interest in international law.   
 Merze Tate wrote one of the first overall accounts of the pre-war arms 
limitation movement, in her 1942 work, The Disarmament Illusion.21  Utilizing 
published diplomatic records, she assessed the state role in the disarmament 
movement while also addressing the contributions of lawyers, public opinion, and 
pacifists.  Tate’s book, appearing during the Second World War, reflected 
contemporary pessimism about arms limitation.   She deemed armaments to be 
inextricably linked to political disputes, rendering arms control impossible without 
resolving the underlying tensions.22  While broader than earlier works on arms 
limitation, her work extended only through the 1907 Second Hague Conference, and 
failed to mention significant successes, such as the 1902 Argentine-Chilean Naval 
Arms Treaty.  Moreover, the published diplomatic record she utilized was 
insufficient, leaving out key discussions and providing an incomplete view of 
negotiations.  Finally, while Tate discussed academic legal writing on disarmament, 
her work displayed no real familiarity with state practice of international law.  As 
with other works, her view of international law remained heavily influenced by 
grandiose projects for powerful institutions associated with disarmament, obscuring 
the more mundane diplomatic practices which made law workable.23   
 Since the 1940s, two authors have written extensively on the Hague 
Conferences.  The first, Calvin Davis has written the definitive accounts of 
America’s role, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference, and The 
United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference.24  Davis sketched a broad 
overall account of the conferences, including the pre-conference diplomacy, the 
personalities at the Hague, and on the social aspects of the gatherings.  His opinion of 
international law evolved between the publication of his first and his second book, 
moving from a negative judgment of the 1899 conference to viewing it as a first step 
                                                 
20 Wehberg, Die Internationale Beschränkung Der Rüstungen; Hans Wehberg, The Limitation of 
Armaments:  A Collection of the Projects Proposed for the Solution of the Problem, Preceded by an 
Historical Introduction, trans. Edwin  H. Zeydel (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1921).   
21 Tate, The Disarmament Illusion.   
22 Id., 346.   
23 Id., 347.   
24 Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1962); Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the Second 
Hague Peace Conference:  American Diplomacy and International Organization 1899-1914 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1975).   
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in the evolution of international law and a long-term effort to halt the arms race.25  
But armaments remained a minor part of the accounts, garnering only fourteen pages 
of his 1899 study, and a meager five pages in his 1907 conference work.26  The 
second author, Jost Dülffer provided greater detail of European diplomacy 
surrounding the conferences in his Regeln gegen den Krieg?  Die Haager 
Friedenskonferenzen von 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik.27  His 
discussion of armaments was minor, with a few sections detailing the declarations 
issued at the Hague.  While he utilized Foreign Office records, Cabinet, Admiralty, 
and Colonial Office papers were not discussed.  Thus his account lacked the inter-
departmental deliberations that determined the character of British participation at 
the conferences.   
 More recently, essays by Andre T. Sidorowicz and Keith Neilson, in Arms 
Limitation and Disarmament:  Restraints on War, 1899-1939, have traced efforts at 
arms control at the Hague in 1907.  Sidorowicz placed British efforts at arms control 
at the Hague in the context of Liberal campaign promises of reductions, finding the 
effort significant as the first direct attempt at limiting Anglo-German naval rivalry.28  
Keith Neilson continued the account in the same volume, discussing the role played 
by maritime rights in British arms control discussions at the time of the Second 
Hague Peace Conference.29  Both authors utilized the most recent thinking on British 
naval policy, and drew upon relevant British archival sources.  Their works have far 
more fully explored British policy-making than earlier accounts of the Hague 
Conferences, although their works were confined to the 1907 Conference.  
Moreover, international law still remained an unexplored dimension of these papers, 
neither author investigating how British diplomats hoped to integrate treaties into 
national security planning, a crucial issue when discussing the role of the Hague 
conventions in Britain’s maritime strategy.   
 
                                                 
25 Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference, vii-viii.   
26 Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference, 110-24; Davis, The United States 
and the Second Hague Peace Conference, 215-19.   
27 Jost Dülffer, Regeln Gegen Den Krieg?  Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen Von 1899 Und 1907 in 
Der Internationalen Politik (Berlin: Ullstein, 1981).   
28 Andre T. Sidorowicz, The British Government, the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, and the 
Armaments Question, in B. J. C. McKercher, ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament:  Restraints on 
War 1899-1939 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1992), 16.   
29 Keith Neilson, “The British Empire Floats on the British Navy”:  British Naval Policy, Belligerent 
Rights, and Disarmament, 1902-1909, in Id., 21.   
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A thorough study of the role of international law in arms limitation will fill a 
gap in the existing literature as well as illustrate more broadly how statesmen 
intended law to function.  In turn, the perspective of the predominant sea power on 
naval arms control will provide further insight into how law was expected to enhance 
national security in a vital strategic area.  Rather than viewing law as a hindrance to 
sea power, the Foreign Office conceived of law as a means to reinforce strategic 
advantages.  This stands in stark contrast to the attitudes of Germany, the 
preponderant land power, towards arms limitation.  Finally this study offers insights 
into effective strategies a dominant great power may take in managing the rise of 
competitors, and how law can contribute to security and stability in such a period of 
transition.   
The thesis details the British role in the evolution of naval arms control from 
1817-1914, with an emphasis on negotiations from 1899-1914.  Beginning with an 
assessment of arms control precedents in the nineteenth century and an explanation 
of how statesmen expected law to contribute to security, later chapters will build 
upon this foundation while reevaluating the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 
1907, as well as subsequent Anglo-German negotiations.  What will emerge 
throughout is the employment of law as an element of a larger national security 
policy.  Like all elements of national security, law was incapable of independently 





CHAPTER 1:  ARMS CONTROL ANTECEDENTS IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
 
Armaments Competition and National Interest in the Nineteenth Century 
The disarmament movement seemingly broke out onto the international scene 
with the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, but in reality had a rich history of 
antecedents.  While calls for general disarmament yielded no results throughout the 
century, limited legal agreements assisted statesmen in managing specific issues.  
Grounded in security planning, nineteenth century international law provided a 
framework for developing legal norms relating to security concerns.   
 In the nineteenth century, the terminology of arms limitation remained 
rudimentary.  General disarmament referred to both advocacy of complete 
disarmament, as pacifists sought, and broad arms limitation among the great powers.  
In the modern era, this distinction is more precise.  Disarmament signifies the entire 
elimination of all defenses or an entire class of weapon, while the modern term arms 
control involves the regulation of weaponry in order to manage competition.  In the 
modern sense, disarmament is utopian, requiring a fundamental alteration in the 
nature of international relations.  In contrast, arms control assumes conflict will 
remain among states, and seeks to channel competition into less volatile and 
destabilizing weapons acquisitions.  However, early nineteenth-century authors used 
“disarmament” to cover both concepts, sometimes distinguishing between “general 
and total disarmament” and “peace footing,” with the former term corresponding to 
disarmament and the latter conforming to ideas of arms control.  The lack of 
precision in terminology often lent itself to muddled debating, and influenced 
international attempts at regulating war and peace.   
 The role of pacifists in arms limitation has been broadly explored, yet the 
often unexamined government initiatives played a larger role.  While Richard 
Cobden and the Manchester School influenced British economic policy, pacifist 
arguments held little sway over official policy.1  Motivations were often complex,2 
and genuine humanitarian concerns played a role, but the common theme in calls for 
                                                 
1 David Nicholls, “Richard Cobden and the International Peace Congress Movement, 1848-1853,” 
Journal of British Studies 30, no. 4 (1991): 367-69; Alexander Tyrrell, “Making the Millenium:  The 
Mid-Nineteenth Century Peace Movement,” Historical Journal 21, no. 1 (1978): 75 et. seq.; Tate, The 
Disarmament Illusion, 161-63.    
2 Dan L. Morrill, “Nicholas II and the Call for the First Hague Conference,” Journal of Modern 
History 46, no. 2 (1974): 313.   
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limitation was a desire to maintain the national interest.  For this same reason most 
efforts towards a general limitation failed.  Often if one monarch saw an advantage 
in disarmament, his peers often had a counter-interest in maintaining arms levels.  
Never did all the great powers simultaneously hold an interest in limitation, ending 
many of these initiatives.  Thus, in 1816, Czar Alexander I’s calls for a limitation 
gained little traction.  Prince Metternich quickly noticed that Russia posed the 
greatest potential threat to peace as its large army had not demobilized from 
Napoleonic War levels.3  When French King Louis Philippe called for a general arms 
limitation in 1832, Metternich noted that the French were more concerned with the 
economically destabilizing effects of armaments expenditures and potential army 
involvement in anti-monarchical palace intrigue than with any common European 
arms problem.4  Napoleon III made several calls for a general arms limitation 
between 1859 and 1870, also motivated by a mixture of altruism and realism.  One 
ascribed desire was to curry favor with agrarian elements in France by limiting 
military service.5  Influenced by a desire to preserve a French voice in the 
momentous changes taking place in Germany, Napoleon III coaxed Britain into 
attempting to mediate an arms limit with Prussia in 1868-1870.  Prussia naturally 
refused to limit its military while remaining the smallest of the great powers hemmed 
in by large military nations.6   
 Statesmen feared the fiscal expense of armaments more than the danger of 
war resulting from an arms race.  The concept of an arms race, including an 
understanding of the spiral dynamic that often accompanied arms competition, was 
well understood.  However, skyrocketing armaments costs appeared to be a greater 
threat to national stability, reviving lingering fears of revolution after 1815.  Military 
expenditures rose dramatically during the century, especially with the unprecedented 
leaps in technology, but state capacity to pay climbed along with the costs.  Armies 
                                                 
3 Tate, The Disarmament Illusion, 8-9.   
4 Metternich to Apponyi, Oct. 28, 1831, in Klemens von Metternich, Memoirs of Prince Metternich, 
ed. Prince Richard Metternich, trans. Gerard W.  Smith, Vol. V:  1830-1835 (London: Richard 
Bentley & Son, 1882), 111-12.  Moreover, Metternich perceived the proposed disarmament as 
asymmetrical, as the French peace-time establishment excluded the Garde Nationale while other 
states included the Landwehr as an integral party of the army, thus proportionate reduction of forces 
would leave France with a larger potential military force.  He despaired of any treaty setting fixed 
numbers. “It would be vexatious, because it would demand a reciprocal control; it would be useless, 
because such a control is impossible.”   Metternich to Apponyi, June 3, 1831, in Metternich, Memoirs 
of Prince Metternich, 113-14.   
5 Lyons to Clarendon, Jan. 30, 1870, in Lord Newton, Lord Lyons:  A Record of British Diplomacy, 
Vol. Volume I (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), 248.   
6 Bismarck to Bernstorff, Feb. 9, 1870, in Id., 263.   
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grew dramatically as the ability to supply a force in the field improved.7  The French 
Revolutionary nation in arms, and the 1860s Prussian experience with mass 
conscription, provided models for contemporary armies.  Where eighteenth-century 
armies tended to be small, highly trained peacetime forces, the nineteenth century 
witnessed a shift towards large conscript forces.  Prior to the nineteenth century, 
technological evolution was incremental and slow, but by mid-century it yielded to 
revolutionary changes, particularly in naval affairs.8
Perceptions, tied to the fear that the public might stage a tax revolt, proved 
more important than actual costs.9  Prince Metternich noted:   
[a] very large army presents a considerable danger even when maintained for 
preserving domestic order of a State, because it exhausts resources which are 
indispensable for a wise administration of the people.  This danger is 
particularly great at the present time (1816), when armies themselves are 
imbued with revolutionary ideas and given up to aspirations which cannot be 
realized without overturning the existing order of public affairs.10   
 
Similarly, at the 1831 Paris conference the delegates of France, Great Britain, 
Austria, Russia, and Prussia recognized “the purpose of strengthening the general 
peace and relieving the peoples of the burden of extraordinary armaments which 
have been imposed upon them. . .”11  However, German Colonel Gross von 
Schwarzhoff spoke for many at the Hague in 1899 when he noted “as far as Germany 
is concerned, I am able completely to reassure her friends and to relieve all well-
                                                 
7 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 99-100.   
8 Id., 101-02; William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power:  Technology, Armed Force, and Society 
since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 232, 72.   
9 In the nineteenth century, states also perceived the need for a standing army as a defense against 
domestic social unrest.  In some cases, this concern actually served as a limit on the growth of the 
military.  German authorities believed a smaller, professional army, drawn from the rural provinces, 
possessed greater loyalty and resistance to revolutionary ideals than recruits from the growing urban 
centers.  Arming the urban masses would only increase the danger of revolution.  See Holger H. 
Herwig, “Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation-State:  Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918,” in The Making of 
Strategy:  Rulers, States and War, ed. Williamson Murray (1996), 242, 48.  Industrialization of war 
raised risks that armies composed of social discontents were more likely to revolt, while 
simultaneously increasing the tax burden on the populace.  The threat of revolution was a significant 
factor to a generation of leaders who had not seen a general European war since 1815, yet had lived 
through repeated revolutions.  Excessive armaments posed a question of European survival, thus, “[i]l 
leur est indispensable de sortir, et à tout prix, de cette situation, s’ils ne veulent avec le temps devenir 
les victims des barbares de l’intérieur. . .”  [Italics in original.]  Count Kamarowski, “Quelques 
Réflexions Sur Les Armements Croissants De L'europe,” Revue de Droit International et de 
Législation Comparée 19 (1887): 481-82. 
10 Prince Metternich, Memorandum, in Documents Relating to the Program of the First Hague Peace 
Conference:  Laid before the Conference by the Netherland Government,  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1921), 5.   
11 As quoted in Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments, 9.   
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meant anxiety.  The German people is not crushed under the weight of charges and 
taxes.”12   
Richard Cobden exploited these concerns where pacifists had failed, by 
appealing to rational self-interest.  His influential theory of interdependence 
advocated gradually eliminating the need for offensive weapons, and utilizing 
cheaper means of defense.  As a corollary to Cobden’s theories, interdependence 
required a denser network of international connections.  International law supplied 
the means of framing that network, and treaties were increasingly used to regulate a 
myriad of issues incapable of unilateral resolution.  Telegraphy, weights and 
measures, postal, and patent and trademark regulation, all came under international 
treaty regulation.  The Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 provided the 
centerpiece of Cobden’s program of improving relations and ending a succession of 
naval panics.   
 International law proved an instrument facilitating a denser network of 
relationships in the nineteenth century.  The trend was pronounced from mid-century 
onwards, with the movement for the “progressive codification of international law”13 
providing the goal of integration through legal relationships.  Beyond the occasional 
initiatives for broad, general limitations of armaments, and beyond the petitions 
framed by the sporadic gatherings of the peace movements, lay a more concrete role 
for international law in managing competition in weaponry.  Statesmen had a rich 
legal and practical base from which they could craft practical agreements for limited 
purposes.   
 Great Britain played a central role in the development of arms control in the 
era.  As the largest naval power, the dominant trading nation for much of the century, 
and the possessor of extensive overseas interests, Britain had a disproportionate 
influence on the development of international law.  The Foreign Office utilized its 
predominant position to shape international law to British requirements.  A number 
of arms initiatives were stifled by British opposition, due to the larger political 
questions involved or the perceived impact upon British naval strategy.  A study of 
                                                 
12 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Vol. 1, 657.   
13 Progressive codification was the goal of standardizing legal obligations, by taking the complex 
tangle of international custom and creating a unified code, thereby reducing conflict as rules of 
international conduct would be clearly set and understood.  Hannis Taylor, A Treatise on International 
Public Law (Chicago: Callaghan and Co., 1901), v, 93-95.   
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these arms initiatives provides a broader sense of how international law meshed with 
strategic planning, and how statesmen perceived law.   
 
The Anglo-French Naval Declarations of 1787 
 
 International projects for limiting arms competitions date back into antiquity, 
but while many were rooted in utopian schemes for peace, statesmen also placed 
practical and limited regulations into agreements.  The Treaty of Utrecht included a 
ban on French fortifications at Dunkirk, to provide greater security for its Channel 
neighbor, Great Britain.14  One of the earliest agreements negotiated specifically for 
the purpose of limiting armaments dates to 1787.  These treaties between Great 
Britain and France regulated naval armaments during a crisis between the two states, 
providing an opportunity for tensions to subside while reducing mutual fears of 
attack by the other party.   
 The immediate crisis arose from an uprising in the Netherlands.  France had 
forged an alliance with the Netherlands in 1785, following a rupture in the long-term 
Anglo-Dutch relationship that occurred during the War of American Independence.  
To the British, this new alliance presented the specter of a great power controlling 
the Scheldt estuary harbors on the English Channel.  When the Netherlands was 
convulsed by revolution in the winter of 1786-1787, Great Britain and Prussia sided 
with the ruling House of Orange, against the French-supported Patriots.  In July 
1787, a Prussian expeditionary corps was formed to oust the Dutch Patriots.15  In 
response, the French formed an army at Givet, with many in the French government 
urging intervention on behalf of their Dutch ally.   
 Alongside the immediate tensions relating to the Dutch revolution, lay Anglo-
French competition in the East and West Indies.  The Dutch alliance offered the 
opportunity for attacks on British-Indian trade from bases in the Cape Colony and 
Ceylon, and coincided with a reinvigorated French trading presence in the region.16  
                                                 
14 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between France and Great Britain, signed at Utrecht, Apr. 11, 1713, 
Clive Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1969), 
Vol. 27: 482, Art IX.  In 1766, Austria proposed a ¾ reduction of standing armies to Prussia, although 
the offer met no success.  Tate, The Disarmament Illusion, 7.   
15 J H Rose et al., “The Missions of William Grenville to the Hague and Versailles in 1787,” English 
Historical Review 24, no. 94 (1909): 280-81.   
16 Munro Price, “The Dutch Affair and the Fall of the Ancien Regime, 1784-1787,” Historical Journal 
38, no. 4 (1995): 877.  Many, although by no means all, prominent French leaders preferred better 
relations with Great Britain, including the King and the new Foreign Minister Montmorin, but the 
Dutch alliance kept alive a strategic option if war did occur.  Moreover, French activity in India could 
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In the summer of 1787, tensions over the Dutch revolution fueled rumors of naval 
and military expeditions being organized by France and Britain against each other.  
These rumors variously held that their neighbor was planning an expedition to the 
Indies in anticipation of war.  The British also feared French intervention in the 
Netherlands.17   The combination of tensions over the Netherlands and the Indies 
made both France and Great Britain nervous and highly sensitive to movements of 
troops and ships.  In order to resolve the immediate crisis in Europe, the two powers 
needed greater confidence that neither would launch a pre-emptive strike on the 
other.   
 It was in these circumstances that envoy to France, William Eden, entered 
into naval disarmament negotiations with the French Foreign Minister, the Comte de 
Montmorin.  Both sides sought an agreement that would reduce the risk of attack, by 
clarifying intentions about naval movements and by limiting the number of 
commissioned ships.  One peculiar feature of the negotiations was that rather than 
focusing solely upon the number of warships built or under construction, concern 
centered upon the relative state of preparedness.  In this era, navies generally 
possessed a number of warships in mothballs, in varying states of readiness, which 
required a significant amount of time to mobilize.  British calculations focused upon 
French forces that could be made ready to go to sea in a short period of time, and 
arms control discussions emphasized preparedness, and means of verifying levels of 
warlike-preparations.  
Eden’s instructions required him to determine the number and size of ships 
“actually fit for immediate Service, the Number and Size of those now building, and 
their different Degrees of Preparation, as well as the State of the naval Magazines of 
Stores and Provisions.”18  Montmorin, in replying to this request for information in 
August, detailed not only the size of the fleet, but listed those ships that were in good 
repair, those without masts and rigging, those that were unmanned, and those that 
were being sheathed in copper in preparation for sea service.19  After a series of 
                                                                                                                                          
have taken a provocative course in reasserting French influence in the region.  See G C Bolton and B 
E Kennedy, “William Eden and the Treaty of Mauritius, 1786-7,” Historical Journal 16, no. 4 (1973): 
681-85.   
17 Eden to Marquess of Carmarthen, June 18, 1787, in Eden, FO 27/25 (May-Sep. 1787), at 64; Eden 
to Carmarthen, Aug. 2, 1787, Id., at 178; Whitehall to Eden, Aug. 10, 1787, Id., at 226.   
18 Whitehall to Eden, June 29, 1787, in FO 27/25 at 132.   
19 Eden to Carmarthen, Aug. 9, 1787, in FO 27/25, at 187.  The lack of information was endemic.  The 
British heard rumors of a large supply of salted provisions shipping out of London bound for the 
French Fleet at Brest, and could only confirm the shipment from their own capital by asking the 
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requests for clarification brought by both Britain and France, Eden offered to 
regularize the exchange of information in a declaration.20  Montmorin initially 
replied with an offer to disarm the French squadron when the British reciprocated, 
and later suggested both states limit mobilized naval forces to six warships, for the 
duration of the present crisis.21   
Eden and Montmorin finalized these negotiations in a joint declaration.  The 
British government expressed an interest in making the arrangement permanent, but 
both parties recognized the need to expressly limit its application to the “present 
circumstances” and consider the effects a permanent treaty would have on other 
naval stations.22  Naval forces were numerically limited to “l’établissement de paix,” 
active commissioned warships were limited to six ships of the line, and each party 
had to give notice prior to altering its naval preparations.23   
In September, the situation deteriorated, following Prussian military 
intervention in the Netherlands, threatened French invasion, and subsequent British 
preparations.  Throughout October, war appeared likely, until France backed down 
with some embarrassment.  The French lacked funds to initiate a major war in both 
the East Indies and the Netherlands, yet were prepared to fight if pressed.  
Montmorin expressed himself as “horrified beyond measure” with having to “keep 
pace with [British] armaments”;24 thus arms limitation appealed to France for 
financial reasons.  Great Britain, for its part, feared that France was using the lengthy 
period of negotiations to prepare its fleet for war, and sought to reaffirm the mutual 
commitment to restrict naval forces.25   
                                                                                                                                          
French.  Whitehall to Eden, Aug. 10, 1787, in FO 27/25, at 225.  Montmorin agreed that if such a 
report was true, the British could halt the shipment.  Eden to Carmarthen, Aug. 16, 1787, in FO 27/25, 
at 265-266.   
20 Eden to Carmarthen, Aug. 4, 1787, in FO 27/25, at 186.   
21 Id.; Eden to Carmarthen, Aug. 16, 1787, in FO 27/25, at 265.  France had initially mobilized six 
ships of the line in response to a British squadron organized in the summer.  Eden to Carmarthen, 
Aug. 4, 1787, id. at 187.   
22 Whitehall to Eden, Aug. 24, 1787, id. at 294.  “[D]ans la position actuelle des affaires.”  Reciprocal 
Declaration between France and Great Britain, signed at Versailles, Aug. 30, 1787, in Parry, ed., 
Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 50: 211.   
23 Id.  The “Peace Establishment” referred specifically to normal mobilized forces, later set at active 
forces as of January 1, 1787.   
24 Eden to Carmarthen, Oct. 17, 1787, in Eden & Grenville, FO 27/26 (Sep.-Dec. 1787), at 223.   
25 Whitehall to Eden, Oct. 14, 1787, id. at 208.  Moreover, the British sought to signal to Spain that 
the Dutch affair was unlikely to lead to war, in order to coax the latter state to reduce its naval 
preparations.  As in 1912, Mediterranean calculations influenced British negotiations, making bilateral 
arms control more challenging.   
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The parties negotiated a further disarmament treaty, reaffirming their 
commitment to resolve the crisis peacefully.  Given the precarious nature of French 
finances on the eve of the Revolution, Great Britain achieved nearly all its goals.  
France sought to remove Prussian armed forces from the Netherlands as part of the 
agreement, but Prussia refused, and the British disavowed any ability to bind their 
ally – signaling an Anglo-Prussian victory in the entire Dutch affair.   
 The October agreement related solely to naval armaments.  Differences in 
levels of actual peacetime preparations made a meaningful comparison of French and 
British forces difficult.  Great Britain maintained a number of “guard ships” in semi-
active status, while France had fewer ships in service, but at a higher state of 
readiness.  Montmorin expressed a desire to emulate the British system of guard 
ships, drawing objections from the Foreign Office, which viewed such measures as a 
de facto increase.26  The ultimate use of the term “le pied de l’établissement de la 
paix” was intended by Britain to reject such a possibility, with both parties agreeing 
to revert to their naval status as of the beginning of 1787.  Foreign Office instructions 
requested Eden to gain assurance that France had not intended to intervene in the 
Netherlands, nor would it seek to do so in the future, a suggestion that Eden wisely 
sidestepped as both offensive to French national honor and unlikely to provide any 
real security in a legal agreement.27  Verification might have provided a more 
effective measure, and both sides contemplated exchanging naval officers to confirm 
the state of preparedness at major ports.  However, Eden noted that it would still be 
easy to disguise many preparations, and verification provisions might only fuel 
suspicions and ill-will.  Hence the topic was quietly shelved.28   
The final agreement differed from the August declaration in consisting of a 
declaration and counter-declaration exchanged by each party simultaneously, with a 
third joint declaration between them.  The use of separate notes was common in 
contemporary negotiations, allowing each party to explain its views more fully in its 
own preamble, while retaining nearly identical wording of the binding provisions.  
British wording in the first declaration was expressly conditional (“seraient 
discontinués”) and only on receiving French assurances did the British agree that 
                                                 
26 Whitehall to Eden, Oct. 24, 1787, id. at 247-248.   
27 “I beg leave to submit that it is easier to give such a suggestion than to [execute] it: - and if it were 
practicable, which I apprehend it is not, it does not appear that it would be of any utility. – I conceive 
that no Court ever was required by another to make such a promise; and also, that if made, it would 
afford a most slender security.”  Eden to Carmarthen, Oct. 11, 1787, id. at 187.   
28 Eden to Carmarthen, Nov. 1, 1787, id. at 258.   
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armaments “seront discontinués.”29  The attention to wording and an explicit Foreign 
Office insistence on the simultaneous exchange of notes reflected a concern with 
how each party might be held to the agreement.30  Both states deemed the agreement 
to be binding, even though termed only a “Ministerial Declaration.”31   
The Anglo-French Declarations of 1787 provided a precedent for later arms 
control agreements.  In contrast to later discussions, negotiations focused on the state 
of preparations rather than on numbers of warships, although this presaged 
Churchill’s goal of reducing Anglo-German mobilized naval forces in May 1914.  
The intervening wars through 1815 and a failure to build upon this model meant that 
arms control law did not directly progress from the 1787 agreements.  However, 
these early discussions showed that the nature of the arms race was understood at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.  The process of competitive armaments was 
seen to contribute directly to “les jalousies nationales et des défenses inutiles.”32  
International agreements could relieve the situation by providing an exchange of 
information as well as verification of defense arrangements.  Finally, statesmen 
affirmed as a principle of international law that national defenses, when they 
menaced their neighbors, were a legitimate topic of regulation.   
 
Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 
 
 Another early agreement, also involving naval armaments and Great Britain, 
played a larger role in the long-term development of arms control law.  The Rush-
Bagot Agreement of 1817 regulated British and American naval forces on the Great 
Lakes, and still remains in force, the longest lasting arms control agreement, 
although modified by diplomatic notes in the twentieth century.  In its long tenure, 
this agreement has reflected the challenges of regulating naval forces and predicting 
technological evolution.  More centrally, the continued existence of this treaty, 
despite numerous initiatives to terminate it, highlights the enduring value of law in 
shaping policy.   In spite of violations and challenges to its continued effectiveness, 
                                                 
29 Reciprocal Declarations between France and Great Britain, signed at Versailles, Oct. 27, 1787, in 
Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 50: 245.     
30 Whitehall to Eden, Oct. 15, 1787, in FO 27/26, at 211.   
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32 Eden to Carmarthen, Aug. 16, 1787, in FO 27/25, at 265.   
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the existence of a treaty increased the political costs of shifting national policy 
enough to help prevent any radical change of course.   
 The treaty was part of the post-war settlement following the War of 1812.  
The conflict featured savage warfare, the burning of Washington in retaliation for 
American sacking of York, atrocities against civilians, and a state of almost 
fratricidal warfare in the Great Lakes region.33  Relations remained embittered 
following the 1814 Peace of Ghent, with the United States protesting that British 
warships still fired upon their merchants in the Great Lakes.34  The possibility of 
renewed conflict remained real.   
Both sides had built up large naval forces on the Great Lakes during the war, 
the British maintaining 28 warships, including one 74 gun and one 60 gun ship of the 
line, comparable to heavy warships on the oceans.35  The Great Lakes, as enclosed 
seas lacking navigable access to the ocean, offered a unique regulatory advantage.  In 
1815, a treaty limiting warships on the Great Lakes could not be violated by one 
party bringing in ships from the high seas, where Great Britain enjoyed an 
overwhelming naval superiority.   
Following the War of 1812, Great Britain sought to increase its naval 
armaments upon the lakes, and the Americans, fearing the expense of an arms race 
sought an agreement.  The concept of an arms race was clearly expressed in 
American correspondence, which recognized the need for an international solution.36  
Castlereagh objected initially, noting that the defense of Canada depended on forces 
being available at the start of a conflict, as the United States could out-build the 
Canadians after war had erupted.37  Moreover, the British recognized control of the 
                                                 
33 Ernest Crosby, “A Precedent for Disarmament:  A Suggestion to the Peace Conference,” North 
American Review 183, no. 6 (1906): 776.   
34 Adams to Castlereagh, Mar. 21, 1816, in Message from the President of the United States, in 
Response to Senate Resolution of April 11, 1892, Relative to the Agreement between the United 
States and Great Britain Concerning the Naval Forces to Be Maintained on the Great Lakes, Dec. 7, 
1892, S. Exec. Doc. No. 9, at 4 (1892) [hereinafter Presidential Message].   
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36 “The increase of naval armaments on one side upon the lakes, during peace, will necessitate the like 
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note 34.     
37 Adams to Monroe, Feb. 8, 1816, in Presidential Message, supra note 34.  Adams noted that this had 
been apparent during the peace negotiations at Ghent in 1814, at which point Great Britain proposed 
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Great Lakes as key to the outcome of any future conflict.38  Echoing contemporary 
legal doctrine, a British delegate at the Ghent Conference, Henry Goulburn, noted 
that the United States had no grounds to complain of British armaments if they were 
proportionate to growth of population and did not “exceed the necessity of the 
case.”39  In a reversal, early in 1816, Castlereagh accepted the American proposition 
to limit warships, in part due to peacetime budgetary constraints.  Additionally, he 
proposed the agreement move beyond a limitation of extant forces to an actual 
reduction of warships.40   
American Ambassador John Quincy Adams suggested a basic formula in 
August 1816, but the British government delayed acceptance until the spring of 
1817.41  The parties agreed to a numerical limit on warships allowed on the Great 
Lakes, with provision for one vessel on Lake Ontario, two on the upper lakes, and 
one on Lake Champlain.42  The agreement was also the first to feature both size 
limitations and armament regulation, as vessels were restricted to 100 tons, and to 
one 18 pound cannon.43  All other extant vessels were to be “dismantled” and no 
further construction would be allowed.44  The interpretation of dismantling allowed 
warships then under construction in the Great Lakes to be maintained in an 
unfinished condition for future use, which both parties did for many years, by 
building sheds over the incomplete hulls.45  At Adams’s insistence, the Rush-Bagot 
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41 Updyke, The Diplomacy of the War of 1812, 464-65.  Tensions remained so high that the Americans 
feared the British had undertaken the lengthy negotiations merely to “amuse us” while preparing for 
renewed hostilities, as they had failed to give their lead diplomat any authority to bind his country.  
Monroe to Adams, Nov. 14, 1816, in Presidential Message, supra note 34.   
42 Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and the United States Relative to Naval Forces on the 
American Lakes, signed at Washington, Apr. 28, 29, 1817, in Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series, 
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44 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement.   
45 C. P.  Stacey, “The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier 1815-1871,” American Historical Review 56, 
no. 1 (1950): 12.   
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Agreement also contained an express provision for terminating the agreement, 
requiring either party to give six months notice.46   
The agreement, initialed a year after negotiations began, took the form of a 
pair of notes exchanged by Charles Bagot, British Minister in Washington, and 
Richard Rush, Acting American Secretary of State.  The use of diplomatic notes, 
which had also been employed in the Anglo-French declarations, almost immediately 
led to confusion as to the status of the agreement within international law.  Neither 
statesman had initially been given authority to conclude a binding treaty; only “a 
provisional arrangement” had been desired, in order to alleviate an immediate 
problem without necessarily creating a long-term relationship.47  The statesmen 
sought a way of reducing the inordinate number of warships in enclosed seas, as they 
were unable to redeploy them to other stations.  A diplomatic exchange of notes 
provided an ideal method for resolving this temporary dispute, but left questions as 
to whether a long-term arrangement had been anticipated.  A year after the notes 
were signed, President Monroe suffered doubts about whether or not the agreement 
was a binding treaty, and submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent.48  The 
United States did not resolve the question of whether or not the agreement was 
binding until after the Civil War, although throughout the century the Americans 
acted in the belief that they were bound.49   
Over the course of the nineteenth century, both parties violated the 
agreement, arguing self-defense, but the relationship anchored by the treaty remained 
important enough to overlook occasional breaches and remained in force.  The 
British were the first to violate the agreement, when responding to a rebellion in 
Canada in 1838.  A group of rebels, self-styled “Canadian Patriots,” seized an island 
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in the Niagara River and used it as a base to attack and burn a British ship and to plot 
further attacks.50  As the forces authorized under the treaty were insufficient to quell 
the uprising, the British notified the American government that they would 
temporarily need to build a naval force.51   
The American government attempted to confirm if the agreement remained 
operative, and when the British failed to respond, insisted on “rigid compliance with 
the terms of the convention.”52  In addition, President Van Buren commissioned 
military forces under Major General Winfield Scott to verify British compliance.  
However, the realities of the frontier terrain prevented effective verification, as Scott 
had only five officers to spare for a task involving hundreds of miles of coastline.  
Not only did the Americans have to rely upon rumors in their final report, but one of 
the officers, a General Brady, confessed that prior to his assignment he had never 
heard of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, and that “during the border troubles he 
frequently had a piece of ordnance on board the steamboat in the employ of the 
United States,” unwittingly violating the agreement.53   
Unable to independently confirm British forces in the region, and armed with 
rumors of 500 ton British steamers plying the lakes, the American Navy built the 
Michigan, its first iron-hulled warship.  Weighing 498 tons and carrying six guns, the 
ship clearly exceeded the treaty limitations, consuming more than the total tonnage 
allowed for the squadron.54  The episode showed the challenges of regulating rapidly 
evolving naval technology.  The agreement made more sense in 1817, as warship 
design had not evolved significantly over the prior 150 years.55   By the mid-
nineteenth century, when steam power was supplanting sail, when exploding shells 
replaced solid shot, and when iron was mounted on the sides of warships in response, 
technological change became the norm.  From that time forward, the challenge of 
adequately regulating unforeseeable technological changes in a legal agreement 
provided ample opportunities for circumventing a treaty’s intention.  The ship served 
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on the Great Lakes into the 1920s without being replaced – its paddlewheels 
churning the freshwater into the age of submarines and aircraft.   
During the Civil War, the Americans also violated the agreement, on the 
basis of self-defense, following a Confederate plot to seize an American warship, 
raid prisoner of war camps on the lakes, and spread havoc.56  More significantly, the 
American Civil War altered Anglo-American relations.  As the relative power shifted 
to the United States, Americans increasingly raised objections to the treaty, while the 
British sought to retain it in order to bolster their own position.  The United States 
officially gave notice to withdraw from the treaty in 1864, but rescinded the notice 
before the end of the mandatory six month period.57   
Circumstances changed greatly between the 1860s and the 1890s.  The 
completion of the Welland Canal on the Canadian side allowed the British to 
circumvent the agreement in an emergency, by sending in ocean gunboats.58  
Moreover, America perceived a greater risk to its growing cities in the region.  In the 
early nineteenth century, the area had been wilderness, but was now populated with 
some of its richest industrial metropolises, including Chicago, Milwaukee, and 
Detroit.  The volume of trade in the Great Lakes rivaled that passing through the 
Suez Canal.59  American naval planners increasingly worried about both undefended 
trade on the Great Lakes and the risk of bombardment of undefended cities.60  The 
agreement increasingly appeared to favor British at the expense of American 
interests.  On the other hand, America’s perceptions of the dangers of its position 
were more than compensated by its ability to overwhelm Canada.  Increasingly, 
American strategic calculations centered upon the “Canadian hostage,” assuming that 
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in a future conflict the British would dominate the seas while the United States 
would conquer Canada.61   
By late century, the treaty had become more important to the British.  By the 
1890s, influential Midwestern Senators sought the termination or modification of the 
agreement for commercial reasons.  With the growth of the New Navy, American 
shipbuilding firms increasingly sought lucrative contracts, but Great Lakes steelyards 
and shipbuilders were shut out by treaty provisions forbidding the construction of 
warships.62  Secretary of State James Blaine suggested the treaty be modified to 
allow warship construction, with the finished vessels being obligated to leave the 
lakes.  The British sought to stall negotiations, fearing that modifications might lead 
to greater friction and suspicions.  The British also worried that modifications would 
allow the Americans to leave a number of warships half-built, which they could 
rapidly arm in a conflict with Canada.63  While negotiations lingered into the 1900s, 
the British ignored technical American violations and sought to maintain the 
agreement.64   
In the early 1900s, the United States sought permission to build more 
warships on the Great Lakes, on the condition that they be moved immediately to the 
ocean.  American Secretary of State Elihu Root informally renewed the discussions 
which had been undertaken sporadically since 1898.  Internal British deliberations 
focused on verification challenges presented by the proposed amendment.  By 1906, 
all American gunboats entered the Great Lakes through the Canadian-controlled 
Welland Canal.  Naval construction on the lakes would undermine this security, as 
“[n]o restrictions which would be practically enforceable could prevent the United 
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States from having large numbers of war vessels on the stocks ready to be finished 
off quickly on emergency.”65   
In response to American actions, War Office officials recommended 
terminating the agreement, initiating a Canadian Great Lakes building program, and 
funding a £20,000,000 strategic canal expansion.66  However, in joint discussions 
with the Foreign Office cooler heads prevailed.  War with the United States was not 
considered likely, but the treaty was still important.  The Admiralty had disclaimed 
any ability to defend the lakes, and the growing disparity in force reduced the 
military options available to Britain.  A strong Canadian response would only 
generate an unwanted arms race.  American ship-builders would have eagerly seized 
the opportunity to construct warships on the lakes, but lacked the political influence 
to abandon the treaty on their own.  As it was noted when the matter resurfaced in 
1912:   
any change must inevitably drag both countries into an absurd waste of 
money on ship-building:  That political pressure would be so great on both 
sides that this would be unavoidable, and that at all events the Rush-Bagot 
agreement serves as a brake, and can be produced by the United States as a 
reason for not giving way to the clamours of the shipyards on the Lakes.67   
 
This correspondence highlights the value of treaty law as an obstacle, if not 
an insurmountable barrier to conduct.   
The fact is that the agreement if not very effectual is still of some value as a 
brake on shipbuilding.  The violation of it by the U.S.A. forms the subject 
from time to time of rather foolish protests. . . – foolish because such protests 
ignore the hopeless weakness of Canada and Great Britain against the U.S.A. 
if the latter thought it worth while to put out her strength, and because they 
are practically a challenge to do so.68   
 
It was simply best to “let sleeping dogs lie.”69   
Ultimately, the British policy succeeded, as the United States chose not to 
abandon the agreement, despite British unwillingness to renegotiate.  Despite 
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repeated violations on both sides and fundamental changes in circumstances relating 
to naval technology and the strategic environment, both sides perceived an interest in 
maintaining the treaty.  Great Lakes shipbuilders did not gain the right to build 
warships for the ocean-going navy until after the First World War, as they were 
unable to generate enough support to change the law.  The violations that did occur 
were of a limited nature.  The Rush-Bagot Agreement took on a different meaning as 
the century progressed, forming the cornerstone of closer relations.  While law did 
not eliminate all violations, it stifled greater naval construction, contributing 
effectively to British imperial security.   
 
Black Sea Neutralization of 1856 
 
 The third major arms control agreement of the era again involved naval 
armaments, with Great Britain as its promoter.   The Black Sea Treaty of 1856, part 
of the settlement of the Crimean War, banned both Russia and Turkey from 
maintaining warships in the Black Sea beyond six small steam vessels of 800 tons 
weight and four smaller craft under 200 tons.70  The agreement regulated numbers of 
warships and their size, like the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, although the treaty 
did not limit their armament.  Notably, the victorious allies imposed the treaty upon 
an unwilling Russia.71  As a result, the long-term stability of this arms control regime 
rested upon a slender support.72  However, the agreement did succeed in temporarily 
stabilizing the region, the immediate goals of the British negotiators.   
 The settlement of the Crimean War, at the Paris Peace Conference, also 
included a Tripartite Guarantee Treaty protecting Turkey, a treaty neutralizing the 
Aland Islands in the Baltic, and a treaty demilitarizing the Turkish Straits, in addition 
to the general Peace of Paris.73  Britain and France had fought the Crimean War to 
contain Russian expansion, in particular the naval threat posed to Constantinople by 
                                                 
70 Convention between Russia and Turkey, limiting their Naval Force in the Black Sea, Art. II, in 
Michael Hurst, ed., Key Treaties for the Great Powers 1814-1914 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 
1972), Vol. 1, 331. [hereinafter Black Sea Neutralization Treaty].   
71 The agreement had precedents in Russian experience.  Russia had imposed similar naval limitations 
on vanquished foes in the past, forcing Persia to accept demilitarization of the Caspian Sea in the 1828 
Peace Treaty signed at Turkmanchai.  Russia also had been obliged to accept demilitarization of the 
Black Sea in 1739.  “[L]a Russie ne pourra ni sur la mer de Zabache, ni sur la mer Noire, construire & 
avoir de flotte & d’autres navires.”  Definitive Treaty of Peace between the Emperor and Turkey, 
signed at Belgrade, Sep. 18, 1739, Art. III, in Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series Vol. 35, 431.   
72 On the fate of the agreement, see next chapter.   
73 Additionally, the parties ratified the Declaration of Paris, regulating maritime warfare, discussed 
infra.  This work will refer to the agreements collectively as the Peace of Paris, unless specifically 
referring to one of the agreements.   
 30
the Russian Black Sea fleet.74  The war began with a stunning Russian victory over 
the Ottoman fleet at Sinope, in which new Russian shell-firing cannons decimated 
the wooden walls of their Turkish enemy.75  British policy throughout the ensuing 
conflict focused on countering the challenge of Russian naval expansion.  The main 
land campaign in the Crimea revolved around the siege of the primary Russian naval 
base in the region, Sevastopol, and resulted in the complete destruction of the Black 
Sea Fleet.   
As part of the peace negotiations, the British insisted upon Russian naval 
disarmament in the Black Sea, this becoming one of the points in the Austrian 
ultimatum delivered to Russia.76  By eliminating the risk of a naval landing, the 
Turkish defenders could focus on the two land routes from Russia.  Of these, the 
western route through the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had been 
neutralized by the Peace of Paris, and the victorious allies acquired a stake in 
protecting the territory as it moved towards independence in the 1860s.  The eastern 
route traversed remote mountainous territory far from the center of Ottoman power, 
preventing a rapid attack from destabilizing Turkey.  In these circumstances, Russia 
could not hope to rapidly overthrow the Ottoman Empire by a coup de main on 
Constantinople, and Turkey would be given time to strengthen its institutions and 
revitalize its position.77  While Russia lacked a naval force on the Black Sea, the 
Turks could maintain a fleet beyond the Straits in the Sea of Marmara, and could also 
call upon allied assistance if attacked.  Thus the Black Sea neutralization played a 
key part in the scheme to restore the regional balance.   
 Prior to the Paris Peace Conference, Russia had accepted a general limitation 
on its Black Sea naval forces in principle, leaving delegates at the gathering to 
resolve the details.  Russia and Turkey would be limited to maintaining light vessels 
in the Black Sea, while other powers would generally be banned from sending 
warships through the Bosphorus, neutralizing the sea.78  Moreover, Russia agreed not 
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to rebuild naval arsenals on the Black Sea.  However, the parties had not exactly 
defined either the extent of the Black Sea or what “light vessels” included.  As to the 
first issue, Russia claimed an exemption for its main surviving naval works at 
Nicolaev, thirty miles from the coast on the Bug River, arguing that if this riverside 
establishment was banned, there would be no natural limit to how far inland the 
treaty would operate.79  Moreover, Russia considered the Sea of Azov to be inland 
waters beyond the scope of the ultimatum.80  The Foreign Office sought advice from 
the Law Officers, who advised that technically, the Russians were correct.  The Sea 
of Azov, like ports up the Bug River, were not part of the Black Sea.  However, 
Palmerston seized upon their broader argument that the goal of neutralizing the 
Black Sea required regulation of all adjacent regions.  If Russia could easily bypass 
the agreement by stationing a fleet in the Sea of Azov, a treaty could not achieve its 
broader goal of neutralizing the Black Sea.81  Ultimately, Russian delegate Orlov 
pledged not to use Nicolaev as a naval base, beyond supporting the minor naval force 
allotted to Russia under the treaty, and the British let the matter rest.   
 Technical questions relating to warship regulations proved more complex, 
although Russia generally acceded to British demands.  The British negotiators 
demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of verification challenges.  Policies were 
developed in coordination with Admiralty experts, and framed around feasible 
restrictions.  The British sought to reduce naval armaments on the Black Sea to the 
minimum level necessary for police duties.  Russia continually pushed back, seeking 
as powerful a force as possible allowable under the Austrian ultimatum.  Initially, 
Russia claimed that the limitation to light vessels would allow the construction of 
frigates, the smallest vessels capable of standing in the line of battle.  Armed with a 
single deck of forty to fifty guns, a frigate was far smaller than the three decker ships 
of the line.  As a modern frigate could equal the fighting capability of an older ship 
of the line, the Foreign Office refused to accept this claim, fearing it would vitiate the 
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entire agreement if Russia maintained such a squadron.82  Russia then sought to build 
corvettes under the agreement.  Another memo went out from the Foreign Office 
explaining this type of warship to Foreign Secretary Earl of Clarendon, and noting 
that these also were far too big and powerful and did not “answer the Description of 
light vessels for the service of the Courts and for the Prevention of Piracy mentioned 
in the Austrian ultimatum.”83   
Even when the interpretation of “light vessel” had been narrowed down to a 
vessel under 50 meters in length, Russia sought other means of circumventing the 
limit.  Orlov requested a number of “hulks,” to house harbor guards.84  Traditionally, 
navies utilized older warships of the line as hulks, often removing rigging and 
making the ships stationary.  While Clarendon and French Admiral Hamelin thought 
the key issue would be ascertaining that the vessel was truly stationary and 
immobile, the Foreign Office vetoed the idea, fearing the ships could be re-converted 
into ships of the line, and would undermine the stability intended by the treaty.85   
Finally, after the tentative number of light vessels had been set at six, the 
Russians sought to augment this force with a number of military transports for 
moving troops when policing coastal areas.  Initially the Foreign Office opposed this 
demand, fearing that Russia would build large ships that could be converted into 
frigates or ships of the line,86  allowing Russia to maintain warship-building arsenals 
under the cover of transport construction.87  When Orlov and the French delegation 
agreed to an additional four small vessels for Russia, Clarendon accepted it, 
reasoning that nothing could prevent Russia from building transports under “a 
Commercial disguise.”  Britain would “run less risk by giving a formal sanction to 
800 tons more for small armed vessels than to 2000 or 3000 more tons for 
transports.”88   
Underlying much of these negotiations were concerns regarding verification.  
An international agreement was of little value if it could be easily circumvented, and 
would not increase confidence in Turkey or the West if it was perceived to be faulty.  
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Clarendon’s instructions vigorously sought to prevent future loopholes, as well as 
attempting to avoid unrealistic expectations as to what verification could accomplish.  
The instructions repeatedly referred to length, weight, and number of guns as the 
standards to be set on light vessels.  The British sought limits of 400 tons and four 
guns, on 50 meters length.  Ultimately, Admiralty advice held that weight was a 
more important characteristic than length or number of guns, which could be altered 
when needed.89  The final agreement allowed Russia and Turkey each to maintain six 
vessels of up to 800 tons and 50 meters waterline length, and four light vessels of up 
to 200 tons.90  No mention was made of allowable armament in the final text.  Length 
could be easily determined, and weight derived from a ship’s size.  These two 
components could be easily verified, and in turn would limit the power of any 
engine.  Moreover, Palmerston insisted on the presence of British consuls in Russian 
ports to verify compliance.91   
The agreement was contained in a separate bilateral treaty between Turkey 
and Russia.  However, the Treaty of Paris incorporated the regulations of the Black 
Sea Treaty, preventing either Turkey or Russia from altering its disposition without 
the consent of all the parties to the peace treaty.92  The Treaty of Paris also forbade 
the maintenance of any “Military-Maritime Arsenal,” hobbling the ability of Russia 
to rebuild a navy.93  An additional agreement prohibited Russia from maintaining 
military or naval establishments or building fortifications in the Aland Islands in the 
Baltic.94  Great Britain, despite pressure from some quarters did not push for a 
harsher disarmament in the Baltic.  A Russian Baltic Fleet was deemed necessary for 
the defense of the capital.  Additionally, the fleet had not been used aggressively, and 
more importantly, it remained intact at its fortified base.   
In 1856, negotiations indicated the importance the Foreign Office placed 
upon easily verifiable arms control terms.  Clarendon repeatedly rejected Russian 
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counter-offers in order to craft an agreement that could be verified through consular 
officials.  The painstaking deliberations provided a model for future arms control.  
The following chapter will detail the subsequent history of the Black Sea Treaty, as 
its termination posed central questions of international law, but the significance of 
the agreement in 1856 lay in this emphasis on verifiable obligations.   
 
St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 – “Explosive Missals” 
 
 The final major arms control agreement of the century differed from the other 
three by banning a specific weapon type for ostensibly humanitarian purposes.  The 
St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 banned exploding bullets from use among its 
signatory parties, preventing the new ammunition from gaining general acceptance.  
Like the Hague Peace Conference called by the Czar Nicholas II in 1898, Russian 
initiative led to the 1868 gathering.  The summit followed the precedent set by the 
Geneva Conference of 1868, an important early gathering held to codify rules 
respecting the Red Cross in wartime.  The resulting declaration was significant in 
creating a precedent for humanitarian arms control later developed at the Hague in 
1899.  Additionally, the 1868 debates at St. Petersburg highlighted differing opinions 
regarding technology and war.   
 The exploding bullet was designed to attack artillery caissons, allowing a 
sniper to hit and detonate enemy ammunition supplies on the battlefield.  Following 
the 1863 introduction of the weapon by Russia, several European nations developed 
exploding bullets in the early 1860s, including Prussia, Austria, Switzerland, and 
Bavaria.95  These bullets, fired by ordinary rifles, generally featured a hollow shell 
containing a fulminating substance designed to explode upon hitting a target.  The 
earlier version built by Russia was designed to detonate only upon hitting a hard 
substance, such as a wooden artillery case, but later versions could explode upon 
striking a soft surface, such as a human being or horse.96   
 Although designed for use against inanimate targets, the Russian government 
feared that this ammunition might end up being used against soldiers or horses.97  
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Initial Russian regulations only supplied ten of the special bullets per soldier and 
regulated their use, but concerns remained that in the heat of an engagement, a 
soldier would use them against the enemy.  The Czar called for an international ban 
on the ammunition in May 1868, and after negotiation on the scope of prohibition, 
the Russian government issued a third circular in July, calling for a conference at St. 
Petersburg.98   
 Between the issuance of three circulars and the conference held in October, 
debate focused on the breadth of the regulation.  Prussia sought a broader law-
making conference, such as the one that formulated the Declaration of Paris in 1856.  
In part, Prussia feared that a vaguely worded declaration would also forbid exploding 
artillery shells.99  The Prussian government sought to codify the general principle 
banning unnecessary injury while still allowing legitimate weapons.  This goal was 
ultimately enshrined in the Preamble to the Declaration.100  The level of attendance at 
the conference promoted progressive codification of international law as Spain was 
the only major European country not to attend.101   
 While Prussia sought a more general rule of international law, Great Britain 
resisted, fearing that such a regulation could halt technological development of 
weaponry.  While the British were not concerned specifically with exploding bullets, 
as a capital-intensive state they depended disproportionately on technical advances 
for defense and would not easily abandon their advantage. 
[W]hile the numerical force of the British army was less than that of any 
Great Power, the mechanical resources, the inventive talent and the wealth of 
England were probably not exceeded, if indeed they were equalled, by those 
of any other country:  and it followed therefore that any understanding which 
tended to limit the application of mechanical or chemical arts to war would 
                                                                                                                                          
Elements of International Law, with a Sketch of the History of the Science (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & 
Blanchard, 1836), 249-50.   
98 Mémoire, supra note 95, at 4-10.   
99 Buchanan to Stanley, July 14, 1868, in FO 83/316; Communication Prussienne, July 10, 1868, in 
FO 83/316.   
100 “Declaration of St. Petersburg, of 1868 to the Effect of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles in 
Wartime, Nov. 29, (Dec. 11) 1868,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 Supplement 
(1907): 95.[hereinafter Declaration of St. Petersburg].  Preambles generally did not contain binding 
obligations, and were used to restate general principles and motivations behind agreements, which 
could be used in interpreting the duties contained in a treaty.   
101 Protocole No. 1, Commission Militaire Internationale, Oct. 28, 1868, at 1, [for purposes of 
simplicity, Western dates will be utilized in this work except where specifically mentioned], in FO 
83/316 (1868).  As in 1899, Russian invitation policy excluded Latin America; as in 1856, the United 
States refused to participate.  Other states were allowed to adhere to the declaration, Brazil ratifying it 
in 1869.  Buchanan to Clarendon, Oct. 28, 1869, in FO 83/316.   
 36
operate, so far as it was effective, to reduce rather than to augment the 
military force of this country as compared with that of other nations.102   
 
Likewise, Sweden expressed reservations at the conference, noting that with the 
recent invention of the mitrailleuse, “qu’on ne peut pas préjuger les progrès de la 
science.”  The Swedish delegation unsuccessfully advocated that a margin be built 
into regulations “suffisante à l’esprit d’invention.”103   While this conference was 
held before the last great wave of imperialism, the British clearly had in mind the 
question of utilizing technological superiority in defending the empire, with the 
Sepoy Rebellion as a recent reminder of the risks faced by a small occupying force in 
hostile territory.   
Initially, the British refused to attend the conference, but ultimately 
participated and signed the resulting declaration.  Their decision to attend was 
influenced in no small part by the decision to make the legal obligations contained in 
the Declaration reciprocal.104  Only parties to the Declaration could claim the 
protection of its provisions, thus Europeans could utilize the weapons against non-
parties including Asian and African peoples.  Thus, a new legal norm intended for 
humanitarian purposes was effectively limited to the sphere of European 
international law, without regard to the mass of humanity outside its protection.   
The negotiations highlighted the difficulties in regulating rapidly evolving 
military technology.  Statesmen in numerous countries expressed fears that 
regulations could be framed too broadly, either preventing the adoption of new 
technology or resulting in recrimination by belligerents as to the exact nature of the 
ban.  When negotiating the text, the parties argued about whether Congreve rockets, 
mitrailleuses, or even standard explosive artillery shells would be banned by the new 
rule.105  The British government struggled to keep up to date on the technology being 
regulated.  Even the terminology proved too complicated, their correspondence 
perpetuating an unintended pun by repeatedly referring to regulations on “exploding 
missals.”106    
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Underlying these questions were concerns about national power and 
humanity.  Arguments raged as to how war could best be made more humane.  
Noting that the vast majority of casualties came from illnesses spread in camp, some 
argued that the more humane course would be to adopt weapons that made war as 
short as possible.107  Modern weapons were also seen as serving a deterrent function, 
as the horror of their use prevented states from going to war.108  A country could not 
abandon unique national advantages, including advanced technology, for abstract 
principles of humanity.  Without its technological advantages, the small British army 
would be no match for a continental foe, and would be insufficient to maintain a vast 
overseas empire.  In framing the Declaration of St. Petersburg, the British delegate 
sought to preserve national advantage.   
 
Customary Limits on Armaments 
 
Besides arms limitation agreements, international law regulated armaments 
through many other obligations.  A preoccupation with stability and security 
underlay international law in the nineteenth century.  Arms control agreements and 
many other areas of legal regulation reflected the underlying premises.  A number of 
treaties negotiated in the century developed principles of arms control, although few 
of these agreements focused specifically upon armaments.  More often, treaties 
covering a broad range of topics contained arms control provisions in a few articles.  
Mostly, these treaties included the dismantling of fortresses; occasionally they 
regulated naval forces and armies.109  The term disarmament also applied to the 
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demobilization of forces at the end of a crisis, sometimes imposed upon a vanquished 
state.110   
In addition to treaty provisions regulating armaments, international custom 
also created limits.  Statesmen justified these limits as necessary for maintaining the 
balance of power or for preventing humanitarian abuses.  States possessed the right 
to self-defense, which included the right to amass armaments and enter into 
alliances.111  At the same time, neighboring states had a right to live in security, 
which could be violated by a neighbor’s disproportionate arms increase.  While states 
theoretically possessed full liberty to arm themselves, “some modification of [the 
right] appears to flow from the equal and corresponding rights of other nations, or at 
least to be required for the sake of the general welfare and peace of the world.”112  A 
state could also voluntarily bind itself not to increase armaments.113  These legal 
rights and duties did not automatically translate into national policy, but could be the 
basis of arguments made to the international community when taking actions to limit 
foreign threats.   
States had a duty to explain extraordinary armaments increases, and 
possessed a corresponding right of self-defense in the face of such increases by 
neighbors.114  “Armaments suddenly increased to an extraordinary amount are 
calculated to alarm other nations, whose liberty they appear, more or less, according 
to the circumstances of the case, to menace.  It has been usual, therefore, to require 
and receive amicable explanations of such warlike preparations; the answer will, of 
course, much depend upon the tone and spirit of the requisition.”115  State practice 
followed theory.  In 1793, Foreign Secretary William Grenville sought explanations 
from France for its sudden increase in naval armaments, basing the right to this 
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information upon international law.116  Similarly, Palmerston warned Russia that its 
naval build-up in 1833 was causing misunderstandings, and sent a similar note to 
France in 1840.117  Again in 1855, Clarendon explained to the Russian government, 
“if it was true that Russia might keep up the force she pleased within her own limits, 
it was also true that other Powers had a right to require explanations, and upon their 
not being satisfactory to declare war.”118   
By the 1800s, legal theory recognized the community-wide nature of 
armaments competition.119  Anglo-American theorists went so far as to justify 
preemptive strikes to redress the balance of power,120 validating the earlier British 
strike on the Danish fleet at Copenhagen in 1807.  Law provided a continuum of 
responses to strategic threats from neighboring states, legitimizing actions ranging 
from arms treaties to preemptive strikes.  The balance of power underlay these 
principles of international law.121  A central goal of international law was to maintain 
the state system.  International law used this premise to justify intervention in the 
affairs of neighboring states, and to put down revolution.122  In assessing threats to 
the international balance, population and economic growth rates did not warrant 
international action, but the decision of a state to increase its armaments could be a 
justification for a military response.123   
Besides enshrining principles relating to the peacetime balance of power, 
international law regulated permissible wartime conduct.  States could also enter into 
treaty obligations that remained in force during wartime, such as the St. Petersburg 
Declaration of 1868.  Custom also provided regulations, such as the banning of 
poisons.124  International legal requirements obliging military forces to be under the 
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control and regular military discipline of the state limited the employment of levées 
en masse and colonial troops.  Although international law did not ban their 
employment, it did regulate their use.125   
International law proscribed the use of weapons deemed inhumane, although 
often initial moral disapproval faded as weapons gained acceptance.126  Law could 
evolve around a community-wide approbation of a new technology, as occurred with 
exploding bullets.  However, initial moral outrage often did not coalesce in a clear 
community-wide rule, leaving statesmen to argue whether a particular weapon was 
legitimate.  From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, a dizzying revolution in 
military technology, particularly naval technology, raised numerous questions of law.  
Torpedoes, naval mines, and rams could all rapidly sink an enemy warship, leading 
to doubts as to the legitimacy of their employment.127  Confusion in terminology as 
well as technology often marked discussions of weapons, with the rule of 1868 
regulating “explosive missals” linked to the archaic use of red hot shot at sea.128  
This particular debate was largely irrelevant as technology was moving beyond 
wooden ships which could be burned by this shot towards ironclads which could not, 
as well as away from smoothbore muzzleloaders to rifled breechloaders incapable of 
handling such ammunition.   
The principle underlying these regulations was that the means of injuring an 
enemy in warfare were not unlimited, and that a state could inflict no more harm than 
was necessary to render an enemy combatant hors de combat.  Warfare was seen not 
as a situation of total license to wreak harm, but as a vindication of rights, through a 
trial by combat.129  As a corollary, states could inflict only the harm necessary to 
bring the enemy to terms.130  International law limited the scope of warfare, in part to 
make war more humane, and in part to assist in the resumption of relations after a 
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brief, sharp conflict.  Incorporated within international law were nineteenth century 
conceptions of limited war.   
 
International Law and Security in the Nineteenth Century 
 
In addition to armaments regulations, international law affected peace and 
security in numerous other ways.  Both alliances and neutralization treaties attempted 
to increase predictability in interstate relations.  Diplomats codified the system of 
alliances in legally binding agreements, in the belief that law increased their 
effectiveness.  Neutralization treaties attempted to limit the geographical range of 
warfare, removing key territories such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the 
Greek Ionian Islands, and the Suez Canal from direct military competition.131  Often 
the great powers accompanied these treaties with military guarantees, vesting these 
states with a stake in the success of the treaty regime.   
Arbitration agreements attempted to reduce the recourse to war by providing 
a peaceful means of settling disputes.  Interest in arbitration grew dramatically over 
the century, culminating in major advances at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 
and 1907.  The Alabama claims arbitrated between Britain and the United States in 
1871 also provided a key example of the new system.  In this instance, the United 
States complained of the damages caused to American maritime trade by a 
Confederate commerce raider outfitted by a British shipyard.  Both states agreed to 
resolve the matter amicably, Gladstone’s government motivated partly by a desire to 
promote arbitration.  Undoubtedly, the government also sought to delegitimize 
commerce raiding, a form of warfare uniquely suited to undermine British maritime 
trade.  Ultimately, states rarely arbitrated claims, and most arbitration agreements 
contained exceptions for “vital interests” or national honor. 132  Direct negotiation 
remained the preferred method for peaceful dispute settlement, limiting the influence 
of arbitration.   
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The crystallization of the rules of war provided another key example of the 
role international law played in security.  Nineteenth century diplomats attempted to 
codify the customary international law of war, taking the confused tangle of 
regulations and moral proscriptions and creating a concise statement of law.  The 
Brussels Conference of 1874 was held to achieve this aim, but reflected the divisions 
among states, and the manner in which law could enshrine national interest.  
Germany and Russia, large land powers, sought to define rules of war which would 
grant an occupying power greater leeway in stamping out resistance, in response to 
experiences during the recent Franco-Prussian War.133  The smaller states vigorously 
opposed this initiative, attempting to preserve legal protections for irregular 
combatants rising up in the defense of their country.134  France, still embittered by its 
recent experience at the hands of Prussia, also opposed regulations that would 
condemn franc-tireurs.135  Fundamentally, the conference was held too soon after the 
1870-1871 war for a dispassionate discussion of the rules of war.  Great Britain 
opposed the inclusion of naval warfare within the terms of discussion, and ultimately 
doomed the declaration by refusing to ratify it.136   
The Brussels conference indicated the manner in which international law 
could be shaped to advance national interests.  This was a struggle over law, with 
states arrayed in opposing camps, on polarizing topics of conquest and survival.  The 
intensity of negotiations indicated that the laws of war mattered.  Smaller countries, 
which relied heavily upon hastily mobilized forces, could neither afford to sacrifice a 
significant part of their defenses, nor accept the alternative expenses of peacetime 
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conscription.  Britain rallied the smaller states in opposition to what it termed a 
“Code of Conquest.”137  The Russian sponsors of the project just as adamantly 
needled those “who are naturally addicted to the defensive” for their unwillingness to 
accept limits.138   
 At the conference, the regulation of armaments arose indirectly.  The Swedish 
delegation proposed an extension of the 1868 Declaration to cover soft lead bullets, 
which, unlike hard lead bullets, had a tendency to expand when hitting flesh.139  The 
resulting Declaration forbade the use of “arms, projectiles, or substances which may 
cause unnecessary suffering” and affirmed the general principle that the “laws of war 
do not allow to belligerents an unlimited power as to the choice of means of injuring 
the enemy.”140  Although the Declaration never entered force, it influenced the future 
codification of international law at the Hague in 1899, and found its way into 
numerous military manuals issued by European states.141   
 The Brussels gathering failed largely because of British influence.  Derby’s 
Foreign Office initially opposed the conference out of fear that regulations could 
limit its ability to utilize sea power, and ultimately because the rules weighed heavily 
against smaller countries, as well as countries like Britain which lacked a large army 
manned by universal conscription.  This episode illustrated not only how 
contemporary diplomats viewed the importance of international law, but also the 
extraordinary ability of the British government to shape the law to fit its strategic 
needs.  As the dominant sea power, and possessing only a small peacetime army, the 
British sought specific rules that favored the type of warfare they assumed they 
would confront in the future.   
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 The larger question remained the value of law as an instrument of policy.  A 
state could never be sure that a treaty-partner would uphold its obligations.  
International law presented both opportunities and risks, as highlighted in debates 
over the 1856 Declaration of Paris.  As many statesmen noted, no international police 
force existed to enforce obligations.  States had to defend their own rights, by 
generating international support for their position, and ultimately by force of their 
own arms.  Additionally, the existence of a treaty could lull a public into a false 
sense of security, and could be exploited by politicians to cut defenses.  The British 
government recognized this risk, weighed the benefits and disadvantages of 
agreements, and still believed that law could contribute to security.142   
In spite of uncertainties in international law, statesmen often utilized treaties 
when planning national defenses and in defusing disputes.  Great Britain proved no 
exception to this rule, and was pivotal in shaping arms control law in the nineteenth 
century.  British statesmen made conscious decisions to utilize or avoid law based on 
an assessment of national interests.  This implicitly presumed that law had some 
effect on these interests.  This in turn raises the question of what influence statesmen 




 Statesmen had a wealth of precedents in both arms limitation agreements and 
in general international law.  Law was utilized in numerous ways in shaping the 
security environment, both in peacetime and during war.  This foundation provided 
negotiators at the turn of the century with a framework when considering the 
possibility of limiting armaments by treaty.  The issues raised at the Hague in 1899 
and 1907, and later during Anglo-German naval discussions, had their precursors in 
these earlier negotiations.  While international law could play a role in defense 
policy, statesmen were acutely conscious of its limits at the same time.  Diplomats 
crafted agreements in the nineteenth century while recognizing the limits of law, and 
attempted to get the most that could be realistically hoped from treaty agreements.   
Treaty provisions had to reflect the absence of international institutions capable of 
verifying restrictions, as well as a limited public attention span that might not long 
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maintain the will to enforce obligations.  At the same time, while working within 
these confines, law was able to make a contribution to defense policy.   
Britain’s role in this development reflected an assessment of self-interest as a 
global power.  Armament agreements were used to reduce the immediate risk of 
conflict, and to defuse limited regional tensions, as in the Great Lakes and Black Sea.  
Support for arms limitation was not dogmatic, and British opposition to restrictions 
on new technology or on rules for naval warfare reflected the concerns of a naval 
power seeking to maintain a world empire with a small army.  Britain showed a 
willingness to engage the world and to shape law in a manner to reinforce British 
interests.  Yet in order to fully grasp what Britain hoped to achieve through 
international law, it is necessary to understand how international law was perceived, 






CHAPTER 2:  INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
The Declaration of London, 1871 
 
 In October 1870, as Europe was preoccupied with the Franco-Prussian War, 
Russian Foreign Minister Prince Gorchakov announced that because of violations of 
the 1856 Peace of Paris, Russia would no longer be bound by the Black Sea Treaty.  
The unilateral Russian pronouncement challenged the integrity of the international 
legal system, and threatened to add an Eastern war to the ongoing Western conflict.  
The episode that followed provided a rare glimpse into contemporary attitudes 
towards international law generally, and to issues of arms control specifically.   
 Russia immediately turned to overthrowing the Black Sea Treaty after 1856, 
viewing the imposed disarmament much as Germany would perceive the Versailles 
Treaty after 1919.  The treaty limited Russia and Turkey to six warships up to 800 
tons each and four light vessels of up to 200 tons on the Black Sea, further 
prohibiting the maintenance of naval arsenals.  Russia gained French diplomatic 
support for a revision in 1859, in return for Russian military assistance against the 
Austrian Empire.  However, Napoleon III only offered vague support at a future 
conference, ending the initiative.  The resulting Franco-Russian treaty contained a 
nonspecific obligation, “[l]es Hautes Parties Contractantes s’entendront sur les 
modifications aux traités existants à faire prévaloir en commun, dans l’intérêt de 
leurs Empires, lors du règlement de la paix.”1   
 During the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, Russia prepared a circular ending 
the treaty, but the rapid conclusion of the war preempted Russian plans. 2  Four years 
later, the Franco-Prussian War presented a more opportune moment.  The war 
incapacitated one of the key guarantors of the Peace of Paris, France, at a time when 
Austria-Hungary appeared preoccupied with domestic affairs.  Gorchakov 
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brandished the same circular he had prepared in 1866, announcing the unilateral 
repudiation of the Black Sea Treaty.3   
 The Russian Circular of October 1870 claimed violation of the neutralized 
sea by whole squadrons of warships, undermining Russian security in the region, and 
noted “the advent of ironclads constituted a change in circumstances unforeseen in 
1856.” 4  Foreign Secretary Lord Granville disputed the Russian factual claims, but 
focused on the challenge to the international legal system posed by the unilateral 
abrogation of a treaty:   
Yet it is quite evident that the effect of such doctrine, and of any proceeding 
which, with or without avowal, is founded upon it, is to bring the entire 
authority and efficacy of Treaties under the discretionary control of each one 
of the Powers who have signed them; the result of which would be the entire 
destruction of Treaties in their essence.  For whereas their object is to bind 
Powers to one another, and for this purpose each one of the parties surrenders 
a portion of its free agency, by the doctrine and proceeding now in question, 
one of the parties in its separate and individual capacity brings back the entire 
subject into its own control, and remains bound only to itself.5   
 
 The unilateral Russian action threatened to undermine the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda, the concept that nations must honor their treaty obligations.  This 
implicit principle of good faith underlay all treaties, forming a cornerstone of the 
legal system.  On the other hand, rebus sic stantibus, or the doctrine of changed 
circumstances, allowed abrogation of agreements when conditions had materially 
altered in an unforeseeable manner.  This latter doctrine stood in an uneasy 
relationship with nineteenth century international law, challenging the orderly 
revision of treaties. 6   
The resulting crisis threatened war, pitting Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, 
Italy, and Turkey against Russia.7  Prussia could not afford to alienate Russia during 
the Franco-Prussian War, and was expected to side with Russia, expanding a western 
conflict into an eastern one.  Granville feared crystallizing the division of Europe 
                                                 
3 W. E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855-1871:  The Story of a Peace Settlement 
(London: Macmillan & Co., 1963), 161-62. 
4 Oct. 19/31 1870 Gortschakow’s Telegram Ending the Neutralization of the Black Sea, in Wilhelm G. 
Grewe, ed., Fontes Historiae Iuris Gentium:  Sources Relating to the History of the Law of Nations, 3 
vols., Vol. 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 473.  However, as the earliest ironclads had been 
tested by French forces in the Crimea, their development was not entirely unforeseen 
5 Granville to Buchanan, Nov. 10, 1870, in Correspondence respecting the Treaty of March 30, 1856, 
FO 881/1901 (Nov. 1870-Feb. 1871).   
6 See David J. Bederman, “The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View 
of the Law of Nations,” American Journal of International Law 82, no. 1 (1988): 8.   
7 Bloomfield to Granville, Nov. 24, 1870, in FO 881/1901; Paget to Granville, Nov. 19, 1870, in FO 
881/1901.   
 48
into two camps, and sought a diplomatic solution.  At Bismarck’s suggestion, the 
powers met at London to defuse the situation in January 1871.  The London 
Conference side-stepped the Russian Circular, reaffirmed the principle that treaties 
could only be altered by mutual consent of all the parties in the Declaration of 
London, then jointly confirmed the end of the Black Sea neutralization.   
In the wake of the conference, Parliament assembled to discuss the 
embarrassing episode, revealing contrasting expectations for the international legal 
system.  Many observers believed the conference had only papered over a Russian 
breach of international law, leading to two critiques.  The first critique decried the 
weakness of the international legal system, as no international body existed which 
could enforce a treaty.8  Radical liberals, and even Gladstone, sought international 
tribunals with ability to enforce judgments.  The second view decried national failure 
to uphold a treaty obligation.  Liberals like Sir Charles Dilke called for robust 
national enforcement, by war if necessary, while Conservatives sought to scale down 
national obligations, summed up by Lord Salisbury:  “if they will not adapt their 
promises to their powers, or their powers to their promises, I foresee a time of 
terrible humiliation to this country which may shake our institutions to their 
centres.”9  Two contrasting views of the international legal system emerged, one 
focusing upon powerful international institutions and the other upon national 
enforcement.   
Diplomatic historians decried the result as a “fiction” and a “sop to the British 
public in exchange for abandonment of the Black Sea clauses.”10  In contrast, 
international lawyers have had less difficulty with the episode, recognizing the need 
to modify treaties and viewing the era overall as one of “contractual fidelity.” 11  This 
view was best expressed by Philip Muntz in the House of Commons in 1871.  Muntz 
acknowledged that the government never intended the agreement to be permanent.  
On the contrary, “if they looked into the history of such treaties, they would find that 
like piecrust, they were made to be broken, and always had been broken when 
opportunities presented themselves.”12   
                                                 
8 Sir Charles Dilke, Hansard 3rd ser., CCV, 901, 915, Mar. 30, 1871; Somerset Beaumont, id at 917.   
9 Marquess of Salisbury, Hansard 3rd ser., CCIV, 1367, Mar. 6, 1871.  Radical Liberals also followed 
this logic, but advocated a more isolationist policy, avoiding any treaty obligations.   
10 Baumgart, Peace of Paris 1856, 194; Mosse, Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 182.   
11 Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, 514-15.  Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of 
Nations, 198-99; Bederman, “1871 London Declaration,” 39-40.   
12 Muntz, Hansard 3rd ser., CCV, 927, Mar. 30, 1871.   
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Palmerston, like most British negotiators, did not expect these provisions to 
last more than ten years.13  The treaty was designed to accomplish its goals within 
that timeframe.  Turkey gained breathing space to undertake internal reforms, while 
halting Russian ability to project force in the region for a more extensive period.  In 
fact, the treaty lasted fifteen years.  During these fifteen years, Russian maritime 
industries received no contracts, skilled workmen sought other employment, and new 
workers were not trained.  At this point, the Russian naval industries had withered 
away and had to be cultivated from scratch.  Russia could not begin the process of 
regenerating the maritime industries until after 1871.  Russia required another decade 
to fully recover and begin the lengthy process of building major warships.14   
Six years after ending the treaty, Russia could not even build small craft in 
the Black Sea, and sought British-built torpedo boats for its Black Sea fleet, 
specifying that these vessels needed to be capable of railroad shipment.15  The first 
coastal ironclads had to be built in the Baltic, shipped in sections by train, and 
reassembled in the Black Sea.  Russia did not complete its first sea-going battleship 
in the Black Sea until 1889, and did not possess an ironclad squadron until 1894. 16  
Only at this juncture did Britain’s anxieties about its position in the Mediterranean 
reemerge.17  Had Russia utilized its fledgling maritime industries in the Black Sea to 
begin reconstruction of its fleet in 1856, it might have directly resumed its position.  
The maritime industries left to wither took more than a decade to recover.   
Russia consistently sought to overturn the diktat over the fourteen years 
following 1856.  But the treaty created obstacles to Russian policy making, too great 
even for an autocracy to overcome.  Law had a major effect in preventing a great 
land power from unshackling itself from an extraordinarily unpopular treaty.  Russia 
abrogated the agreement only when Europe was preoccupied with the Franco-
Prussian War.  Russia’s reluctance to rebuild its fleet did not arise solely from the 
threat of great power intervention, as great power interests shifted in the years 
                                                 
13 Lord Granville, Hansard 3rd ser., CCIV, 246-247, Feb. 14, 1871.   
14 Roger Parkinson, The Late Victorian Navy:  The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First 
World War (Chippenham, United Kingdom: Boydell Press, 2008), 51.  On the complexity of maritime 
industries and industrial dependency on government orders, see Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea 
Power, 37-42.   
15 Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 93.   
16 Gardiner, Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, 177, 78.   
17 The relative Russian naval ascendancy in the region was due as much to Turkish disinterest in 
maintaining its fleet after 1876 as to Russian efforts to bolter its fleet.  Grant, Rulers, Guns, and 
Money, 80-81. 
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following the 1856 peace.  Of the three powers enforcing the obligations on Russia, 
two of them, Austria and France, were at war with one another by 1859 and were 
willing to sacrifice the agreement in order to gain Russian support.  The existence of 
the agreement in itself created an obstacle in altering policy.  Once an agreement had 
been ratified, diplomacy tended towards inertia – states consciously had to decide to 
alter course, accepting the repercussions of removing the treaty.  Hence, diplomats 
needed to uphold the fiction that treaties could only be altered by consent, as 
credence in the fiction created a real obstacle to state action.   
The Black Sea Treaty was a British success.  It was nearly forty years before 
Russia posed a naval challenge in the Black Sea, for the first fifteen years directly 
because of the treaty restrictions, and the following twenty odd years because of the 
lack of maritime industries resulting from the treaty.  While Britain and Russia 
continued to spar throughout Central Asia and the Far East, the treaty prevented a 
direct Russian maritime challenge until the 1890s, and then only in conjunction with 
France.  While the Black Sea Treaty was unilaterally breached by Russia in 1870, 
with some diplomatic discomfort to the British government, Russian Black Sea 
maritime development had been halted for most of the remaining years of the 
nineteenth century.   
A simplistic assessment of international law might view this agreement as an 
abject failure.  But the fate of the agreement was less important than its influence, 
and this treaty substantially furthered British interests.  A more sophisticated 
understanding of international law, as held by Palmerston when creating this treaty, 
would see the long-term security benefit it conferred.  The ultimate value of any 
agreement, and of international law more generally, lies in shaping behavior into 
paths that allow states to predict and plan their policy.   
In 1870, the continued validity of the international legal system was at stake.  
Following two decades of upheaval, the post-Napoleonic Vienna settlement, based 
on an orderly change of treaties, had been forcibly dismantled.  International law 
remained as it had always been, a thin social system capable of channeling behavior, 
but incapable of controlling it.   The 1871 Treaty of London was a fiction in as much 
as all law is a fiction; that is, its strength depended upon the context in which it was 
invoked.  Nonetheless, both this affirmation of pacta sunt servanda and the Black 
Sea Treaty played an important role in shaping conduct and setting expectations.  
The painstaking negotiations involved in codifying this rule at the London 
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Conference indicated that significance lay behind these words.  Law was more than 
diplomatic formality.   
This extraordinary episode raises questions regarding the meaning of 
international law in the nineteenth century.  Historians and lawyers have reached 
different conclusions about the Black Sea crisis, reflecting a lack of common 
appreciation of legal concepts.  Ideas such as the binding nature of treaties, 
enforcement of legal obligations, and even sovereign equality of states have both a 
commonplace and technical meaning.  In order to properly assess foreign policy in 
the era, the historian must fully comprehend how these concepts were understood by 
nineteenth-century diplomats, and more broadly, the nature of international law as 
practiced by states.   
 
Introduction 
Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavours to tell a piece of it must 
feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web.18   
 
International law has always been more than its critics have alleged and less 
than its champions have hoped.  As an institution of interstate relations, law has 
influenced state conduct, without ever fully constraining independent action.  While 
international law has not fully fettered sovereignty, it has changed the cost structure 
of individual diplomatic choices, channeled activities in both war and peace into 
commonly accepted paths, and arguably has helped shape national interests.  The 
role played by international law needs to be understood in order to evaluate the 
manner in which statesmen have sought to incorporate it into security planning.   
Law was most effective when it coincided with national interest and with 
power.  In the 1871 parliamentary debates after the London Conference, statesmen 
advocated two solutions to the perceived failings of law, calling either for stronger 
international institutions or more robust national enforcement – making obligations 
match British means, to paraphrase Salisbury.  Britain chose to craft treaties that 
matched national enforcement capabilities, undertaking obligations that could be 
upheld, signaling a pragmatic stance rather than a utopian view of law.   
 The focus will be on international law as it was practiced in the nineteenth 
century.  State practice largely revolved around treaties and custom, interpreted by 
                                                 
18 F. W. Maitland, “A Prologue to a History of English Law,” Law Quarterly Review 14, no. 53 
(1898): 13.   
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states and enforced through self-help.  Law served as a universal grammar for 
resolving disputes, by providing an understood system for raising claims, and 
functioned entirely through existing diplomatic practices.  Non-lawyers often harbor 
misconceptions about international law, portraying it as a set of utopian schemes of 
world government, or as vague principles of morality lacking effective sanction.  
While many lawyers and diplomats had grander aspirations for law, calling for the 
creation of powerful international institutions, 19 day-to-day diplomacy functioned in 
their absence.  International law reflected power relations as much as it included 
moral aspirations.   
This is not to suggest that statesmen always had a firm grasp of the law when 
wielding it.  Nor should it be assumed all administrations followed the same 
approach.  A drive for international organization played a more prominent role in 
some administrations, such as Gladstone’s, than in others, such as Salisbury’s.  
However, even the latter statesman exploited international law in advancing national 
goals.  Statesmen of both parties worked within the existing system, utilizing law as 
a tool of diplomacy in meeting national interests.   
 The practice of international law involved the advocacy of legal rights as 
specified in treaties and custom, through a range of legitimate state enforcement 
actions.  Despite paltry legal institutions, law as a policy-maker’s tool served key 
functions.  The importance attached to legal obligations made violations more costly, 
reducing the likelihood of breaches.  By reducing the chances of unacceptable 
conduct, law could increase predictability in international affairs, assisting states in 
long-term planning.   
 This chapter will detail the legal system, starting with the relationship 
between national and international law, then detailing the sources of legal obligation.  
The chapter will address central themes within international law, exploring whether 
                                                 
19 See Schücking, The International Union of the Hague Conferences. on the goal of world federation; 
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1832). on lack of 
effective sanction in international law.  Martti Koskenniemi described the reformist element in 
nineteenth-century international law, epitomized by the early history of the Institute of International 
Law.  See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations:  The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 91.  This branch of legal scholarship 
was driven by a goal of reforming international society, and its accounts of international law focused 
upon what law might become rather than what statesmen perceived it to actually be.  Often critical of 
older generations of legal scholarship, with their descriptive accounts of extant legal relationships, 
primarily expressed through treaties negotiated out of expediency rather than universal principles, the 
reformers sought an international legal system based firmly upon concepts of interdependence.   
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legal obligations added weight to agreements, assessing the functions of law, and 
exploring the ultimate question of enforcement.   
International law was not static.  For instance, law evolved over the course of 
the century to legitimize a broader great power role in maintaining the balance of 
power.  Law also changed with the movement for progressive codification in the last 
third of the century, and through the creation of broader treaty networks regulating a 
growing myriad of topics.  But the utilization of law in meeting state goals remained 
a constant.   
While statesmen often sought powerful international institutions to make 
relations more orderly, it remained another question if such institutions would merely 
mirror the power structure in the world at large, or whether it could truly make great 
power behavior more law-like.  Ultimately, statesmen lacked the luxury of waiting 
for such utopias, yet could cope manageably within the existing system.  The failure 
of arms control prior to 1914 cannot be attributed to a lack of developed legal 
institutions.  Law provided a comprehensive structure for ordering state behavior, 
and by and large statesmen knew it.   
 
Topics, Sources, and Themes 
 
 To begin, international law must be understood within the context of the 
nineteenth century legal system.  International legal theory varied from country to 
country, but core principles remained universally accepted.  International law was 
embodied in standard forms, largely through treaties and custom.  To make sense of 
the unwritten custom, states accorded great weight to compilations by leading 
scholars, many of whom were governmental advisors writing from experience.  
These treaties and customs, and what statesmen expected from them, must be 
explored.  It also needs to be determined if legal obligations added anything to 
international agreements, and whether statesmen perceived international law as an 
actual legal system.   
International law evolved as a distinct category of legal education in the 
nineteenth century.  Prior to mid-century, legal studies had often been undertaken on 
an ad hoc basis, as more of an apprenticeship than a modern course of study.  Within 
universities, the era witnessed a shift from teaching international law within 
philosophy faculties to law faculties.  Older chairs in the Law of Nature and of 
Nations in philosophy departments were replaced by chairs in International Law in 
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law departments.20  The process was gradual, with the first British chairs in 
international law being occupied at Oxford in 1859, and Cambridge in 1866.  
Germany, despite its rich tradition of legal education, did not follow suit until after 
1900.21 Russia also joined late, having only one major scholarly work translated into 
Russian prior to 1880.22   
 
International and Domestic Law 
International law possessed no single standard regarding how states should 
incorporate international legal obligations into domestic law.  Each state determined 
how international law fitted within its domestic legal structure in a manner reflecting 
its unique historical experiences.  However, there were broad cross-border trends 
within international law, and leading scholars influenced the development of theory 
beyond their home states.  International law in the nineteenth century was largely a 
European phenomenon, although the addition of states in the Americas led to the 
gradual broadening of the legal community.   The evolution of terminology from 
“European public law” to “general international law” reflected this change, as did the 
shift from “Christian states” as mentioned in treaties in the early part of the century 
to “civilized states” in the second half.  The 1856 Treaty of Paris constituted a 
milestone by incorporating the non-Christian Ottoman Empire into the legal 
community.   
 Within this system of international law, continental and Anglo-American 
schools existed, mirroring their domestic civil and common law systems 
respectively.  At the turn of the century, government-sanctioned German legal 
theorists placed international law below domestic law, stressing the limits of 
international law, and allowing national sovereignty to trump treaty obligations.23  
The United States held its constitution as the supreme law of the land, above Acts of 
Congress and treaties.24  British statesmen occasionally argued that their unwritten 
                                                 
20 Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 237.   
21 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 33, 209.   
22 Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 231-32.   
23 See generally Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 210-11.  Most legal theories implicitly 
acknowledged this reservation, see, e.g. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. V, 221.  
However, few theorists emphasized this reservation over the general rule.   
24 U. S. Const. Art. 6.  Moreover, in the nineteenth century, the United States government argued that 
its constitution prevented it from contracting binding alliances, as treaties were ratified solely by the 
Senate, but Article I of the Constitution placed the power to declare war in the hands of both houses of 
Congress.  See Christopher H. D. Howard, Britain and the Casus Belli, 1822-1902:  A Study of 
Britain's International Position from Canning to Salisbury (London: Athlone Press, 1974), 128.   
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constitution prevented them from accepting binding alliance obligations, as ratified 
agreements would illegally bind future governments, although this rationale was only 
utilized sporadically and did not prevent Great Britain from contracting numerous 
treaty obligations, all of which bound future governments.25  Moreover even when 
raised, this argument was associated with treaties of alliance, rather than the myriad 
range of treaties into which Great Britain willingly entered.  British governments did 
not question whether treaties were binding as a matter of British law, only whether 
certain types of treaties, such as alliances, could be made, and whether these 
agreements had to be placed before Parliament for ratification.26   
While each state determined how legal obligations would interact with 
domestic law, this fact did not alter obligations on the international level.  Treaties 
still remained binding within international law.27  Even if a state held a ratified treaty 
to be incompatible with domestic law, its treaty partners could still assert the 
obligation and seek some form of compensation for violations.  As constitutional 
differences caused variations in treaty ratification procedures, domestic law 
influenced the creation of legally binding obligations.  Early in the century, for 
example, absolute monarchies had greater authority to enter into treaties, so 
ratification could be implied at the time of signature.  More democratic states 
reserved this authority for legislative bodies, which could significantly delay, or even 
jeopardize, the ratification process.28  Nations were put on notice of notoriously 
fickle systems, and recognized that a state was not bound until the agreement had 
been ratified in accordance with domestic law.   
 
Scholars and Official Law 
 As customary law remained a largely unwritten source of binding obligations, 
governments relied upon compilations of custom by leading scholars.  The 
diplomatic world furnished countless international law scholars, many of whom 
continued to advise their governments on contemporary legal questions while writing 
and whose works reflected their diplomatic experience.  The major scholarly works 
                                                 
25 See generally Id., especially 126 et. seq.   
26 On the binding nature of treaties as a source of national law, see Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties, Their 
Making and Enforcement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1904), 151 et. seq., especially 59-
60.   
27 “Pacta sunt servanda is the pervading maxim of International, as it was of Roman jurisprudence.”  
Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law (Philadelphia: T & J.W. Johnson Law 
Booksellers, 1855), Vol. II, 56.   
28 Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 187.   
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were considered by states to be a significant supplementary source of international 
law.29    
International Law is not a body of rules which lawyers have evolved out of 
their own inner consciousness:  it is not a system carefully thought out by 
University Professors, Bookworms, or other theorists in the quiet and 
seclusion of their studies.  It is a living body of practical rules and principles 
which have gradually come into being by the custom of nations and 
international agreements.  To the formation of these rules Statesmen, 
Diplomatists, Admirals, Generals, Judges and publicists have all 
contributed.30   
 
Foreign Office memoranda liberally quoted legal scholars, particularly in 
matters of custom, as reflecting the extant state practice.  Foreign Office files on 
bombardment, laws of war, and other topics were littered with passages from 
scholarly texts.  Leading figures in British legal circles, such as Travers Twiss and 
Robert Phillimore, served as consultants for the Foreign Office.31  In turn, their 
writings reflected prevailing Foreign Office attitudes.  Indeed, Phillimore has been 
criticized for taking a parochial view, limiting his influence beyond Anglo-American 
schools of thought.32  However, for this same reason, Phillimore’s works are 
particularly useful for understanding official British perceptions.   
Throughout the era, agents responsible for shaping international law on 
behalf of their nations contributed to legal scholarship.  Naval figures like Vice-
Admiral Charles H. Stockton, military officers like J. B Porter, Major George B. 
Davis, General H. W. Halleck, and politicians including Elihu Root and Senator 
Cushman Davis all contributed to international legal theory.33  Even noteworthy 
figures such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and General Helmuth von Moltke participated 
in legal debates, if only to argue against further extension of regulations over their 
                                                 
29 Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. I, 62.     
30 A. Pearce Higgins, The Binding Force of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1910), 3.   
31 Phillimore served as a Queen’s Counsel and provided advice on questions of international law.  See 
Howard, Britain and the Casus Belli, 94-95.     
32 Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 235-36.  Unlike his near contemporary 
Wheaton, Phillimore was never translated.   
33 Charles H. Stockton, Outlines of International Law (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914); 
Davis, Outlines of International Law; Halleck, Elements of International Law; J. B. Porter, 
International Law, Having Particular Reference to the Laws of War on Land (Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas: Press of the Army Service Schools, 1914); Elihu Root, “The Sanction of International Law,” 
American Journal of International Law 2, no. 3 (1908); Cushman K. Davis, A Treatise on 
International Law Including American Diplomacy (St. Paul, Minnesota: Keefe-Davidson Law Book 
Co., 1901).   
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fields of endeavor – contributions that should not be overlooked.34  Many military 
officers received training in international law, and in the execution of their duties 
they were often required to determine the legality of different courses of action.  The 
leaders’ statements indicated likely wartime conduct, which in turn indicated the 
actual extent of the law.  Declarations of military law, such as Lieber’s Code, proved 
influential in the subsequent development of the law of war.35  Additionally, state 
papers and diplomatic correspondence served as a source of international law, 
indicating actual state practice.36   
 The topics addressed by experts and practitioners centered on state to state 
relations, or public international law, differentiating the topic from law governing 
relationships between individuals of separate states, or private international law.  
Nineteenth century legal texts were generally divided into major sections on 
peacetime law and the law of war.  Often, texts began with an account of the 
fundamental principles of international law, founded on either natural or positive 
law.  Subsequent sections covered the extent of national jurisdiction, practices of 
diplomatic etiquette such as ambassadorial immunity, and the various types of legal 
relations established between states.  These texts usually covered the settlement of 
international disputes in a spectrum, starting with negotiation and mediation, then 
moving to sanctions and war.   
 
Sources 
Public international law, a term that came into use in the nineteenth century,37 
included treaties, customs, and judicial opinions as its sources.  Judicial opinions 
often summarized state practice, and were influential in areas such as naval prize 
law, in which national courts adjudicated the legality of seizing merchant vessels in 
war, relying upon international precedent.  Custom referred to unwritten practices 
accepted as binding by states, or opinio juris, as evidenced by state action.38   
Custom is probably the hardest concept for non-lawyers to grasp, given the 
unwritten nature of this source of law.  Practices regularly engaged in by states could 
                                                 
34 Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration; Helmuth von Moltke and Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, “Les Lois 
De La Guerre Sur Terre,” Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 13 (1881).   
35 Lieber, Lieber's Code.     
36 Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. I, 68.    
37 The term had been coined by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century, and well into the 
nineteenth century other terms such as “the public law of nations” remained in currency.   
38 Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. I, 39-41.   
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gradually take on a binding nature.  As no authoritative government work listed 
binding custom, diplomats and lawyers working for the government often prepared 
textbooks summarizing these obligations.  Despite the absence of official 
compilations, states deemed custom to be as binding as treaty law.  Prior to the 
codification movement in the late nineteenth century, the most authoritative 
compilations of customs were those contained in these scholarly works, which the 
Foreign Office utilized widely.  In this respect, the distinction between scholarly 
international law and state practice was more apparent than real.  Scholarly works 
provided a significant source of information on the bulk of unwritten international 
law, by perpetuating customs reflected in prior state practice.   
When considering the dense web of international custom reported in legal 
texts, it should also be kept in mind that law only provided a set of rights and 
obligations, but did not dictate the manner in which states should raise these issues or 
uphold them.  Ultimately, the decision to raise a legal claim was a policy decision to 
be made by the state.  Law merely provided the generally recognized rationale for 
framing these claims.   
Treaties formed a key part of the international legal system, binding the 
parties who contracted them.39  The role of treaties as a source of general 
international law, obligating non-parties as well as parties, was increasingly 
recognized during the nineteenth century, but usually their effect was considered to 
be limited to the signatories.40  A certain amount of confusion exists regarding the 
status of treaties as sources of international law. 41  The use of the term “source of 
international law” in the nineteenth century was reserved for sources of general 
obligation binding all states, while current usage tends to define any legal obligation, 
whether specific to a single state or general to the whole community, as a “source of 
law.”  A modern international lawyer studying nineteenth century texts can easily 
make the mistake that since treaties were not usually listed as “sources of 
                                                 
39 G. F. Von Martens, A Compendium of the Law of Nations, trans. William Cobbett (London: Corbett 
& Morgan, 1802), 47-48; Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 49-50, 188; Phillimore, 
Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. I, 38; “[t]he most useful and practical part of the Law of 
Nations is, no doubt, instituted or positive law, founded on usage, consent, and agreement;” Maine, 
International Law, 32; Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 323; Westlake, Chapters on the 
Principles of International Law, 78, 83; Thomas Joseph Lawrence, The Principles of International 
Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Heath and Co., 1910), 101 et. seq., 326-27.  This was not merely a matter of 
scholarly theory but of state practice, as seen with the Declaration of London.   
40 Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 101 et. seq.   
41 E.g. Clive Parry, “Foreign Policy and International Law,” in Foreign Policy under Sir Edward 
Grey, ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 91.   
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international law” in older works they were not considered legally binding, but the 
evidence indicates otherwise.  Legal treatises uniformly described treaties as binding 
within international law, and state practice confirmed this expectation.  International 
legal scholars often analogized these obligations to domestic contract law.  Treaties 
were agreements willingly entered into by the parties, containing obligations that 
could be avoided only on narrowly drawn grounds, and which entailed a right to 
remedies if a breach occurred.42   
International law utilized treaties to manage some of the core questions of 
international relations.  Treaties considered binding within international law included 
many of the alliances of the era, such as the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian 
Alliance.43  The treaty system enshrined the balance of power within the international 
legal order, specifically referencing its maintenance as a goal.44  Treaties also 
specified spheres of influence45 and set national boundaries,46 often codifying 
expectations in order to preserve peace or to restore international stability.  Treaties 
also specified rules of conduct in wartime to limit the repercussions when efforts to 
keep the peace failed.47   
 
Non-binding Agreements and International Law 
This leaves the question of whether legally binding obligations contributed 
anything to the impact of an agreement.  Law was not the only means of 
communicating state interests.  Statesmen could employ many other means to convey 
their vital national interests and signal their intentions, including Parliamentary 
                                                 
42 Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 323 et. seq.   
43 Additionally, the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian ententes were enshrined in binding legal 
documents.  But while these created legal obligations, they contained no binding duties to intervene 
militarily, and only regulated colonial and policy disputes.  The broader policies enshrined in ententes 
remained outside of any legal obligation.   
44 Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. I, 576-77; Treaty of Constantinople, Mar. 
12, 1854, Preamble “[T]heir said Majesties being fully persuaded that the existence of the Ottoman 
Empire in its present Limits is essential to the maintenance of the Balance of Power among the States 
of Europe. . .”; Treaty of Stockholm, Nov. 21, 1855, Preamble “[The parties] being anxious to avert 
any complication which might disturb the existing Balance of Power in Europe. . .”  both in Hurst, ed., 
Key Treaties, Vol. I, 299, 315.  Many legal texts recognized the balance of power as a precondition for 
international law.  See Alfred Vagts and Detlev Vagts, “The Balance of Power in International Law:  
A History of an Idea,” American Journal of International Law 73, no. 4 (1979).  
45 For Example Declaration Between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, 
Apr. 8, 1904; Hurst, ed., Key Treaties, Vol. II, 760.   
46 The Treaty of Berlin provided a key example.   
47 “Declaration of Paris, Apr. 16, 1856,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 Supplement 
(1907); “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded of 
Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 Supplement 
(1907); Declaration of St. Petersburg; the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.   
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speeches, state papers, diplomatic negotiations, military maneuvers, and fleet visits.  
Even royal visits abroad could indicate changes in policy, leading diplomats to 
carefully balance travel itineraries in order to prevent international panics.  
Statesmen utilized legal instruments for specific reasons, when predictability 
outweighed flexibility in decision-making.  By framing policy in a binding 
agreement, an additional message could be expressed.   
The use of non-binding instruments provides evidence that legally binding 
obligations were intended to have an additional effect.  Otherwise, all agreements 
could simply have been termed binding.  Not all international agreements were 
binding as a matter of law.  States could enter into gentlemen’s agreements, 
understandings, modi vivendi, non-binding exchanges of notes, and other forms that 
would currently be termed soft-law agreements.  Diplomats drafted these documents 
specifically to avoid legal obligation, often to clarify informal arrangements while 
leaving greater liberty of action.  Non-binding instruments had the advantage of 
simplicity and often circumvented complex ratification procedures.  Additionally, the 
use of these non-binding documents as an alternative to binding treaties conveyed a 
specific message, indicating that a different level of obligation was intended.   
Salisbury’s 1887 Mediterranean Agreement with Austria-Hungary and Italy 
provides a classic example of a non-binding agreement.  This agreement concerned a 
coordinated response by the parties to any changes in the territorial status quo within 
the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas.  Salisbury pledged only that “[i]t will be 
the earnest desire of H.M.’s Government to give their best co-operation . . . in 
maintaining these cardinal principles of policy” while recognizing that “[t]he 
character of that co-operation must be decided by them, when the occasion for it 
arises, according to the circumstances of the case.”48  The elder statesman 
consciously chose this type of instrument, with no firmer obligation than an “earnest 
desire” and no duties other than cooperation, a vague term to be defined solely by 
Britain.  Britain sought to coordinate policy with Italy and Austria-Hungary, without 
becoming obliged to enter a war on behalf of these Triple Alliance partners.  By 
avoiding a binding assurance to the two Mediterranean states, Salisbury reduced the 
likelihood that Italy and Austria-Hungary would act aggressively in the expectation 
                                                 
48 Emphasis added.  British Note to the Italian Government in Regard to a Mediterranean Agreement, 
Feb. 12, 1887, Hurst, ed., Key Treaties, Vol. 2, 635.   
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that Britain would back them up.49  Britain could frame policy based upon present 
circumstances, in this case during a Franco-Italian war scare, signaling to France an 
intention to support Italy, without becoming locked into a long-term obligation to the 
Triple Alliance.   
Despite Salisbury’s occasional claims to the contrary, his actions indicated 
that he considered treaties binding.  On certain occasions he set British policy 
through binding treaties, while on other occasions non-binding documents were used.  
Had he truly believed treaties conveyed no legal weight, there would have been no 
reason to avoid their use.  Non-binding agreements would have allowed him to 
negotiate without parliamentary review, but his administration was clearly not 
concerned about avoiding legislative scrutiny.  He had no qualms about hiding a 
binding treaty made with Portugal from Parliament in 1899.   
British avoidance of firm treaty commitments to the Triple Alliance in 1880s 
and 1890s reflected a conscious weighing of advantage between freedom of action 
and obtaining firm commitments from the other parties.  Similarly, the Anglo-French 
and Anglo-Russian ententes, while legally binding treaties, contained no provisions 
relating to mutual security arrangements.  The caution shown by various diplomats, 
including Lord Salisbury and Sir Edward Grey, in denying that Britain had 
undertaken legal obligations, indicated a belief that treaty obligations bound the state 
in a manner that non-binding agreements did not.  States sought on the one hand to 
record these alliances in legally binding documents, and Great Britain on the other 
hand, often sought to avoid writing them down.  This indicates that the character of 
being legally binding had some independent value within agreements.   
 
Law as Institution or Function 
International law did not then, nor does it now, possess a firm means of 
enforcement.  A common misconception among non-lawyers is that international law 
encompasses only obligations under the jurisdiction of a world court or other 
international institutions capable of adjudicating disputes and enforcing settlements.  
                                                 
49 Earlier in the century, Clarendon had preferred to keep the exact nature of British obligations vague, 
in order to prevent guaranteed states like Portugal and Belgium from flaunting unconditional British 
support at their enemies.  See Howard, Britain and the Casus Belli, 96.  These concerns also 
influenced British alliance negotiations with Japan, although ultimately Britain accepted formal treaty 
obligations.  See Draft Dispatch from Lansdowne to MacDonald, Dec. 24, 1901, CAB 37/59/142 
(1901) at 2.   
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The reality is that international law was, and remains, very much a system of self-
help.   
In the nineteenth century, positivist John Austin reassessed international law 
in light of the lack of enforcement authority.  According to Austin and his followers, 
the law “properly so-called” required an authority to compel its enforcement, and the 
absence of this authority in the international sphere relegated international law to 
“positive morality” at best.50  Austin influenced Anglo-American circles of scholars 
more than continental ones, where another school of positivists emerged after 1815.  
While Anglo-American scholars increasingly had to address this critique, Austin’s 
theory did not predominate among them, and was not held as an official view by the 
British government.51   
The response to Austin rested on perceptions of law.52  Law can be viewed 
either in terms of institutions or in terms of its function within society.  The 
institutions of legal systems include a legislature, judiciary, and executive.  While a 
rudimentary legislature can be discerned in the development of treaty networks and 
customary law, a judiciary capable of defining legal obligations rarely existed, and 
an independent executive with police powers was entirely absent.  An institutional 
view of law, such as Austin’s, would find that international law is not truly law.  On 
the other hand, if one focuses upon the function of law, then international law can be 
viewed as truly law, albeit weaker than domestic law.  The function of law within 
society lay in establishing predictability in behavior.53  Law accomplished this 
function by setting expectations for mutual conduct, and through fear of 
                                                 
50 Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 138, 46-48, 208.   
51 Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, 509-10.  While Foreign Ministers like Salisbury 
commented on the lack of binding nature of treaties, the Foreign Office never subscribed to this view 
and continued to treat treaties as legally binding.  Moreover, Salisbury’s conduct indicated that his 
own views were more complex than he admitted in political speeches.  See generally Howard, Britain 
and the Casus Belli. and specifically, 126 et. seq.   
52 “The capability of being enforced by compulsory means is not the only or the most essential 
characteristic of Law.  That characteristic lies much more in this – that it is the rule and order 
governing all human communities in all spheres and dimensions of private and public life, and also of 
the social relations of Peoples and States with one another, which is also International Law.  
Compulsion only issues from the community as such.  This is the order which ought to be upholden – 
the life regulated by law is the common life of States.”  Kaltenborn, as translated in Phillimore, 
Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. I, 77.  Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 3, 
9-11; Halleck, Elements of International Law, 54.   
53 “Municipal law itself is constantly and systematically violated by the average citizen. . . . We do not 
ask of law that it should absolutely suppress all action which is opposed to its dictates; its function is 
performed when it imposes a definite and powerful check upon any such action; more we cannot 
require of it.”  Thomas Baty, “The Basis of International Law,” Macmillan's Magazine 78, no. 466 
(1898): 280.   
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repercussions.  Law only needed a sufficiently effective sanction to deter most 
proscribed conduct, even if it was unable to enforce all obligations.54  Rather than 
deterring every violation, law only has to influence enough behavior to set 
expectations and allow individuals to plan.55  When viewing law as a function within 
society, recognized and sanctioned by the state, then international law is law.56   
Contemporary lawyers recognized this distinction, noted the weakness of 
domestic law, and focused upon the functions of law.  After assessing legal 
institutions such as police forces one author noted:   
… they are not essential to the conception of law, any more than ermine and 
sealing wax, and any attempt to exaggerate their importance can only result in 
exhibiting them in the light of cumbrous and clumsy excrescences on the 
essential characteristics of what law is.57   
 
The British Foreign Office utilized this sophisticated understanding of law when 
negotiating agreements in the nineteenth century, ever cognizant of the limitations of 
law but sharply aware of how law could promote British interests.   
 
The Function of International Law:  “An Obstacle though not a Barrier”   
 
Statesmen utilized legally binding agreements to increase predictability in 
international relations, to communicate vital interests to other parties, and to create 
and strengthen mutual interests.  The question of enforcing a binding engagement 
when one party was recalcitrant arose only secondarily.  While the threat of sanctions 
lay at the root of international legal obligations, law functioned more by altering the 
cost structure of decision-making by communicating acceptable avenues of conduct.  
As a violation of law justified retaliation and could lead to international isolation, 
statesmen used greater care both when entering into legal obligations and when 
attempting to exit from them.  Politicians recognized that the existence of a treaty, 
                                                 
54 Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 3.   
55 For instance, domestic law has not eliminated bank robberies, only made them rare enough that the 
public has confidence placing its money within banks.  A vast proportion of law is regularly 
disobeyed, including speed limits on the highways, but the rules are enforced sufficiently to keep the 
highways relatively safe.  Law enforcement is always relative and contextual, dependent upon 
numerous factors, varying upon neighborhood, time of day, and even weather, as witnessed by the 
prevalence of crime in many cities during the dog days of summer.   
56 As a normative question, each state determines for itself the nature of its domestic legal obligations.  
The question of whether international law was truly law can be simply answered by recourse to 
national legal texts.  In the nineteenth century, Great Britain held international law to be legally 
binding.  See Edward Wavell Ridges, Constitutional Law of England (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1905), 424-26.   
57 Baty, “The Basis of International Law,” 279.   
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while unlikely to entirely eliminate proscribed conduct, could inhibit a state from 
taking actions deemed illegal by raising the political costs of such actions.  This 
circumscribed range of options constituted the binding effect of international law.   
 
Law’s Function in Increasing Predictability 
Politicians warily approached the legal obligations which treaties engendered.  
Many leaders publicly expressed a cavalier attitude towards treaty obligations, the 
most famous example being von Bethmann Hollweg’s “scrap of paper” comment 
regarding the 1839 Belgian guarantee.  The truth was subtler.  Even autocratic 
governments like Wilhelmine Germany approached new obligations cautiously, the 
Germans refusing to accept broad obligations at the Hague Conferences.  Had 
Germany attached no weight to these agreements, then it could have avoided the 
onus of scuttling various negotiations in 1899 and 1907 by simply signing and then 
promptly ignoring the resultant treaties.58  Treaty obligations ratified by domestic 
procedures carried political weight both at home and abroad, raising the political 
costs of casually breaching obligations.  In a famous example, British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Stanley attempted to water down Britain’s obligations under the new 
1867 treaty guaranteeing Luxembourg by claiming that the “collective guarantee” 
was inherently ineffectual.59  When he posed this interpretation in Parliament he 
drew immediate rebuke from Lord Russell as well as diplomatic protests from 
Bismarck, and hastily disavowed the statement.60   
Although international law was breached, agreements given the imprimatur 
of law could not easily be abandoned without entailing political consequences.61  
Throughout the era, British statesmen recognized this effect of law and utilized 
                                                 
58 The Kaiser impatiently claimed this as his policy.  “To prevent him [the Russian Czar] from making 
a fool of himself before all Europe, I have agreed to this nonsense.  But in practice I will continue as 
before to trust only in God and my sharp sword!  And will shit on all the resolutions!”  Norman Rich, 
Friedrich Von Holstein:  Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1965), 607.  However, the record of German treaty ratification indicated 
that agreements were cautiously entered into.   
59 He claimed that “collective guarantees” made by all the great powers, such as the 1867 agreement, 
could only be brought into effect if all powers agreed to participate in the defense of the guaranteed 
state, an unlikely situation as these same nations were the only parties likely to invade the guaranteed 
state.  If one of them invaded Luxembourg, there would be no collective defense of the hapless state.  
Howard, Britain and the Casus Belli, 79.  A collective guarantee required intervention only when 
other guarantors intervened, but an invasion of the guaranteed state by one of these parties would not 
excuse the others of this duty.  Lassa Oppenheim, International Law:  A Treatise, 2nd ed., (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), Vol. I, 601-02. 
60 Howard, Britain and the Casus Belli, 79-80.   
61 The political cost of breaching legal obligations also depended on the nature of the breach, and the 
array of states capable of sanctioning the conduct.  See the following section on this point.   
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binding agreements for this reason.  For instance, with regard to submarine cables, a 
member of the Colonial Defence Committee noted that they were:  
well aware that no Treaty obligations will suffice to secure absolute immunity 
for cables in time of war.  They consider, however, that if a sentiment against 
this mode of injuring an enemy, sufficient even to cause a certain measure of 
reluctance to adopt it, can be promoted, there would be a direct gain for the 
Empire.62   
 
Again when discussing rules of war prior to the Second Hague Conference, 
the Committee of Imperial Defence held:   
All international agreements are liable to be set aside by a belligerent who 
considers he could secure definite advantage by violating them, and believes 
himself powerful enough to ignore neutral protests; or by a neutral who 
strongly favours a belligerent, and who is prepared to disregard the interests 
of other neutrals.  At the same time, the existence of international agreements 
must create some measure of reluctance to appear publicly in the part of a 
violator, and must tend to develop a community of sentiment in regard to the 
methods of conducting operations of war.63
 
When discussing the possibility of a mediation clause in the 1856 peace 
agreement, Clarendon noted that while causes for war might still exist, 
“[n]evertheless I thought a general declaration in favour of the principle of mediation 
would be a fitting corollary to the treaty and oppose an obstacle though it might not 
prove a barrier to the renewal of war.”64  By creating an obstacle to proscribed 
conduct and setting an expectation regarding future behavior, law could increase 
predictability in international affairs, even if it could not create a total barrier against 
violations.   
The process of treaty ratification can in turn shape state interest.  States 
accept legal obligations in the international sphere in order to communicate a firm 
intention of guiding their policy with reference to agreed terms.  Policy can be 
expressed in many forms, but law adds another layer of obligation, solidifying 
commitments.  To breach an agreement, after taking extraordinary pains to reach a 
common policy, and after convincing a domestic audience of the wisdom of 
undertaking treaty obligations, involves higher domestic political costs.  Coalitions 
                                                 
62 Memorandum of the Colonial Defence Committee, Jul. 19, 1886, quoted in Committee of Imperial 
Defence, The Hague Conference:  Notes on Subjects which might be raised by Great Britain or by 
other Powers,  at 5, CAB 38/10/76 (Oct. 26, 1905).     
63 The Hague Conference, at 9, CAB 38/10/76.     
64 Clarendon to Palmerston, Apr. 15, 1856, in FO 27/1169.   
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are formed to ensure ratification of a treaty, and proponents of the engagement place 
their political credibility on the line to gain domestic allies.65   
 
 
Law’s Function in Communicating Vital Interests 
Some historians have decried the limited utility of law, holding that if 
national interest dictates a particular course of action, a state will follow these 
interests regardless of the existence of a treaty.66  This view echoes statements made 
at the time.  “If the interests exist, you will have the support of those whose interests 
are similar to your own, with or without alliances; if the interests have changed, you 
will not secure them by alliances which have no longer any binding force.”67  As an 
example of this interpretation, Great Britain did not need a treaty guaranteeing 
Belgium:  If it was in the British interest to defend Belgium, Britain would do so, and 
if it was not in Britain’s interest, no treaty obligations could secure British 
intervention.  But this narrow view ignores the value of law in both communicating 
vital interests to third parties, and strengthening and channeling national interests.   
Treaty obligations communicated vital interests to other parties.  The British 
participation in the Belgian guarantees signaled a long-standing interest in preventing 
any great power from gaining control of the Scheldt estuary and harbors near British 
territory across the English Channel.  Moreover, the guarantee could be and was used 
to rally public support for British intervention when Belgium was invaded.  Indeed, 
Clarendon recommended binding obligations to spare future British governments 
from the temptation to neglect national interests.68   
The existence of a treaty could reduce the likelihood that force would be 
necessary to defend national interests.  In 1906, the government contemplated a 
guarantee of Spanish territory opposite Gibraltar in return for a Spanish promise 
never to cede the territory to another power.  While expressing dislike of guarantees, 
the Admiralty noted “it seems very doubtful whether we should ever be called upon 
                                                 
65 For an excellent exposition of this process, see Abram Chayes, “An Inquiry into the Working of 
Arms Control Agreements,” Harvard Law Review 85, no. 5 (1972).     
66 Howard, Britain and the Casus Belli, 172.   
67 Sir William Harcourt, Hansard, 4th ser., LVIII, 1420, June 10, 1898.   
68 Clarendon to Palermston, Apr. 12, 1856, Clarendon Papers, C. 135, ff.540-541.   
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to fulfil this obligation to Spain by force of arms, if we frankly announced our 
attitude (and gave a “hands off” notice to the world thereby.)”69   
The guarantee of Sweden in 1855 similarly was intended to signal British 
commitment to Scandinavian independence.  British Prime Minister Palmerston 
noted that Britain had fought the Crimean War to counter Russian aggression in 
Turkey, and that as Britain had a similar interest in halting Russian expansion into 
the north, “if we can do so by Inkshed instead of by Bloodshed surely it is wise to 
take the opportunity to do so.”  He further explained:   
First of all the Knowledge of such a Treaty would be a powerful check upon 
Russia and would prevent her from pressing Sweden. . . In the next Place 
Sweden if left free to act as she liked might have Inducements held out to her 
which might make her willing to consent to what Russia wants. . . . the 
Swedish Government if unshackled might think the Bargain a good one for 
Sweden, but it would be a very bad one for us; and yet if there was no Treaty 
we should have no Right to object.70   
 
Palmerston also acknowledged a third justification for legally binding agreements 
here by remarking on the creation of mutual interests.  In the absence of an 
agreement, Swedish policy might have evolved in an opposite direction into the 
Russian orbit, but a decision to enter into a treaty made such a reversal more difficult 
politically.   
 
Law’s Function in Strengthening Mutual Interests 
Law could strengthen mutual interests, thus the existence of a treaty might 
prevent a state from drifting into an antagonistic position.  Great Britain entered into 
an alliance with Japan in 1902, partly in order to preempt a Russo-Japanese 
arrangement.71  After Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, it became more important 
to Great Britain to keep Japan on friendly terms, thus the treaty was repeatedly 
renewed.72  International law channeled Japanese policy into a parallel course with 
                                                 
69 Charles Ottley, Memorandum, Dec. 14, 1906, in Admiralty – Grey Correspondence:  Admiralty 
1905-1913, FO 800/87, (1905-1913), 88-89.   
70 Palmerston to Clarendon, Sep. 25, 1855, Clarendon Papers, C. 50, ff.98-99.  See Howard, Britain 
and the Casus Belli, 57.   
71 Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance:  The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907 
(London: Athlone Press, 1966), 167, 94-95, 230.  Nish noted that while Great Britain and Japan had 
interests in common, “it was necessary to codify their common interests in the diplomatic language of 
a treaty. . .”, 239-240.  Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 427-28.   
72 Marder, Dreadnought, Vol. I, 238.  Although outside the timeframe of this present study, in 1921, 
the British attempted to gain American adherence to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, recognizing 
explicitly the value of the treaty in keeping Japanese policy aligned with that of the West.  One 
correspondent described it as placing a bad elephant “between two good elephants to behave.”  
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British interests.  Both Japan and Great Britain were compelled to make public 
decisions about the future course of their foreign relations when entering into the 
alliance, which closed other doors.  Had statesmen believed that national interest 
operated purely independently of international law, there would have been no point 
in attempting to keep Japan on friendly terms through a treaty.  Moreover, British 
diplomats were not alone in their use of alliances.  Bismarck’s complex system 
attempted to prevent Germany’s neighbors from sliding into antagonistic positions.73  
While the Prussian statesman may have shown disdain for the concept of 
international law, Bismarck still utilized it in securing Germany’s future.   
 
International legal agreements, at the very least, could serve to warn third 
parties of a state of relations, thus deterring conflict.  Agreements could also channel 
the expectations of the parties, by specifying what behavior was acceptable.  
Additionally, agreements could create national interests, by creating factions with a 
government tied to passage of the treaty, and by creating awareness among the public 
of certain concerns.  Law played a role by creating an obligation that was expected to 
be binding.  Statesmen feared entering into binding agreements without serious 
consideration of the consequences; thus if an agreement was concluded, it was after 
serious reflection and some measure of acceptance of the obligations by at least some 
factions within the state.  While law could perform a limited function by increasing 
international stability, enforcement remained a significant means of ensuring that 
stability.   
 
Enforcement of Legal Obligations 
 
 While the British Foreign Office held international law to be as binding as 
other forms of domestic law, the means of enforcing it were weak and uneven.  
States enforced international law through a spectrum of measures ranging from 
peaceful negotiation to open war.  The legal system remained largely one of self-
                                                                                                                                          
Memorandum by Fletcher of a Conversation with Willert, May 31, 1921, Dep. of State 741.9411/96, 
as quoted in Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 
(Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), 30.  Prior to the Washington 
Conference of 1921, the British stressed the goal of maintaining the alliance “as we cannot afford to 
risk the open hostility of Japan.”  Victor Wellesley, General Survey of Political Situation in Pacific 
and Far East with Reference to the Forthcoming Washington Conference, Oct. 20, 1921, in FO 
412/118 (1921) at 3.   
73 W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe (London: Athlone Press, 1956), 
41-44.  In 1880 Russia sought an alliance with Germany to circumvent that nation’s hostility, rather 
than to affirm common interests.  Medlicott, Concert of Europe, 41.   
 69
help, although public opinion and self-interest also motivated third parties to uphold 
the law.  As previously mentioned, no international court existed that was capable of 
determining rights and duties.  More importantly, even if adjudication was possible, 
increasingly in the form of arbitration, no international police force existed that was 
capable of enforcing a decision.  However, compliance with international law more 
often came about from subtle influences, and this compliance was sufficient for 
statesmen to set expectations of future behavior.   
 Legal compliance usually did not require legal enforcement, and the threat of 
compulsion generally arose secondarily as a motivation.  Even Bismarck, no 
champion of morality in international affairs, recognized the value of law:   
[T]he plain and searching words of a treaty are not without influence on 
diplomacy when it is concerned with precipitating or averting a war; nor are 
even treacherous and violent governments usually inclined to an open breach 
of faith, so long as the force majeure of imperative interests does not 
intervene.74   
 
Compliance usually arose from habit and the realization that self-interest required 
cooperation.75  The interests of states “meet and cross each other at so many points 
that there is generally, before long, some point at which the offender is made to feel 
the loss of sympathy which his conduct has occasioned.”76  A state contemplating a 
breach of one of the many treaty obligations could expect a response.   
 A state injured by a breach of a legal obligation could calibrate its response 
depending upon the circumstances.  A minor infraction by an ally might draw only a 
diplomatic protest, whereas a similar breach by an unfriendly nation might justify the 
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York: Harper & Brothers, 1899), Vol. II, 270-71.  The crux of Austin’s theory was that without the 
threat of compulsion and the authority to administer it, law “properly so-called” did not exist.  But 
“the largest number of rules which men obey are obeyed unconsciously from a mere habit of mind.  
Men do sometimes obey rules for fear of the punishment which will be inflicted if they are violated, 
but, compared with the mass of men in each community, this class is but small. . .”  Maine, 
International Law, 50.   
75 “There must be a coercive force somewhere, because mankind obeys that law, nations obey it.  In 
the first place there is the force of opinion.  In the next place, there is the force of pacific retaliation, of 
restrained intercourse, of international boycotting and outlawry, of unfriendly legislation.  And then, 
finally, there is the supreme arbiter and coercive force of war.”  Davis, A Treatise on International 
Law, 26, see 26-28; “In reality the source of its strength are three:  (i) a regard – which in a moral 
community often flickers but seldom entirely dies – for national reputation as affected by international 
public opinion; (ii) an unwillingness to incur the risk of war for any but a paramount national interest; 
(iii) the realisation by each nation that the convenience of settled rules is cheaply purchased, in the 
majority of cases, by the habit of individual compliance.”  Frederick Erwin Smith, International Law, 
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abrogation of a treaty relationship.  Moreover, international law did not dictate the 
manner of response.  A state could choose to nullify a treaty that had been breached 
or abrogate a separate agreement.  Direct negotiation was the primary method for 
resolving disputes.  If negotiation failed, states could also undertake retorsion, by 
treating subjects of the offending nation in a similar manner to that complained of, 
reprisals, by seeking compensation in other areas, or embargo.77   
 
Legal Enforcement and Limited War 
 Ultimately, war remained as an option to enforce claims of legal right.  Prior 
to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, war remained a legitimate means of upholding 
legal rights, although states had to exhaust all peaceful means first.78  Legal scholars 
of the era likened war to trial, albeit a medieval sort of trial by combat.79  Phillimore 
compared war to criminal law, as a necessary result of the depraved nature of 
society,80 although he also made a finer distinction, noting that international law held 
no truly criminal sanctions.  Unlike criminal law, where sanctions could be levied 
against individuals, the law of war held that an aggrieved state only had the right to 
take actions necessary for compensation, but had no further right to punish.  
Generally, international law held that conceptions of limited warfare prevailed, as 
states had no authority to take action beyond that necessary to vindicate rights.81  
This limitation upon the rights within war could also be seen in the intricate relations 
existing between neutrals and belligerents described in most legal texts of the period.  
A state of law continued to exist between belligerents, and between belligerents and 
neutrals.   
 This conception of war had two implications.  The first implication was that 
limited war justified wartime regulations.  It had long been recognized that treaty 
relations could continue between belligerents in time of war, if the states specified 
this within the treaty.82  In effect, states could limit their rights by treaty, just as they 
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could limit other rights in peacetime.  Moreover, concepts of humanity had 
traditionally been recognized in warfare – for instance, prohibitions on the use of 
poisons dated back to antiquity.83  These prohibitions were never absolute, and 
coexisted in an uneasy tension with the dictates of national survival, held to be the 
primary obligation of the state.84  But implicitly it was recognized that states could 
limit their freedom in areas central to the exercise of sovereignty.85  This evolution 
underlay the nineteenth century development of the law of war, including much of 
arms control law.   
 Second, the concept of limited war spoke volumes about nineteenth century 
perceptions about the future of war, and of the nature of international relations.  
International law was predicated on expectations of limited war, as neutrals were 
vital to wartime enforcement.  International law possessed different means of 
enforcement in peacetime and in wartime.  In peacetime, a state could respond to a 
breach of a legal obligation in many ways, by voiding treaty obligations even in 
unrelated areas.  Generally, a state had fewer options to prevent a breach of law in 
wartime, other than the threat of retaliation.86  The other means of enforcement in 
wartime were through neutral pressure.87  Third parties often had vested interests in 
upholding legal rights as neutrals, for instance with the right to conduct maritime 
trade with belligerents.  Belligerents like Great Britain sought to use a preponderance 
of naval power to halt the maritime trade of an opponent.  When over-zealousness in 
halting trade led to stretching the laws of blockade and maritime capture, neutrals 
who lost their shipping on the high seas protested.  The willingness of the United 
States to go to war with Great Britain in 1812 over perceived violations of maritime 
rights exemplified the possibility of enforcement by a neutral, just as it was to do a 
century later in 1917.   
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 The expectation of neutral enforcement of international law reveals beliefs in 
limited war in the future.  As many of its principles could only be enforced by neutral 
third parties, the volumes written on this avenue of enforcement indicated a belief 
that future conflict would leave numerous powerful states as neutrals —states which 
would be capable of upholding the law.  International law utilized the model of 
European conflict between 1815 and 1914, in which no more than two or three great 
powers were directly involved in warfare at any point.  The principles upon which 
lawyers and statesmen spent significant energy were not workable in a general war 
on the model of the later world wars.   
 Additionally, international law evolved in anticipation of short wars, with 
higher frequency of conflict.  As seen from the 1874 Brussels Conference 
negotiations, statesmen consciously shaped humanitarian rules of war with an 
intention of limiting lingering hostility after war ended, by reducing the displacement 
and atrocities attendant with military conflict.  The expectation was that wars would 
be brief and sharp, and the goal of the international community would be to heal the 
wounds as quickly as possible, preventing the development of long-term hatred 
among adversaries.88  Finally, states also had to design law in a manner that reflected 
the diverse situations they might find themselves in during a war.  Great Britain had 
to carefully frame maritime policy on its role as the world’s largest shipping nation 
requiring protection as a neutral, while not hampering its ability to effectively utilize 
its sea power as a belligerent.   
 
Legal Enforcement and International Order 
 Nineteenth century conceptions of international law were intrinsically bound 
up with perceptions of international order.  After 1815, the central preoccupation of 
the state system was in preventing a further revolution on the model of France in 
1789.  Lawyers and statesmen devised broad theories justifying great power 
intervention in the internal affairs of other states to prevent revolution from 
occurring, by arguing that revolution inherently posed an international threat.89  More 
generally, after 1815, the international legal order broadly acknowledged a special 
                                                 
88 Phillimore argued that states had to obey rules in war in order to allow peace negotiations.  
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role to be played by the great powers, the Concert of Europe, in preserving European 
peace and order.90  By the second half of the century, many argued that the European 
Concert was evolving into an institution of law enforcement.  The notion of a special 
status for the great powers grated with the long-standing conception of equality 
among states in international law, but state practice appeared to confirm this 
evolution.91  As T. J. Lawrence put it in 1885:   
The foregoing examples [from 1815 to 1882] by no means exhaust the 
subject; but they are sufficient to shew [sic] that the Great Powers have by 
modern usage a position of preeminence in European affairs, which is so 
marked, and has such important legal results, that the old doctrine of the 
absolute equality before International Law of all sovereign states is no longer 
applicable.  It is not merely that the stronger states have influence 
proportionate to their strength; but that custom has given them what can 
hardly be distinguished from a legal right to settle certain questions as they 
please, the smaller states being obliged to acquiesce in their decisions.92   
 
 The great powers used the occasional meetings of the Concert of Europe to 
resolve standing questions threatening the general peace.93  The Concert met in 
various forms prior to 1878, not as a formally organized body, but ad hoc.  Despite 
the lack of formality to the system, the geopolitical weight behind its great power 
members, and the role they assigned to the Concert in resolving questions, lent 
authority to it as an institution.  Diplomats saw the Concert of Europe as possessing 
both legislative and judicial powers, as well as being capable of enforcing its 
decisions.94  Without judging the morality of this evolution, it was hoped that a 
system of the great powers could eventually evolve into a true international 
institution.95  These assessments were not based on a sanguine view of the great 
powers’ motivations, but merely a realistic appraisal of their role in international 
society.  Moreover, the Security Council of the United Nations has since evolved to 
fulfill a similar function within international law.  At its heart was the understanding 
that law had to reflect existing power structures.  This is not to say law merely 
abdicated its place to politics, as law could also slow the drift of states into 
proscribed behavior.  It is merely to say that while law could have an effect, it could 
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best do so when it harnessed existing forces in the international environment.  
Similarly, the balance of power, while sometimes referred to as a political institution, 
was generally seen as integral to the system of international law.96   
 However, the European Concert, the balance of power, and international law 
generally, proved an uncertain source of order.  Lawrence hoped that the system of 
alliances could eventually serve a legal function and ensure peace, but his view was 
not universally accepted.97  Phillimore noted that a “league of protection” would 
better uphold the law on behalf of small states, and that the policy of law founded 
upon a single principle of international law, namely order, at the expense of other 
principles, would be fatal to the peace.98  Large states were far more likely to get 
away with breaching their obligations than small states.  This consequence flowed 
naturally from the self-help aspect of enforcement.  “What is the sanction of 
international law?  It is self-help in its most licentious form:  for international law 
professes itself unable to regulate the occasions on which resort may be made to war, 
the litigation of states.”99  While international law may be considered true law, it “is 
habitually deficient in that coercive side of the term law. . .”100  Also, even amongst 
the great powers, the recognition that military force was perceived as the final 
deciding factor and that international law lacked certain means of enforcement short 
of war also weakened the system.101   
 
 
Treaty Interpretation and Legal Enforcement 
Finally, even when an agreement was deemed binding, states could find a 
way to redefine how obligations were to be discharged.  In certain respects, this 
created a greater challenge for effective international law than the risk of open 
breaches.  As no court possessed mandatory jurisdiction to adjudicate on the nature 
of legal commitments, each state was left to determine how obligations were to be 
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fulfilled.  International lawyers often came up with colorable interpretations 
rationalizing their state’s conduct.  For instance in 1877, when Disraeli’s government 
faced the unpopular option of militarily defending the Ottoman Empire or breaching 
the terms of the Tripartite Guarantee of 1856, the Foreign Secretary Derby instead 
chose to reinterpret the treaty in a manner relieving Britain of obligation to 
intervene.102  By lawyerly reinterpreting and recasting the obligations contained in 
the agreement, Britain could avoid any duty to Turkey.   
In fact, much of Salisbury’s opposition to binding engagements arose from 
indeterminacy of language.  He did not oppose onerous obligations so much as vague 
duties, which could be circumvented, and sought to frame them in such a manner that 
they would be likely to be upheld.103  His record as Foreign Secretary indicated that 
he never disputed that treaties were binding, but insisted on concise obligations so as 
to prevent parties from evading their duties.   
Statesmen still had to please two audiences, one domestic, and one 
international.  Maneuvers such as that undertaken by Derby might be more likely to 
convince the British public, particularly if the obligation was as unpopular as the 
Turkish guarantee was.  But such a course would still leave the international 
community skeptical.  States still had to answer to the international community to the 
extent that they valued good relations, thus the sanction of international law 
remained relative to national power and the degree of interdependence of the state in 
question.   
 
Breaches of international law were infrequent, although they could have large 
consequences when they occurred.  In fact, it was usually the egregious breaches and 
the shredding of “scraps of paper” that have gained the attention of historians and the 
public, not the more numerous, mundane instances of compliance.  While 
international law possessed weak sanctions, it did provide statesmen with a greater 
degree of predictability in international relations.  Not unlike domestic law, 
international law functions more by creating sufficient predictability for interstate 
relations to function.  Although never deterring all illegal conduct, international law 
provided enough stability for relations to continue.  As a result, enforcement of legal 
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obligations remained an intricate diplomatic pirouette.  Dependent upon the 
international political situation, national strength, and interest in the question at 
stake, enforcement remained tentative.  While international legal theory tabulated 
numerous rights and duties within the international community, rights which all 
states recognized in the abstract, it remained another question when such rights were 




International law could never fully eliminate banned conduct, and statesmen 
never expected it to do so.  At best it could function as “an obstacle but not a 
barrier.”  Only by keeping in mind what international law could and could not do is it 
possible to understand what British statesmen expected from arms control 
negotiations at the turn of the century.  The historian’s perception of international 
law is central to how arms control initiatives such as the Hague Peace Conferences or 
the Anglo-German naval arms dialogue are evaluated.  If one perceives international 
law in terms of world courts and international police enforcement, then two 
interpretations of British arms control initiatives seem logically to follow:  Either 
statesmen who sought arms control were utterly naïve about the realities of world 
affairs, seeking unrealizable utopian goals, or alternatively, they were cynical 
practitioners of realpolitik, never expecting agreements to materialize but utilizing 
negotiations to embarrass foreign competitors and maintain domestic pacifist 
support.  Certainly, foreign policy-makers were at times motivated by naivety and 
cynicism.  Yet this fails to convey the full story.   
A broader view of international law must recognize that law could fulfill its 
function of increasing predictability in international relations in connection with 
other elements of policy-making.  While law could never serve as an alternative to 
traditional methods of ensuring national security, it could be utilized to bolster a 
state’s position.  If the historian keeps in mind the intended uses and limitations of 
international law, British arms control strategy can be placed in its true context.  
International law in the nineteenth century provided an instrument for advancing the 
national interest.  Like other elements of national policy, such as economic clout or 
military power, the efficacy of law was uncertain and often shifting.  A state could 
not base its security planning solely upon international law, any more than a state 
could rely entirely upon its own arms.  But law could play a role in security planning, 
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and contemporary practice of law perceived a central position for legal relationships 
in upholding the strategic balance of power.     
In order for law to serve its function of facilitating stability, it was necessary 
to set expectations that could be fulfilled.  If law attempted to undertake too bold a 
task, it could not succeed.  Moreover, even when attempting to utilize law in more 
limited negotiations, statesmen had to craft effective regulations that could 
accomplish national goals.  The following two chapters will detail the challenges 
faced by international law when setting unrealistic regulations, as seen with the quest 
for disarmament at the Hague in 1899 in Chapter Three, and when setting limited 
goals, as seen in the emerging area of naval arms control in the early 1900s in 










The First Hague Peace Conference needs to be viewed not simply as the first 
step in twentieth-century developments, but as a culmination of nineteenth-century 
trends.  For diplomatic historians, the focus is often on the following fifteen years, 
and ultimately the failure of international law to halt the war in 1914.  In this view, 
the Hague Peace Conference was merely a footnote in the story of the road to war, 
exemplifying the unrealistic and utopian goals of a segment of the population, who 
had sought to limit armaments, set rules for war, and create a system for peacefully 
resolving disputes.1  Others note the role of the conference as a starting point for 
twentieth century developments in international law and international organization, 
emphasizing legal precedents set by its conventions and the foundation of an 
embryonic international judicial system.2  A fuller exposition of the conference needs 
to place it in the context of its past, as one of a series of nineteenth-century 
conferences designed to codify international law.  While the stir created by the 
Czar’s proposal increased popular expectations of the gathering, and politicians 
acknowledged the historic significance of the conference, responsible diplomats had 
low expectations and perceived it as a political maneuver.  Moreover from prior 
experience, statesmen predicted specific coalitions of states, and planned the 
conference on these expectations.   
At the Hague in 1899 the general lack of interest in arms limitation doomed 
the topic.  Even if the political will had been present, the framing of the proposals as 
general disarmament, rather than limited arms control, diminished the likelihood that 
anything significant would be accomplished.  The defining of the project as 
disarmament pigeonholed it with earlier proposals, posed for political capital more 
than practical results.  While the original program spoke only of limited steps, the 
broad scope of the project, together with popular anticipation that the conference 
would yield great results, increased the political stakes.  Unlike its predecessor at 
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Brussels in 1874, statesmen were obliged to have concrete results by the close of the 
conference, rather than merely drafting a working text for future study.   
The Hague agenda items relating to the rules of war immediately evoked 
unresolved issues from 1874.  The 1874 conference was perceived as a model for 
political alignment in 1899.  The Belgians were particularly concerned that Britain 
would not renew its leadership role in representing the interests of small countries.  
However, Great Britain at both conferences sought to organize a coalition of small 
powers to avoid the creation of a “code of conquest.”  Major-General Sir John 
Ardagh framed the British position on the laws of war within this context.  
Moreover, the Brussels Conference established a working method intended for the 
Hague Conference that has been somewhat obscured in hindsight.  The Brussels 
Conference was more a forum for airing opinions than for the negotiation of binding 
instruments.  Indeed, the conference was initially inspired by non-governmental 
organizations seeking further codification before the proposal was taken over by 
governments.  At Brussels, the final protocol of the conference was signed by all the 
delegates as an accurate summary of their discussions, then sent home for further 
deliberations on whether it would be codified as a binding treaty.  The British 
delegate signed the document under this understanding, as Great Britain opposed 
much of the code and ultimately ended the project by refusing to sign or ratify a 
binding agreement the following January.   
The Hague Conference was initially conceived as a forum for discussing 
views on how arms could be limited, rather than for the immediate goal of limiting 
armaments.  It was in part for this reason that political questions were to be excluded.  
The conference organizer, Russia, envisioned that the best methods of limiting 
armaments could be discussed in abstract, then experts could work out the details and 
present governments with a formal proposal for a binding treaty after the conference.  
Like the earlier gathering in 1874, the goal was to produce a general statement which 
might later be used to craft a binding treaty.  However, the 1899 conference received 
far greater publicity and roused public expectations that the drafts produced at the 
conference would eventually become binding agreements, ultimately limiting candid 
discussions of the issues.   
The proposals followed the pattern of earlier efforts in 1816, 1831, and in the 
1860s.  Like these calls by Russian Czar Alexander I, French King Louis Philippe, 
and French Emperor Napoleon III, respectively, disarmament was a response to the 
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threat of unrest posed by excessive government expenditure.  The First Hague Peace 
Conference differed from these other initiatives in the manner of the announcement.  
The Russian Circular of 1898 was a diplomatic bombshell even to Russian ally 
France.  Despite the public clamor, the 1898 circular did not differ greatly from 
previous initiatives.  Disarmament had been a common political tool used for both 
domestic audiences and the international community.  Differences in opinion could 
be used to embarrass dissenting nations, while common positions on armaments 
signaled broader consensus on diplomatic issues.3
In terms of specific armaments proposals, the Hague Peace Conference 
seemed poised to follow the precedent set at St. Petersburg in 1868 with the British 
government anticipating a refinement of earlier limitations on needlessly cruel 
weapons.  In 1898, the advent of quick-firing artillery led Russia to seek a 
moratorium to spare the industrializing country the expense.  As in 1868, the British 
negotiators were reluctant to relinquish technological advantages, and both the 
Admiralty and the War Office opposed nearly every limit on the agenda.  However, 
the Admiralty was willing to advocate limits that would bolster its strategic position.  
Notably, Salisbury’s government undertook a previously unpublished and unreported 
secret naval arms control initiative with Russia shortly before the Hague Conference.  
Thus, British opposition was never complete.   
 
By placing the First Hague Peace Conference in the context of earlier legal 
reform and prior arms limitation proposals, the expectations held by British 
diplomats can be more fully understood.  Instead of interpreting the results merely as 
a repudiation of any legal regulation of armaments, the gathering reflected a lack of 
common interest at that time as well as the inherent difficulty in disarmament.  In 
this context, concerns expressed at the Hague regarding the impediments placed 
upon national sovereignty by treaties and the utopian requirement of an international 
police force should be reassessed.  These reservations centered upon objections to 
disarmament, while diplomats still acknowledged less radical arms limitations could 
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be enshrined in law.  However, these assumptions that law could serve a role were 
rarely made explicit, and can best be gleaned from long-standing state practice.   
Law could play a role in regulating armaments, but the most successful 
measures in the nineteenth century were limited arrangements, while grand attempts 
at general disarmament failed.  Agreements like the Black Sea Treaty indicated a 
need for provisions to be easily verified, an impossible condition for a general 
armament treaty binding the majority of the nations of the world.  Limited treaties 
did not draw the same criticism regarding enforcement mechanisms.  Bilateral 
agreements, like the Anglo-French or the Anglo-American treaties provided an easier 
format for limiting arms than general multilateral gathering like that at the Hague.   
The experience in 1899 showed that arms control could play a role in foreign policy 
planning, but that much also depended on how much was expected from law.   
 
International Law and General Disarmament 
 
Disarmament posed greater challenges for international law than did arms 
control.  As a result scholarly works on general disarmament were theoretical, often 
based on the hypothesis that the creation of some form of international police power 
was possible.  Arms control, or the limitation of only certain categories or levels of 
armaments, left the parties with means of self-defense.  In contrast, general 
disarmament required states to sacrifice their ability to defend themselves.  As a legal 
question, general disarmament also eliminated this ultimate means of enforcing 
disarmament obligations.  In order to ensure security and enforcement, theoretical 
writing on general disarmament focused upon the radical reorganization of 
international society.  The theoretical nature of this writing clearly distinguished 
these works from other scholarly works describing the existing international system.   
General disarmament remained a vaguely-defined concept throughout the era, 
sometimes referring to the complete abolition of weaponry, but often just entailing a 
substantial reduction in military forces.  At its core, disarmament required different 
methods of enforcement.  Limited arms agreements functioned within the existing 
system of international law, through traditional methods of state enforcement.  
General disarmament presupposed a radical shift in international relations, either 
through more peaceful relations or through deeper international integration.  The 
successful arms control initiatives of the nineteenth century generally did not aim to 
fundamentally alter international relations and were predicated on continuing 
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interstate competition.  Arms control merely sought to channel competition away 
from destabilizing activities to sustainable interactions.   
However, the terminological ambiguity contributed to a muddled debate.  
While Europe had ample arms control precedents from which to develop new 
limitations, general disarmament shifted international law onto entirely new grounds.  
While precedents hinted at means of surmounting hurdles of national sovereignty, 
accurate comparisons of armaments, verification, and enforcement, these issues had 
only been handled in limited agreements.  When statesmen discussed general 
disarmament, these questions were reopened.  The problem was compounded by a 
general lack of interest in disarmament.  Statesmen like Salisbury, who were 
sufficiently familiar with international law, could conflate arms limitation proposals 
with general disarmament and thereby eviscerate them.  By arguing that an 
international police force or the cession of national sovereignty would be required, 
despite having precedents indicating the contrary, arms control could be killed by 
criticism applicable to disarmament.    
 
Given the great complexities involved in measuring comparative armaments, 
and the unrealistic cession of sovereignty required by most schemes, academic 
international lawyers entered the debate ambivalently.  At the 1887 meeting of the 
Institute of International Law in Heidelberg, when Belgian attorney Gustave Rolins-
Jaequemyns raised the question, he drew the wrath of many members who feared 
that discussions of such utopian proposals would bring ridicule to the field of 
international law.4  General disarmament directly contradicted established 
conceptions of sovereignty.5  Disarmament contradicted the fundamental duty of a 
sovereign state to defend itself through all means at its disposal.  The organization 
refused to directly debate the topic at their annual gathering, although several 
opinions were recorded which indicated the state of legal theory.   
 Co-founder of the Institut de Droit International,Rolin-Jaequemyns asked 
whether two or more states could limit their ability to arm themselves by treaty, 
whether such an agreement bound them, and what enforcement measures such an 
                                                 
4 Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments, 12.   
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agreement required.6  After discussing the duty of a state to defend itself and the 
exposed position of an unarmed state in the midst of its armed neighbors, he 
answered:   
Si c’est, pour un peuple, commettre un acte de suicide que de demeurer 
désarmé  au milieu de voisins en armes, n’est-ce pas, pour un groupe de 
peuples, unis par une civilisation commune, un autre genre de suicide que de 
se laisser entrainer tous ensemble, par une sorte de vertige, à jeter, chaque 
année, une portion de plus en plus forte de leur argent, de leur crédit, de leur 
activité physique et intellectuelle dans le gouffre, toujours plus profond, des 
dépenses et des armements militaires?7     
 
 Scottish professor James Lorimer provided an answer to these questions, 
invoking concepts of arms control.  He held that no arms limitation would succeed if 
it reduced the relative strength of a state compared to its neighbors.  Thus, any 
convention should emphasize proportional reductions.8  This in turn would 
institutionalize the status quo, locking national military strength at current levels.  In 
order to create a workable agreement between states with vastly different national 
characteristics, Lorimer held that governments should regulate expenditure on 
armaments, rather than reduce the strength of armies or navies.  This would remove 
the need for excessive international interference in domestic affairs required for the 
verification of numerical troop limits.9  Regarding enforcement, Lorimer admitted 
that at present no international mechanism existed which could guarantee observance 
of such a treaty.  Only a coalition of states could enforce treaty obligations.10  While 
Lorimer noted that international law had to work within the confines of the existing 
diplomatic system, he ultimately championed the ideal of disarmament, using it as an 
argument for developing a strong international legal system with judicial, executive, 
and legislative institutions.   
 Concluding the 1887 debate, Count Leonid Kamarowski, professor of 
international law at the University of Moscow, argued that law provided the only 
way to solve the dilemma of an arms race, as no state could limit its armaments 
alone.  As the development of international law had not progressed to a point where 
states could achieve effective limitations, a series of preliminary conferences in 
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which diplomats laid out their positions on arms control followed by a final congress 
would provide the most effective means of advancing this area of international 
regulation.  Obligations of limited duration would allow the testing of ideas, and 
serve as confidence-building measures.11  Like Lorimer, Kamarowski noted that the 
contemporary international legal environment could sustain arms control, but not 
disarmament.  He also used this as a starting point to argue for an international police 
force and a strong legal system.  While he carefully defined disarmament as merely 
the reduction of military forces to actual requirements, the legal institutions he 
desired placed his scheme in the more utopian category of disarmament.   
 There were several other legal works on disarmament in the period, which 
also sought radical international changes as prerequisite.  In 1894 Raoul de la 
Grasserie, a French judge at the court of Rennes, called for complete disarmament 
over an extended period.  Each nation would proportionally disarm, initially three-
fifths of its active armies in a preparatory period, then the remaining two-fifths under 
international supervision.  An international court would fix the size of each national 
army, allotting troops for the purposes of securing internal order and serving in an 
international army.  Ultimately, an international government and court, reinforced 
with an arbitration system and backed by this international army, would keep the 
peace of the world.12  The scheme assumed that states would relinquish control of 
national defense to an international organization and accept severely curtailed 
freedom of action in international relations.  This utterly unrealistic view completely 
ignored the problem of gaining state acceptance, as well as the practical difficulties 
of setting appropriate levels of armed forces.   
 The mechanics of disarmament also proved daunting, as agreement was 
needed on how to measure military strength.  The many factors in determining 
national strength included not only the size of armies, but also the training of troops, 
length of military service, industrial capacity, and infrastructure, not to mention 
geographical differences such as defensive rivers and mountain barriers.  American 
lawyer Dudley Field proposed a limit of one soldier per thousand inhabitants.13  
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French professor Alexandre Mérignhac noted that strict proportional limits favored 
states with larger populations, allowing Germany a larger army than France; he 
argued instead that peacetime strength at the time of entering the agreement formed a 
fairer basis.14  Kamarowski held the total numbers depended on “indices of real life”, 
including the number of soldiers needed for domestic security, and for defending 
colonies and extra-European territory.15  Lorimer noted that colonial soldiers, 
recruited from foreign territory and neither paid nor trained to European standards, 
should not count as the equal to European soldiers in setting limits.16  International 
lawyers also discussed and disputed the value of limiting service length and 
recruitment age.17  Naval armaments proposals were less developed, some like Field 
claiming there was no need to limit construction of warships, for while not quite 
defensive in their nature, “they are limited in their operations.”18  On the other hand, 
H. William Blymyer, in presenting his plan for disarmament to the Universal Peace 
Congress of Berne in 1892, sought the prohibition of any new ship over 3,000 tons.19   
 Academic disarmament projects differed from contemporary practice in their 
advocacy of a broad international government, a proposal unlikely to find acceptance 
amongst the great powers.  Arms control treaties negotiated prior to 1899 had more 
immediate goals – reducing expenditures and lowering the risk of war – and were 
designed to function in the existing international system.  Academic disarmament 
projects envisioned a heretofore unprecedented scale of international organization 
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and stability.  Many like Kamarowski saw the ultimate answer in an international 
police force or even more cumbersome arrangements.20   
 Realistically, international law could not directly challenge conventional 
conceptions of sovereignty.  Academicians’ focus on concepts of general 
disarmament complicated matters, as the radical utopian nature of proposed world 
federations damaged the credibility of international law.  When the young Russian 
Czar Nicholas II issued his call for a conference to discuss the “possible reduction of 
the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations,” statesmen faced the 
dilemma of obliging the young ruler while not fettering their nations with 
unworkable projects.21  Ultimately, the course of action advocated by Kamarowski 
and Lorimer was pursued at the 1899 Hague Conference.  The gathering was to be 
the first of a series of conferences to gain experience in limited reductions of 
armaments, but with far broader goals.   
 
Calling of the Hague Conference of 1899 
 
 Since the issuance of the first circular of 1898, scholars have questioned the 
Czar’s motives.  The call came as a surprise to the European powers, even to 
Russia’s ally France, whom statesmen assumed would have been consulted prior to 
issuing such a circular.22  The recent acquisition of quick-firing artillery by Germany 
and Austria-Hungary probably initially played a major role.23  The Russian Minister 
of War Aleksei Kuropatkin suggested a bilateral arrangement with Austria-Hungary 
to postpone the exorbitant expense of supplying the Russian Army with this new 
gun.  However, while financial concerns provided an initial impetus for discussing 
armaments, the sincerity of the Czar in seeking to halt the arms race should not be 
underestimated.24   
 Russian policy drew on precedents dating to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, when Czar Alexander I had called for a system of stability and peace 
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through international law at the height of the Napoleonic Wars.25  The nineteenth 
century provided precedents for the calling of peacetime conferences to discuss the 
rule of international law in regulating war.  Conferences leading to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1864 and 1868, as well as the St. Petersburg Conference of 1868 and 
the Brussels Conference of 1874, were all called to discuss military issues, although 
questions of the laws of war played more of a role than disarmament.26  Notably, 
Czar Alexander II called two of these four conferences.27  As a further parallel, the 
Russian call for the 1868 St. Petersburg Conference also followed the development 
of a new weapon, an exploding bullet introduced by the czarist army.28  Therefore, 
when the industrially underdeveloped empire faced the introduction of another 
technologically advanced weapon into world arsenals, a call for a limit could provide 
a solution as it had in the past.   
 However, the Russian Council of Ministers soon widened the plans from a 
bilateral discussion with the Hapsburg Monarchy to a general multilateral discussion 
on the limitation of armaments.  The shift to a multilateral conference reflected 
concerns within the Russian government about the political repercussions of making 
a direct request to Austria-Hungary, whose government would surely disfavor a 
negotiation excluding its ally Germany.29  Additionally, a call made to Austria-
Hungary alone would demonstrate Russian weakness.30  The limited goal of 
regulating a single type of military ordnance suddenly expanded into a scheme to 
limit overall military expenditures.31  Conversely, while political considerations 
required a discussion among more states, the expansion of the agenda to more topics 
made it less politically feasible.   
 In the initial conference call in the summer of 1898, the Czar sought an 
international discussion on “means of ensuring . . . peace, and above all of limiting 
the progressive development of existing armaments.”32  Like the 1874 Brussels 
gathering, the conference was initially intended to generate ideas rather than to reach 
legally binding conclusions, possibly codifying principles of general disarmament in 
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an informal and non-binding protocol.  The parties would have greater liberty to 
openly discuss possibilities of arms limitation without committing themselves to any 
firm position.33  The resulting document could then be circulated among the powers 
and a formal legal agreement reached.   
 By the winter of 1898-1899, international developments dampened the Czar’s 
initial enthusiasm for disarmament, and the need to prevent the failure of a 
conference called solely for this purpose led to the inclusion of other issues in a 
second circular of December 30, 1898.34  This circular stressed the tentative nature of 
its agenda, merely calling for “a preliminary exchange of ideas between the Powers,” 
and expanding the topics from arms limitations to include “the possibility of 
preventing armed conflicts by . . . pacific means.”35  The new circular added 
arbitration and the completion of two earlier non-ratified documents, the 1874 
Brussels Declaration on the rules of war and the 1868 Geneva Convention extending 
humanitarian rules to war at sea.  If the states could not reach agreement on 
disarmament, perhaps a few accomplishments in the field of international arbitration 
would prevent the conference from appearing a complete failure.  Of the eight topics 
included for discussion in the circular, the first four addressed armaments, 
specifically seeking (1) “non-augmentation . . . of the present effective armed land 
and sea forces, as well as war budgets” and a study of future reductions, (2) 
“[i]nterdiction . . . of new firearms . . . and of new explosives,” (3) “[l]imitation of 
the use . . . of explosives of a formidable power . . . and prohibition of the discharge 
of any kind of projectile or explosive from balloons or similar means,” and (4) 
“prohibition of the use . . . of submarine or diving torpedo boats . . . [and] agreement 
not to construct in the future war-ships armed with rams.”36   
 In order to focus the conference upon technical issues of disarmament, the 
Czar’s circular forbade the discussion of political questions as well as any topics not 
specifically listed.  Diplomats could avoid being sidetracked by discussions on 
Alsace-Lorraine, the Boer states, or any other hot issues of the day.  The Czar 
advised that a great power should not host the conference, but rather a smaller state 
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should do so, so as to prevent undue influence on the debates.37  The Netherlands 
accepted sponsorship and issued invitations for the conference to be held at The 
Hague, in May of 1899.38  Significantly, the circular as addressed to “Representatives 
Accredited to the Court at Petrograd” barred states without accredited representatives 
in Russia, i.e. the majority of Latin American states.39  Invitations included European 
states, as well as Brazil, China, Japan, Mexico, Persia, Siam, and the United States.  
This exclusion of Latin America appeared particularly arbitrary in retrospect, as the 
Russian government extended invitations to Luxemburg, Montenegro, and Siam, all 
states with insignificant militaries and no accredited representatives in St. 
Petersburg.40   
 The prevailing opinion of the great powers held that the conference would 
yield few concrete results.41  Many leaders raised doubts about the sincerity of 
Russian aims.  The offer to limit military expenditures appeared planned to allow 
Russia time to develop its economy in peace before beginning a military buildup.42  
France lacked interest in the project, as an arms agreement might prevent it from 
retaking Alsace-Lorraine by force.  Moreover, the Russians had failed to consult 
France before issuing the circular, raising speculation that the Czar was abandoning 
its ally.43  The United States accepted the invitation, but as its peace-time army was 
far smaller than the European armies the Americans did not expect any limitation on 
their military.  Both Italy and Austria-Hungary opposed arms limits, and Japan 
would only accept a limit after its fleet had increased to the level of the great powers.  
Germany sought to prevent Russian embarrassment at the conference, but did not 
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wish to hinder its ability to arm itself. 44  Friedrich von Holstein, counsellor at the 
German foreign ministry, approved of German participation at the conference, 
believing only a broad multilateral discussion by all the powers could achieve any 
results and that “the idea of disarmament will not die.”45  This view reflected the 
general European resignation to attendance at the conference, intermingled with 
concerns for possible entanglements in unmanageable disarmament schemes.   
 
British Preparation for the Hague Conference 
 
 At the St. Petersburg Conference in 1868, the British had opposed 
technological limitations.  In 1899, the Russians were seeking two types of 
limitations, a quantitative limitation on troops or military budgets, and a qualitative 
limitation on new technology.  Given prior experience, the Russians could have 
anticipated that qualitative restrictions would be unpopular with Salisbury’s 
government.  The British also largely opposed quantitative limitation, refuting the 
concept of disarmament in planning documents prior to the conference.  Arguing that 
an international police force could not be created, the Admiralty and War Office held 
that disarmament could not fruitfully be discussed.  Yet the British government was 
not wholly opposed to arms control, and secretly offered a naval limit to Russia.  The 
government also favored limited regulations that would cement British naval 
predominance, such as banning naval mines, torpedoes, and submarines, or general 
naval program reductions which would preserve its relative superiority.  However, 
the British exceptions were not predicated on schemes of world government, and 
could be realized under existing circumstances.   
 The second Russian circular was partly motivated by a desire to isolate the 
British, by proposing topics expected to be unpopular with Britain.46  If Britain 
refused to attend, or obstructed discussions, the island nation could be isolated from 
the continental powers, while Russia would benefit from a diplomatic regrouping.  
However, the British foiled Russian schemes by accepting the Russian agenda.  The 
                                                 
44 Tate, The Disarmament Illusion, 277-78.  While most of the smaller powers generally approved of 
arms reductions, in its semi-official newspapers Serbia candidly expressed a desire to expand its 
borders in a general European war.  “We live in the hope of getting something for ourselves out of the 
general conflagration, whenever it takes place.”  Macdonald to Salisbury, Sep. 15, 1898, in FO 
412/65.   
45 Rich, Friedrich Von Holstein:  Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, Vol. 
II, 603.     
46 Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference, 50-51.   
 91
British government still opposed nearly every element listed for discussion, yet 
sought to avoid becoming the scapegoat for the failure of the program.  While British 
skepticism about general disarmament reflected real concerns about the legal 
challenges, this position ignored the ample experience Britain had in arms limitation 
and security-related law.  This knowledge would have demonstrated that law could 
play a role in shaping the security environment without the creation of a utopian 
world government.  Like technical arguments, international law could be utilized as 
another excuse for not accepting unwanted arms limitations.   
 Prime Minister Lord Salisbury shaped the British bargaining position.  Fresh 
from a diplomatic victory at Fashoda, which affirmed the value of sea power, 
Salisbury appeared reluctant to limit this potent weapon.  Like many international 
observers, he argued that the expense and the destructiveness of war deterred 
conflict.47  Salisbury selected delegates likely to vigorously oppose disarmament, 
most notably Admiral Jackie Fisher.48  Fisher later wrote of his experience at The 
Hague, claiming “every treaty is a Scrap of Paper!” 
The Essence of War is Violence.   
Moderation in War is Imbecility.   
You hit first, you hit hard, and keep on hitting. . . .  
It’s perfect rot to talk about “Civilised Warfare!”   
You might as well talk about a “Heavenly Hell!”49   
 
 There was little interdepartmental coordination before the conference, 
although this differed little from previous gatherings.  The Admiralty only learned of 
the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration after it was signed.  Moreover, the failure to 
consult other departments during submarine cable negotiations in the 1880s led 
belatedly to a complete reversal on policy, unfortunately only after a convention had 
been signed.50  However, Admiralty and War Office opinions were canvassed prior 
to the gathering, and both departments sent experts to accompany the British 
delegation at The Hague.   
 Salisbury questioned the value of disarmament, fearing a limit on armed 
forces could be circumvented, as Prussia had done after the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807.  
Troops could be trained while remaining unarmed, ready to organize in case of war.  
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Likewise, he pondered whether vessels could be built, exclusive of armament, to be 
fitted in case of emergency.51  In order to verify compliance with such an agreement, 
an “inspecting and restraining power” would be necessary, which would need to be 
created before any military limits could be discussed.52  An international police force 
would be needed to enforce these obligations both in peace and in war, an impossible 
task.   
 The argument, while touching upon real concerns, was disingenuous.  By 
placing the emphasis on creating an international organization prior to discussing any 
arms limitation, Salisbury could ensure that no serious discussion on unwanted topics 
took place.  Yet this statesman had knowledge of prior arms limitations operating 
without a police force, and more generally he was familiar with the functioning of 
international law.  While limitations of land forces might be violated relatively 
easily, it would be much more difficult to hide a large scale violation of a naval arms 
limit long enough to significantly alter the naval balance, and almost impossible to 
obscure a violation large enough to alter the strategic balance against the British 
Navy.  Major warships took at least two to three years to complete, and British policy 
traditionally relied upon its faster shipbuilding capacity to counter moves of foreign 
navies once uncovered.   
 The fighting services took their cue from Lord Salisbury.  Major-General 
Ardagh presented the War Office’s position in a key memorandum.  He believed that 
the “perpetual see-saw of superiority works for peace” by making states unwilling to 
go to war while rearming.53  Using similar arguments to those employed at St. 
Petersburg in 1868, Ardagh held that Britain, with its smaller population, relied upon 
technology to maintain its position as a great power.  A limited agreement on new 
technology, such as the ban on exploding bullets, could only succeed if it did not 
alter the outcome of war.  In 1868, the ban on exploding bullets was approved, and 
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was maintained as the weapon had never become integral to military tactics.  A 
broader interdiction on all technologies would fail for the practical reason that states 
would eventually find it in their interest to develop new weapons.  Moreover, Ardagh 
skillfully built a humanitarian argument in favor of new technologies.  Tracing the 
length of wars and casualty rates over several centuries, he noted that as firearms had 
improved and became more lethal, wars had become shorter while tactics had 
adjusted and actually reduced battlefield deaths.  This downward trend in casualties 
could be arrested if new technologies were not allowed to develop.54   
 In a related argument, Ardagh stressed the imperial necessity for technology 
in “savage warfare.”  If the more advanced states no longer harnessed their 
technological innovations to defense, the backward states would gradually achieve 
the same technological level.  Britain could not maintain its great empire if it had to 
put down uprisings by natives armed with the same quality weapons, and ultimately 
British safety would be imperiled by the “uncivilized races.”55   
 Ardagh was conversant in international law and an able delegate for the 
Hague assignment.  Like Salisbury, he raised questions about enforcement of 
disarmament, and the difficulty of defining a measure of military strength.  However, 
he also recognized the role of neutral powers in maintaining international law, in 
accordance with prevailing theory.  His protests against international law must be 
balanced with his practical awareness of how agreements could be enforced.   
 Ardagh advanced a thoughtful argument regarding the superiority of informal 
understandings.  Instead of completing the Brussels Declaration and forming a rigid 
multilateral code regulating wartime conduct, states could reach non-binding 
bilateral agreements to honor rules of war at the outset of a conflict.  The rules could 
be incorporated in national military codes, which would allow greater flexibility 
while still providing protection of humanitarian values in war.  More importantly, 
this method would avoid claims of violation of legal agreements.  Ultimately, he 
opposed every point on the czar’s agenda, with the exception of arbitration, on which 
he expressed no opinion, finding all restrictions on war or weaponry to be 
impossible.56   
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The navy even opposed arbitration.  Like the War Office, the Admiralty 
dissented from nearly the entire Hague agenda.57  Real disarmament would require 
international inspection.   Moreover, disarmament would be impossible until 
outstanding political differences had been resolved under the watchful eye of an 
international police force, an utterly unrealistic expectation.  In a style of writing sure 
to catch Fisher’s fancy, the key Admiralty memo paraphrased a recent article in the 
Fortnightly Review:   
Disarmament is impossible without a durable peace.   
Durable peace requires the adjustment of all differences.   
Adjustment is impossible without a force to enforce decisions.   
Such a force does not exist.58
 
Therefore, according to the logic, disarmament was impossible.59  
Technically, it would also be impossible for officers from two different navies to 
agree on how to measure effective forces.  Echoing War Office arguments, the 
Admiralty stressed the need for technological naval superiority to win wars against 
less advanced “savage” nations, and argued that modern weapons made war more 
humane.60   
While the Admiralty categorically refuted the possibility of disarmament, it 
expressed an interest in arms limitations that would preserve British strategic 
superiority.  The Admiralty approved a possible ban on submarines, as well as on 
mines and torpedoes.61  Submarines posed a particular threat to the British Navy, one 
that the Navy was then only beginning to recognize.  Britain depended on its 
                                                 
57 The Admiralty, unlike the War Office, even recognized the dangers posed by compulsory 
arbitration.  As the Navy planned to utilize peace-time preparedness to launch a rapid strike at the 
beginning of hostilities, the Admiralty feared that arbitration would drag out a dispute long enough for 
an opponent to mobilize their fleet, destroying the British advantage in preparedness.  Admiralty to 
Foreign Office, May 16, 1899, in FO 412/65.  Fisher noted that while on land the first pitched battle 
might not occur until the twelfth day, at sea, the first great naval action could take place on the twelfth 
hour of war.  Fisher, Memorandum, July 22, 1899, enclosure in Pauncefote to Salisbury, July 26, 
1899, in id.   
58 Diplomaticus, “The Vanishing of Universal Peace,” Fortnightly Review 65, no. 389 (1899): 877; see 
Notes on the Subjects to be Dealt with by Peace Conference, May 10, 1899, in Peace Conference, 
(1899-1900), ADM 116/98.  Diplomaticus was purported to be Alfred Austin, poet laureate and friend 
of Salisbury.  Howard, Britain and the Casus Belli, 157.   
59 Analysis did not solely concern the absence of an international police force, but also the lack of 
interest among the great powers.  “The fact is that after a long peace each Power is prepared to fight 
for what it considers its legitimate aspirations.  It will only yield when exhausted by war.”  Notes on 
the Subjects to be Dealt with by Peace Conference, supra note 58, at 1.  But the lack of legal 
enforcement was seized upon as a sufficient reason to oppose disarmament.   
60 Admiralty to Foreign Office, May 16, 1899, in FO 412/65.   
61 Notes on the Subjects to be Dealt with by Peace Conference, supra note 58, at 3-4.   
 95
battleship fleet for command of the sea, and the cheap new submersibles held out the 
prospect that small nations could thwart that maritime control.   
The British delegation to the Hague Conference received no formal 
instructions stating an official position on disarmament, but were referred to the 
memoranda created by the Admiralty, the War Office, and Lord Salisbury.  At the 
conference, the delegates utilized general arguments against disarmament, based on 
the needs of smaller powers to utilize advanced technology, the need of “civilized” 
states to maintain advantages over “savage” nations, and the unrealizable 
requirement that international law provide a fail-proof control.   
 
 
British Naval Armament Limitation Offer to Russia 
 
The Admiralty also made a practical suggestion about limiting naval 
armaments just prior to the Hague Conference, directly offering a naval arms limit 
with Russia.  Russian naval expansion had added to traditional Admiralty 
preoccupation with France.  In the 1890s, French naval policy had been hamstrung 
by rivalry between the Jeune Ecole and traditionalists, causing naval policy to gyrate 
between battleship and armored cruiser programs.62  While the armored cruiser posed 
a new threat to British naval dominance, the pace of French battleship construction 
diminished.  Yet the overall increase in the pace of construction created greater 
pressures for the Admiralty to maintain the two power standard, with unofficial calls 
for arms talks or a preemptive strike.63  These pressures overlapped with the Fashoda 
crisis and attendant risk of war with France in the autumn of 1898, as well as the 
German and Russian seizure of naval bases in China, signaling a more intense phase 
of East Asian colonial rivalry.64   
In response to increased Russian battleship and French armored cruiser 
construction, in 1898 the Admiralty announced an extraordinary building program of 
four battleships and four large cruisers, and anticipated that an additional two or 
three supplementary battleships would be required in the 1899 estimates.65  
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Additionally, First Lord of the Admiralty Goschen, on the urging of the Cabinet, 
suggested a naval agreement with Russia:  “Such a hint might test the sincerity of 
Russia, and at the same time afford a proof of our sincerity.”66  Through Charles 
Scott, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Goschen proposed the cancellation of 
the two supplementary battleships planned for 1899 in return for a Russian 
undertaking not to commence additional battleships beyond the four ordered the 
previous year.67   
The secret initiative occurred simultaneously with the annual presentation of 
naval estimates in Parliament, in which Goschen offered to reciprocally reduce naval 
construction.  When introducing the estimates, Goschen asserted that “I have now to 
state on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government that similarly, if the other great Naval 
Powers should be prepared to diminish their Programme of ship building, we should 
be prepared on our side to meet such a procedure by modifying ours.”68  The offer 
was made on the assumption that the relative size of the British Navy would be 
maintained, and that the other “great Naval Powers” would all agree to such a limit, 
which the First Lord listed as France, Russia, the United States, Japan, Italy, and 
Germany.   
Goschen made the announcement while explaining an increase in British 
naval expenditure, one which he held to be due to the rise of new naval powers, 
Germany, the United States, and Japan, as well as on account of an increase in 
Russian construction.  While the introduction of new naval competitors complicated 
the British situation, Goschen based the Admiralty program upon construction rates 
in France and Russia, the two leading naval powers.  Moreover, he noted the 
precarious nature of the peace in the preceding autumn during the Fashoda Crisis.  
Thus, the offer was not predicated on an optimistic view of current international 
relations.  While Goschen may have been motivated partly by a desire to justify 
increasing expenditure and lacked optimism about the realization of this public offer, 
it was noteworthy in acknowledging that a limit was possible.   
Ultimately, Russian foreign minister Muraviev refused the British offer, 
claiming that both states could continue to complete their programs prior to entering 
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into a general limit at the Hague.  The Russian diplomat also claimed that his country 
needed to build the battleships to match additional Japanese construction in the Far 
East.69  A bilateral initiative failed to address the full contours of naval arms 
competition.  While fruitless, the episode indicated that the Cabinet approved of 
some forms of arms limitation, and that Salisbury was willing to negotiate such an 
agreement.  Salisbury’s interests in arms limitation extended only as far as a numeric 
limit on new battleship construction with Russia, or at most with the other great 
powers.  When this proved impossible, his administration lost interest in most of the 
remaining forms of arms limitation.   
This previously unreported episode of secret diplomacy directly contradicted 
Salisbury’s publically proclaimed opposition to arms limits.  Salisbury opposed plans 
for broad global disarmament as unworkable, but his government’s initiative 
indicates that he accepted limited agreements among the great powers.  While 
Salisbury generally rejected the Czar’s program, he did not completely oppose 
limitations, nor believe arms control to be inherently unworkable.  Opposition to 
arms limitation in the Salisbury government needs to be viewed with this in mind, as 
it was never absolute.   
 
Great Britain and Disarmament at The Hague 
 
The First Hague Peace Conference opened on May 18, 1899, with the 
assembled delegates of twenty-six nations.  The work of the Conference was divided 
into three commissions, the first dealing with armament questions, the second 
discussing the rules of war, and the third handling arbitration.  The First Commission 
on disarmament sub-divided into two sub-commissions, one for military questions 
and the other for naval topics.  Despite widespread skepticism, the commission 
seriously and quickly initiated its work on disarmament.  While subsequently viewed 
as a first-class funeral for disarmament, negotiations focused on the initial steps 
needed to halt the arms race.70  Like the 1874 Brussels Conference, the stated 
purpose of the gathering was to provide a preliminary discussion of theoretical 
questions.  After developing principles related to disarmament, the powers would 
ideally take concrete steps to disarm.  There was political pressure to produce real 
achievements, although the addition of arbitration at the conference would hopefully 
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obscure failures in arms discussions.  Like the 1874 Brussels Conference, the stated 
goal was only a non-binding discussion, although in 1899 political expectations were 
higher.  Thus the gathering opened with both a lack of enthusiasm for disarmament 
and an obligation to achieve something tangible.   
The Russians made most of the proposals, as they had called the conference 
and had placed armaments on the agenda.  However, Russian interest had since 
waned, and their leadership wavered, as Russian delegates sometimes vigorously, 
sometimes half-heartedly raised armament issues.71  Among the other great powers, 
the French raised serious naval proposals, while the British and Americans drafted 
propositions as a counter to a restriction on bullets.  Among the smaller powers, the 
Netherlands offered several ideas.  Beyond this, few concrete suggestions were made 
for halting the arms race.   
The Russian delegate stressed that the parties were only discussing abstract 
principles, and that what was at stake was only a minor limit on armaments rather 
than disarmament.72  The debates surrounding the Russian proposals raised a number 
of contentious points.  The parties argued over the wisdom of limiting advanced 
industrial technology to warfare, the difficulties of quantifying military strength, and 
finally over what type of international institutions would be necessary to oversee 
disarmament.    
 
Land Armaments at the Hague 
The sub-commission dedicated to land armaments started with the easiest 
questions, beginning with small arms, and moved progressively towards more 
difficult topics, including limits on armies and military budgets.  The general goal 
was to limit expenditure associated with new weaponry, as the introduction of every 
new weapon necessitated the wholesale replacement of existing inventories.73  But 
such a goal logically required wide-scale limitation of military technology.  The sub-
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commission also discussed possible means of limiting the evolution of small arms, 
machine guns, explosive powders, and the new quick-fire artillery.  Additionally, 
experimental and exotic technologies such as aerial bombardment, poison gas, and 
expanding bullets were reviewed.  The assembly even questioned whether future 
advances in chemistry and electricity should be considered.74   
Sub-commission President Beernaert opened discussions on small-arms, 
seeking specific proposals, as well as general criteria for limiting them.  The Russian 
and Dutch delegates each arrived at the second meeting with their own agendas.  The 
Russians advocated setting a minimum bullet caliber and weight, initial velocity, rate 
of fire, and prohibiting both expanding bullets and automatic loading rifles.75  
Similarly, the Dutch sought to prevent changes in rifles, by freezing the then-current 
technological specifications.76  In the past half-century, muzzle-loading rifles had 
been replaced by breech-loaders, and rates of fire had increased.  At the same time, 
bullet caliber had decreased in order to accommodate larger quantities of 
ammunition.77  By limiting these trends and fixing a standard, the proposal sought to 
eliminate the incentive to replace small-arms regularly.   
Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, the German military delegate, raised 
numerous cogent arguments against the proposed restriction.  Schwarzhoff’s 
participation relieved the other delegations of the need to oppose disarmament 
vigorously, as his outspoken opposition claimed for Germany the onus of scuttling 
talks that no one truly wanted.  He noted the inherent difficulties in limiting some 
weapons characteristics, such as rate of fire, which largely depended upon training.  
He also raised more general concerns regarding the need to make proposals specific.  
The Russian and Dutch proposals both spoke of limiting substantial “improvements” 
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in firearms without specifying what would constitute such a change.78  Dutch 
delegate den Beer Poortugael also requested that vague wording be made more 
specific, opposing ambiguous proposals that allowed states with antiquated rifles to 
bring them up to the latest standard.79  It was unclear when a change would be 
considered a minor modification and when it was a major improvement.  Ultimately, 
the small-arms proposal failed despite Dutch pleas that the gathering accomplish 
something concrete.80   
The Russians also called for a halt to technological improvements in artillery, 
with the express purpose of allowing less-advanced states to catch up with their 
industrialized neighbors.81  While no one directly raised the argument, this 
technological leveling would eliminate advantages on which other great powers 
depended.  The proposal failed by a nearly unanimous vote.  Even the Russian 
delegate, apparently to avoid the appearance of isolation on the issue, did not vote in 
favor of it, despite this being the Czar’s initial goal for the conference.  Similarly, 
Russian plans to limit the introduction of new types of explosives failed after it was 
explained that the limit would require states to share formulas to ascertain that 
alterations would not be made.  The chemical composition of explosives was a 
closely guarded secret and states would not willingly share such information with 
rivals.   
The small-arms proposal opened up a broader debate on the limits of 
international law.  Den Beer Poortugael inadvertently raised the question when trying 
to persuade delegates to accept the Dutch small-arms proposal.  When explaining 
how parties could be prevented from impermissibly changing their firearms, he 
quoted a famed international lawyer from the 1874 Brussels Conference, Baron 
Jomini, as saying “[i]t would be a wrong to the contracting parties to imagine that 
they could have the intention of not abiding by their agreement.”82  Schwarzhoff 
noted that the vagueness of the proposals would foster misunderstandings.  
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Demanding clarity was not a question of bad faith, but of what improvements 
constituted radical transformations.  Ardagh also noted that such limitations could 
not be verified easily, as states could build prohibited rifles in state arsenals and 
distribute them on the outbreak of war.83   
This discussion highlighted challenges relating to international control.  Some 
delegates sought a judiciary to adjudicate breaches, and an executive to enforce 
judgments.  The Russian delegates noted that international control simply did not 
exist, even in the case of commercial conventions.  Nor could it realistically be 
expected that the gathering could create such an institution.  Even in 1899 statesmen 
acknowledged that by raising the question of control, the whole discussion could be 
derailed through the creation of an insurmountable difficulty.84   
 
General Limitation Debates at the Hague 
These same themes marked the general disarmament debates in the parent 
First Commission.  Broader topics were reserved for the full commission to debate.  
Russia made several proposals to halt the continental arms race, including limiting 
the number of troops, halting technological innovations, and restricting military 
budgets.  Russian delegates clearly indicated they did not intend general 
disarmament, seeking only to halt the continual increase of military forces.85  Russia 
sought a freeze on troop levels for a period of five years, in order to test the principle 
of arms limitation.  If the project succeeded in changing the arms race dynamic, then 
further conferences could actually reduce armaments.86  However, the Russian 
proposal expressly excluded colonial forces, on the grounds that they were necessary 
for local policing and defensive duties.  While the Russians claimed that these forces 
did not alter the balance in Europe, including their Siberian armies as colonial troops 
conveniently ignored the fact that these soldiers could quickly return to fight in the 
west.    
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Colonel Schwarzhoff again opposed the Czar’s project, eloquently pointing 
out the complexity of the situation.  He quickly noted that there could be no 
guarantee that Russia would not recall troops stationed in Asia.  Moreover, relative 
military strength depended on far more than troop numbers, and included the level of 
training, length of service, overall military organization, railroad networks, and the 
number and placement of fortresses.  Each state organized its defenses based upon its 
individual character, history, traditions, economic resources, geographic situation, 
and political policies.  Any reduction in one part of national defense could lead to 
increases in other areas.  For instance, a limit on troops could translate into financial 
savings that would be available for improving the national rail network, effectively 
increasing the military strength of a state like Russia that lacked a modern 
transportation infrastructure.  “I believe that it would be very difficult to replace this 
eminently national task by an international agreement.  It would be impossible to 
determine the extent and the force of a single part of this complicated machinery.”87   
Schwarzhoff questioned the central premise of the gathering, providing a 
weaker argument against the proposed five-year budgetary ceiling.  Although the 
Germans already had a five-year budgetary law, it did not coincide with the five-year 
period proposed by Russia.  This, according to Schwarzhoff, presented an 
insurmountable obstacle.88  Other states raised issues concerning military 
organization and the relative size of forces.  Disarmament was generally predicated 
upon the status quo, disadvantaging nations already maintaining limited armies.  
Similarly, the United States delegation noted that its military was much smaller than 
those of European states, especially as a percentage of population.  Therefore, the 
United States would “refrain from enunciating opinions upon matters into which, as 
concerning Europe alone, the United States has no claim to enter” as “their size can 
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entail no additional burden of expense upon [other nations], nor even form a subject 
for profitable mutual discussion.”89   
The Russians argued that a temporary agreement would allow arms to be 
limited without seriously risking national security.  The Hague negotiations were 
framed as a preliminary examination, allowing an abstract discussion of principles.  
Despite the assurances that discussions were only theoretical, the underlying tenor of 
the Russian proposals favored disarmament.  Many participants questioned Russian 
sincerity, and more importantly the great powers did not generally desire arms 
limitation.  When the Czar’s grand proposal came up for a full discussion, no state 
offered any suggestion as to how it could be put into effect.  Sparing the Russians the 
embarrassment of a vote, the Commission President deemed the silence an adequate 
answer, and referred the topic for further study.90  The parties agreed to place a 
resolution in the final act of the conference, which read “[t]he Commission is of 
opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden 
on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral 
welfare of mankind.”91  While resolutions could include binding obligations, this one 
contained no expression of duty, stating only the principle that the arms race posed a 
burden on humanity.   
 The British delegation maintained a low profile.  While Ardagh took a central 
role in the expanding bullets discussions, and Fisher vigorously participated in naval 
armament discussions, in the general arms discussions there was no need to wreck 
the Czar’s proposals.  Although the British delegation had been prepared to raise 
stronger objections to the Russian program, the Germans carried the burden for them.   
 
Naval Armaments at the Hague 
The discussions on naval limits witnessed a repetition of now-common 
themes.  The British delegation supported weapon bans deemed favorable to British 
interests while still proclaiming the impossibility of regulating areas deemed 
unfavorable.  The first set of naval topics included a limitation on naval ordnance and 
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new explosives.92  Russian naval delegate Scheine called for a prohibition on “new 
types” of artillery.  Scheine also contemplated limitations on automatic reloading 
mechanisms, novel means of using explosives, as well as other experimental 
weapons such as pneumatic artillery.93  He summarized the great changes from 
smooth bore to rifled cannon and from muzzle loaders to breech loaders, noting how 
each advance required costly rearmament, and then expressed misgivings that the 
introduction of new quick-firing artillery would cause similar disruptions.  Scheine 
divided naval artillery by size, then sought a limit on modifications to heavy cannons 
between 120 and 430 mm.  The initial Russian proposal called for an upper limit of 
200 mm for quick-firing ordnance and an overall ceiling of 430 mm for ordinary 
cannon.94  The 430 mm limit was slightly below the largest naval ordnance then 
afloat, the “monster guns” featured in Italian battleship designs in the 1880s.  Since 
that time, the cult of the monster gun had declined as newer explosives had allowed 
much smaller guns, with far higher rates of fire, to exceed the penetrative power of 
the older artillery.95  The British Admiralty noted that they had no intention of 
building warships with 430 mm guns as the weapons were obsolete, yet would not 
relinquish the future right to build larger guns.96   
Opponents seized on the proposed limitation of technology, noting that what 
constituted a “new type” of artillery remained vague.  Moreover, Admiral Fisher 
claimed the advanced states needed the latest technologies in order to maintain their 
position over “less civilized” nations.97  Fisher claimed that a “committee of control” 
would be necessary to enforce Scheine’s propositions, constituting an unacceptable 
sacrifice of national sovereignty.  Scheine countered that a simple conventional 
pledge would be sufficient, and noted that the brief three year period of the naval 
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proposals would allow the concepts to be tested.  While Scheine and French Admiral 
Pephau provided firmer texts, these did not overcome objections, mainly from 
German quarters, that the regulations were unenforceable.98   
American Captain Mahan attacked the proposed regulations, noting that gun 
power was inextricably linked to armor strength, and then disingenuously suggesting 
that the only way to limit guns was to simultaneously limit armor.  Possibly failing to 
recognize the Captain’s sarcasm, the sub-commission president van Karnebeek 
roundly praised him for suggesting a new avenue for arms limitation and added the 
topic of armor limitation to the discussion.99  Not to be outdone, Mahan took the 
argument a step further and claimed that the only way to limit armor would be to 
place unacceptable prohibitions on domestic steel-manufacturing processes.  
Disavowing any intention of limiting armor, he asserted the impossibility of banning 
new industrial processes.   
Ultimately, the Russian gun proposals failed to generate support and were 
quietly referred to national governments for further study.  While the British 
delegation claimed that lack of international supervision made the gun proposals 
unworkable, these objections did not prevent them from supporting Russian proposed 
limitations on the use of rams and submarines.100  Russian delegate Scheine weakly 
supported his government’s proposals, providing an escape clause by demanding a 
unanimous ban on submarines.  This was a level of adherence not required for other 
arms limitations.  Fisher promptly contradicted Scheine, claiming that only a great-
power ban was needed to ensure Great Britain’s support.101   
Like the torpedo boat, the submarine was viewed as the weapon of weaker 
naval powers.  In 1899, the technology was in its infancy and appeared suitable only 
for coastal and harbor defense, but still held the prospect of providing an inexpensive 
alternative to battleship fleets.  Smaller nations were less willing to ban submarines, 
while larger naval powers were more willing to limit the technology.  Germany, 
Italy, Japan, and Russia all expressed an interest in a universal prohibition, but 
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France, with its jeune ecole tradition of torpedo boats and coastal-defense battleships, 
wanted to keep submarines legal.  The United States, which along with France had 
invested in submarine technology, also sought to maintain their legality.  Austria-
Hungary, along with Turkey, and the nominal advocates of arms limitations the 
Netherlands and Sweden, sought to keep submarines legal, claiming the weaponry 
was merely defensive in nature.102  When the topic reached a final vote in the full 
commission, ten states voted in favor of a ban while nine voted against, but many of 
those voting in favor attached reservations requiring unanimity, and the measure 
failed.103   
The conference also considered a ban on the construction of war vessels with 
rams.  As in the submarine debate, states split along lines of interest, with Great 
Britain willing to ban the weapon if all the great powers agreed.  Again, the smaller 
powers opposed this limitation and the proposal failed to receive general support.  In 
contrast to the submarine, a potential weapon of the future, the days of ramming had 
long passed.104  A ban could have been enacted without radically altering naval 
armaments or relative naval strength, yet opposition remained fierce.  This indicates 
that states reached agreements only after full discussion of the potential value of 
weapons, making the resulting arms declarations more than token achievements.   
The final naval topic raised was a budgetary limit on naval forces.  As a last-
ditch effort at reaching some agreement, Scheine proposed that states fix their annual 
naval budgets for a three-year period, freely communicating this information with the 
other parties.  Once this information had been exchanged, no further alteration would 
be allowed.  The proposal would allow budgets to be linked to foreign expenditures, 
and as each state set its own limits, would be less intrusive on sovereign 
prerogatives.  Several delegates questioned how the proposal would work, fearing 
that it would be difficult to set a budget without knowing what others were planning.  
Scheine replied that if one state set a budget that was dramatically higher than past 
expenditures, other states could proportionally increase their budgets in response, 
thus contemplating at least a two-stage process with provisional budgets being 
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adjusted after information was received from other states.105  Again, Germany rallied 
opposition to the proposal, noting that its budget was already set by law, providing 
information for all states, thus “what is demanded already exists.”106   
 
The naval discussions highlighted the manner in which technical and legal 
arguments were used to prevent unpopular bans from being enacted.  Contemporary 
legal arguments need to be viewed in this light.  The British claimed that lack of an 
international police force made a gun limitation absolutely impossible, yet they had 
no similar qualms about submarine limitations.  The unwieldy multilateral 
conference also provided an excuse for inaction, as states demanded unanimous 
acceptance of limitations, recognizing the impossibility of achieving consensus.  
Britain’s position on submarines and rams exposed the fallacy of this position, as the 
world’s greatest naval power, when it truly sought an arms limitation, recognized 
that only a ban on the great powers was essential.  Moreover, Fisher later admitted 
that he exaggerated some of his positions at the Hague.107  Ultimately, technical and 
legal arguments were utilized as justifications for disposing of unpopular arms 
topics, leaving armaments unregulated and public opinion mollified by asserting the 
impossibility of taking action.   
The qualitative proposals, rather than quantitative, garnered the most attention 
at the conference.  The Czar’s proposals tended to focus upon the effect of new 
technology on weapons acquisitions, thus limitations sought to halt the advance of 
new inventions.  This approach was problematic, as not only were states generally 
unwilling to limit technology, but even when there was an interest in doing so it 
proved too difficult to define and restrict unknown future changes.  For instance, 
while naval delegates were discussing limiting obsolete weapons like rams, the 
British Navy was conducting its first experiments with wireless telegraphy, a 
technology which would utterly change British force dispositions in the next decade 
and arguably constituted a major military advance.108  While dual purpose 
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technologies such as steel-making and wireless telegraphy were innovations that 
were too useful to civilization to allow them to be banned, the inability to predict 
how a seemingly benign technology could be employed militarily was a significant 
difficulty.   
The alternative lay in quantitative restrictions.  Proposals to limit troop 
numbers or budgetary outlays were unenthusiastically discussed.  The most 
significant proposal for naval arms limitation, the quantitative limit offered in 
Parliament by First Lord Goschen in March, was not even mentioned at the Hague by 
either British or foreign delegates.  The tense state of relations in Europe prevented 
most states from seriously considering fundamental limitations on military force 
levels.   
A memorandum prepared at the Hague by Charles à Court, a military expert 
attached to the British delegation, provided a British perspective on the situation.  On 
land, the question revolved around the largest military power, Germany.  The refusal 
of Germany to consider army limitations doomed the proposals, as smaller countries 
could not safely limit their armaments in the face of German intransigence.  At sea 
the situation was the reverse.  Absolving the British of any responsibility, à Court 
claimed that the smaller naval powers drove this arms race dynamic.  He argued that 
Britain was willing to limit naval armaments, if the other great powers were willing 
to accept an agreement.  Neither Russia nor France would single-handedly fight 
Britain at sea, nor agree to a limit while Britain maintained naval supremacy.  The 
rise of Japan, Germany, and the United States complicated calculations.  None of the 
rising naval powers would willingly limit their forces until they had attained the level 
of strength of the next highest ranking navy.109   
Fundamentally, most states still perceived that armaments increases could 
improve their security more than arms limitation.  International law lacked sufficient 
strength for states to place their full trust in this institution, particularly when 
disarmament was under discussion.  In order for law to play a role, the arms 
limitation goals needed to be less ambitious, and confidence in law needed to be 
increased.  In spite of this, legal arguments against arms limitation had a 
disingenuous quality, like similar arguments of insurmountable technological 
                                                 
109 Charles à Court, Note on the Limitation of Armaments, enclosure in Pauncefote to Salisbury, July 
31, 1899, in FO 412/65.   
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complexity.  Had the political will been present, these difficulties could have been 
overcome, as demonstrated at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922.   
 
Armaments Declarations at the Hague 
 Despite failures in other limitation debates, the First Hague Peace Conference 
did decide on three binding declarations limiting largely new and untried armaments.  
These included bans on aerial bombardment, on shells whose main purpose was to 
disperse poisonous gas, and on expanding bullets, of which the dum-dum was the 
most famous type.  While aerial bombardment and poison gas generated little 
discussion, the dum-dum bullet declaration was directed against ammunition used 
solely by Great Britain, resulting in heated discussions.   
 Expanding bullets were not on the Czar’s program but had been raised as a 
possible case for limitation by the Swiss and Dutch delegations at the first meeting of 
the military sub-commission.  While preparing for the conference, General Ardagh 
alluded to the subject when he correlated the decreasing bullet size with improved 
weaponry effectiveness.  As firearms evolved from muzzle-loaders to breech-loaders, 
and then into repeating rifles with magazines, bullet sizes had correspondingly 
decreased.110  As this evolution continued, British military experts feared that smaller 
bullets would have less effect on their targets.  In the Chitral Campaign in India in 
1895, veterans claimed that the .303 caliber bullet of the Lee-Metford rifle was 
insufficient to stop determined foes.111  In response, the British had developed bullets 
that expanded upon hitting a target.112   
 According to critics, expanding bullets caused excessive injury as a soldier 
could be put out of combat merely by being struck by an ordinary bullet.  The 
standard of excessive injury set in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration was raised.  
                                                 
110 The percussion musket used up until the Crimean War, the “Brown Bess,” was .753 inch caliber 
and fired a round per minute, the muzzle-loading Enfield was .577 caliber, the breech-loading 
Martini-Henry was .45 caliber, and the magazine Lee-Metford rifle was .303 caliber with a rate of 
fifteen rounds per minute.  The Maxim gun increased the rate of fire exponentially to 500 rounds per 
minute.  Ardagh, The Duration of Wars, from the 14th to the 19th Centuries, in particular reference to 
Improvements in Destructive Agencies, App. No. 6, enclosure in War Office to Foreign Office, May 
17, 1899, in FO 412/65, at 97-98.   
111 Ardagh claimed that soldiers pierced by smaller bullets had been able to continue unhindered to the 
hospital.  Pauncefote to Salisbury, June 15, 1899, in FO 412/65.   
112 These bullets had a solid lead core partially covered by a nickel envelope up to the tip of the bullet.  
The opening in the nickel envelope allowed the soft lead to expand and break into fragments.  As 
Ardagh pointed out at the conference, all older bullets, such as those still used by the British Army’s 
Snider rifle, lacked the nickel envelope over the lead bullet, and therefore also expanded.  See H. 
Brackenbury, Memorandum enclosure in War Office to Foreign Office, June 22, 1899, in FO 412/65.   
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However, the British expanding bullet did not violate the specific terms of this 
convention as it was not actually explosive.  The British couched their need for 
expanding bullets in the context of “savage warfare” in the colonies, but also planned 
to use similar bullets in European warfare, possibly to break up cavalry or bayonet 
charges.113  The dum-dum bullet, referring to a type made in the eponymous Indian 
town, was merely the most famous expanding bullet, as the British made similar 
ammunition in domestic arsenals.  At the conference, Ardagh studiously avoided all 
mention of these other expanding bullets, as they belied claims the ammunition was 
solely designed for imperial conflicts.  He could have made stronger arguments by 
noting that the dum-dum bullet did not have the traumatic effects of the Tübingen 
bullet – a type used in a medical study on the effects of expanding bullets, which was 
often referred to in discussions at the Hague.  However, as other expanding bullets in 
the British home island arsenal mirrored the effects of the Tübingen bullet, he 
remained silent.114   
 Ardagh argued that while “civilized” soldiers would lie down and wait for the 
stretcher-bearer upon being hit by a small bullet:  
your fanatical barbarian, when he receives wounds of a like nature, which are 
insufficient to stop or disable him, continues to dash on, spear or sword in 
hand, and before you have had time or opportunity to represent to him that his 
conduct is in flagrant violation of the understanding relative to the proper 
course for a wounded man to follow, he may have cut off your head.115   
 
Both Ardagh and Fisher repeatedly made distinctions between “civilized” and 
“savage” warfare, where other delegations had been silent.  But Ardagh’s claim that 
more powerful bullets were needed against savages went beyond acceptable 
standards, and drew the rebuke of the Russian delegate, who claimed the 
humanitarian spirit did not allow such invidious distinctions.116  However, privately 
other delegations acknowledged the British division between civilized and savage.  
In much the same off-hand manner as neighbors swap recipes, the Dutch delegate 
claimed his army had been happy with the effects of fully-mantled bullets when 
                                                 
113 Ardagh, Memorandum respecting Expanding Bullets, enclosure in Pauncefote to Salisbury, June 
15, 1899, in FO 412/65.   
114 Second Supplementary Note by Major-General Ardagh on Small-arms bullets, enclosure in 
Pauncefote to Salisbury, June 27, 1899, in FO 412/65.   
115 Ardagh, Memorandum, enclosure in Pauncefote to Salisbury, June 15, 1899, in FO 412/65.   
116 Raffalovich, May 31, 1899, Scott, ed., 1899 Proceedings, 343.   
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fighting their savages, as they had the penetrating power necessary for reaching foes 
sheltering behind improvised stockades and in jungles.117   
 More pointedly, the proposed regulation would only have applied 
reciprocally, so the British could have continued to use the bullets against non-party 
colonial subjects.  The fact that the British continued their opposition to the 
declaration in spite of the provision of reciprocity further indicates that their real 
concern was with using expanding bullets against European enemies, not colonial 
insurrections.  Britain maintained expanding bullets in its home arsenals for use in 
European conflict, thus Ardagh studiously avoided mentioning his government’s real 
intentions in stockpiling this ammunition.  Had British concern solely been with 
colonial subjects, a ban similar to the St. Petersburg Declaration should have been 
acceptable as it had been in 1868.  By focusing its objections upon use in colonial 
warfare, the British delegation evaded the ignominy that would have attached to its 
plans to use expanding bullets against European soldiers.   
 Despite British opposition, the conference voted to ban “the use of bullets 
which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard 
envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.”118  The 
precision of the language caused some misgivings, as the American delegation 
claimed that it would be better to codify the general principle that all bullets causing 
excessive harm should be banned.  As the specificity of the declaration would make 
it easier to circumvent, the Americans proposed an alternative declaration enlarging 
upon the general principle espoused in the St. Petersburg Declaration.  However, 
other delegations countered that a general principle would be easier to breach, as 
there would be no clear definition of what “excessive injury” encompassed.  This 
lack of clarity would merely lead to recrimination and embittered relations.  Thus the 
assembly decided upon a specific formula, even if the formula only removed one 
weapon from the world’s arsenals.   
 In comparison to the debates on expanding bullets, the two other armaments 
declarations regulating poison gas and aerial bombardment followed non-contentious 
                                                 
117 Ardagh, Memorandum, enclosure in Pauncefote to Salisbury, July 10, 1899, in FO 412/65.  While 
the Dutch delegate was seeking British adherence to a declaration against expanding bullets, and may 
have made the claim merely to persuade Ardagh, it reflected common views on the necessity of 
superior weapons to maintain European predominance.   
118 “Declaration Concerning Exploding Bullets, July 29, 1899,” American Journal of International 
Law 1, no. 2 Supplement (1907): 155-157.    
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debates.  Only American Captain Mahan raised serious objections to banning poison 
gas, claiming that: 
 . . . it was illogical, and not demonstrably humane, to be tender about 
asphyxiating men with gas, when all were prepared to admit that it was 
allowable to blow the bottom out of an ironclad at midnight, throwing four or 
five hundred into the sea, to be choked by water, with scarcely the remotest 
chance of escape.119   
 
Mahan remained adamantly opposed to a ban on poison gas, on principle rather than 
out of national interest.120  The final regulation banned shells “the object of which is 
the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”121  In providing the British view 
in the naval sub-commission, Fisher expressed no opposition to the ban on poison 
gas, but the Admiralty, together with the War and Foreign Offices, overruled him.122   
 Finally, the conference placed a limit on aerial bombardment.  Ardagh 
considered aerial bombardment in the same light as other technological advances, 
seeing only the potential for new weaponry to limit the expense and devastation of 
war.  Noting the length of the siege of Paris in 1870-1871, Ardagh claimed that most 
deaths during the siege resulted from starvation rather than bombardment.  While the 
Prussian bombardment had been relatively ineffective, Parisian morale was shattered.  
If an inaccurate bombardment could quickly end a siege, reasoned Ardagh, precision-
targeted aerial bombardment could rapidly bring even a determined garrison to 
terms, sparing the lives of civilians in the process.123   
As in the 1868 discussions of “explosive missals,” the 1899 gathering 
suffered from a lack of practical experience or precise terminology.  As the British 
and other delegations were unclear about the future evolution of aerial technology – 
                                                 
119 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Vol. II, 37.   
120 Ardagh speculated that the Americans must have been planning a poison gas shell, but while the 
technology had been available since the Civil War, no weapon was forthcoming.  See F. Stansbury 
Haydon, “A Proposed Gas Shell, 1862,” Journal of the American Military History Foundation 2, no. 1 
(1938).   
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123 Ardagh was prescient in his predictions:  “That the discharge of high explosives from aerial 
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which in 1899 did not include heavier-than-air craft – their members referred to both 
balloons and kites as the subject of their deliberations.124  It proved difficult both to 
frame regulations as well as to judge the necessity for limiting aerial warfare before 
it had been attempted in a systematic way.  Many shared the humanist sentiment 
expressed by Dutch delegate den Beer Poortugael when he asked “[d]oes it not seem 
excessive to authorize the use of infernal machines which seem to fall from the 
sky?”125  Yet more delegates agreed with his assessment that technology could easily 
make such weaponry possible.  Without knowing the direction technology would 
advance, the conference decided on a five-year ban, allowing reconsideration of the 
question once the technology had sufficiently matured.   
 The British delegation withdrew its objections to the aerial bombardment 
prohibition in order to gain American support in defeating the expanding bullet ban, 
a matter far more important to the British military.126  However, the British 
delegation continued to shape the development of regulations through its opposition 
to them.  The delegations had initially planned on incorporating all three armament 
declarations either in a protocol to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration or in a single 
treaty instrument.  It became clear that British opposition to two of the three 
declarations would result in the island nation’s refusal to ratify a document 
containing all these provisions, so the final declarations were completed as separate, 
independent, treaties.  Ultimately, Great Britain, alone among the twenty-six nations 
at the conference, refused to ratify any of the three declarations.127  Of the other great 
powers, only the United States also chose to abstain from some of the declarations, 
fulfilling earlier predictions that armaments questions could differentiate the two 




 The limits of international law were starkly highlighted during the First 
Hague Peace Conference in 1899.  Sovereign nations refused to accept grand 
                                                 
124 The uncertainty about future technology led to a very general and vague regulation.  The 
imprecision of the language led the Romanian delegate to seek clarification on whether the declaration 
forbade high-angle mortar fire.  Coanda, June 22, 1899, Scott, ed., 1899 Proceedings, 281.   
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126 Declaration respecting the shooting or dropping Projectiles or Explosives from Balloons or other 
novel analogous contrivances, Enclosure No. 4, in War Office to Foreign Office, Oct. 11, 1899, in FO 
412/65.    
127 The British changed course at the Second Hague Conference, ratifying bans on all three weapons 
systems.  Scott, ed., Hague Conventions.   
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disarmament proposals predicated on a radical revision of the international system, 
through such means as the creation of an international police force.  Yet without 
provisions for a police force, delegations professed themselves unable even fruitfully 
to discuss arms limitations in the abstract.  While these opinions were widely stated, 
they belied a certain disingenuousness.  Like technical objections to limitations, legal 
objections were highlighted in order to dispose of a subject that not one of the great 
powers truly wanted to discuss.  This political opposition, more than technical 
objections, ended disarmament initiatives in 1899.  Britain advocated and opposed 
specific weapons limitations based upon its strategic position, rather than out of 
concern for humanitarian principles.  Its approach to international law indicated a 
pragmatic assessment of the advantages and liabilities of treaty restrictions.  Its 
opposition to disarmament based on claims of impossibility must also be viewed as 
an argument designed for public consumption.   
 Had statesmen been truly interested in checking the arms race, they might 
have focused on more pragmatic means.  Had they focused upon arms control, 
utilizing the existing legal system and based on an expectation of continued interstate 
competition rather than a fundamental change in international relations, limitation 
might have proved possible.  Certainly, Britain, in spite of its overall opposition to 
disarmament, was willing to regulate specific naval weapons posing a threat to its 
position.  Moreover, the Admiralty had publicly expressed a willingness to limit 
construction programs if the other great powers followed suit, and privately made a 
concrete offer to Russia.  These were dangerous offers to make had they been purely 
bluff.  Like the prohibitions of specific naval weapons, Britain was willing to accept 
limits that would not be predicated upon cumbersome, and wholly hypothetical, 
international machinery such as an international police force.   
The large multilateral format of the Hague Conferences proved problematic 
for negotiations, while a general limitation of armaments required each state to 
reassess its position relative to all its competitors, rendering bilateral discussions 
incomplete.  The challenges of limiting the continental arms race proved too large, 
and political will utterly lacking, to take such a step.  Yet arms control was possible, 
but depended on the circumstances of the political relationship in question as well as 
the characteristics of the weapons system being regulated.  Naval arms control could 
succeed in a manner in which land restrictions could not, if crafted around existing 
political relationships and the structure of the international political system.  Three 
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years after the Hague, an arms race at the opposite end of the globe was successfully 
ended through an arms control treaty.  Naval weaponry was regulated, Britain played 








CHAPTER 4:  NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AND THE ARGENTINE-
CHILEAN EXPERIENCE:  PRECEDENTS, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 After the fanfare accorded disarmament, the failure of arms limitation 
initiatives at The Hague in 1899 obscured the positive role that law had played.  
While lack of interest amongst the great powers doomed disarmament, the format of 
the negotiations hampered realistic solutions.  A large multilateral disarmament 
agreement, as discussed at The Hague, required novel legal institutions to monitor 
and enforce obligations.  However, the British government recognized that arms 
limitations had precedents and could contribute to security within the existing 
international legal framework.  In the nineteenth century, Britain had repeatedly 
regulated naval armaments, and by 1900 the British increasingly had reason for 
seeking security through a limitation of the naval arms race.   
Technical differences presented unique opportunities for naval arms control.  
Not every weapons system was alike.  Ease of verification of force levels was central 
to arms control, and it was easier to monitor battleships than troop levels.  Moreover, 
different negotiating formats were more likely to create effective agreements.  
Statesmen did not view arms control as an impossibility after the Hague gathering, 
but recognized that it had to be crafted around realistic objectives and the realities of 
technology and politics.   
Naval arms control enjoyed a remarkable success in this period, ending a 
crisis between Argentina and Chile.  The 1902 agreement between the South 
American neighbors, brought about largely through British intervention, 
demonstrated the role law could play in maintaining security.  While the Hague 
conference provided an example of unworkable concepts of disarmament, the Latin 
American Pacts of May suggested the possibilities of arms control.  This chapter will 
detail British involvement in the Pacts of May, then turn to larger themes raised by 
naval arms control.   
 
Ardagh, Naval Arms, and the 1897 Greco-Turkish Negotiations  
 
 While one of the British Hague delegate’s arguments in 1899 focused on the 
impracticality of disarmament, the Foreign Office had substantial experience 
utilizing international law in shaping the security environment, including arms 
limitation.  Thus, the opposition to disarmament expressed at The Hague 
incompletely reflected the British position.  The British government recognized that 
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arms control could work and had been used with success in the past.  Prior to his 
participation at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, Major-General Ardagh had come 
into contact with arms limitation obligations.  Ardagh was involved in a major inter-
agency review of Canadian defenses in the late 1890s, which focused on the defense 
of the Great Lakes region.  The 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement was not directly 
mentioned in the resulting memoranda, but remained in the background of these 
discussions.  The Admiralty and War Office sought means to rapidly improve the 
naval balance at the outset of a potential Anglo-American conflict.  These war plans 
would be activated at the outbreak of hostilities upon the expiration of the Rush-
Bagot Agreement. 1  Thus, it was not unusual that the treaty was not specifically 
mentioned.  The United States had been hinting at ending the agreement since the 
early 1890s, and this contingency would have informed Canadian defense 
discussions.  Significantly, the military services built plans around peacetime 
restrictions and the attendant need to rapidly increase naval forces in a crisis.   
Ardagh also contributed to peace negotiations ending the 1897 Greco-Turkish 
War, charting potential boundary changes and their strategic significance.2  This 
experience, similar to his later role in the Argentine-Chilean negotiations, involved 
the resolution of a boundary conflict while related negotiations involving naval 
power were conducted.  It provided Ardagh with exposure to discussions involving 
the prospective limitation of armaments, two years prior to the Hague Conference.  
The fact that a limitation of the Greek Navy had not been dismissed as a legal 
impossibility indicated that arms control was a possible solution, albeit one that 
Britain did not desire.   
 Greece initiated the war in 1897 in order to liberate Crete, hoping that 
Ottoman military power would prove hollow.  The Turks won the land campaign, 
driving the Greeks back in Thessaly, but the Greek Navy dominated the Aegean, 
allowing volunteers and supplies to aid in the liberation of Crete.  The Greek Navy 
had been expanded in the early 1890s with the addition of three coastal-defense 
                                                 
1 Sir John Ardagh, Naval Action in Defence of the Question of the Great Lakes, in WO 106/40/B1/5 
(1896).    
2 Ardagh, Memorandum on Hostilities between Turkey and Greece, Mar. 23, 1897, FO 881/6907 
(1897); Ardagh, Turco-Greek Frontier Strategical Rectification, June 30, 1897, in Ardagh Papers, 
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battleships, giving Greece a credible force in the Eastern Mediterranean.3  Because of 
the role played by the Greek Navy in the brief conflict, the negotiating parties 
initially considered stripping the fleet, or at least its main units, from Greece.  Britain 
opposed this action, not on legal grounds, but on strategic interest, and the demands 
were dropped.4  Ardagh remained abreast of the strategic issues involved in Greco-
Turkish relations and likely would have had knowledge of possible peace terms, 
including naval arms limitation.  In spite of his opposition to disarmament in 1899, 
the Director of Military Intelligence witnessed practical applications of arms 
limitation.     
 
Argentine-Chilean Naval Arms Treaty:  Background 
 
 The Argentine-Chilean dispute arose from the rise of the two nations and the 
coalescing of a regional balance of power system in South America.  By the late 
nineteenth century, South American diplomacy had evolved into a diagonal system, 
with a Pacific rivalry between Chile and Peru interacting with an Argentine-Brazilian 
rivalry in the Atlantic.5  As Chile and Argentina gained prominence and increasingly 
competed for dominance, their diplomats conspired with each other’s enemies, 
increasing regional instability.   
Chile’s power dramatically increased through the 1879-1883 War of the 
Pacific, in which this nation decisively wielded sea power to defeat Peru and 
Bolivia.6  Chile gained the nitrate-rich coastal provinces of Tacna and Arica, 
providing an important revenue source while also earning the lasting enmity of its 
vanquished foes.  Chile gained the reputation as the “Prussia of South America,” an 
analogy furthered by the eternal Peruvian and Bolivian quest for the lost provinces, 
as a regional Alsace-Lorraine.7   
                                                 
3 Zsis Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919 (London: Routledge, 2005), 14-15.  The 
addition would have allowed Greece to even challenge the Hapsburg Navy on reasonable terms.  
Fotakis, Greek Naval Policy, 11.   
4 Monson to Salisbury, May 7, 1897, No. 147, in Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of 
South-Eastern Europe, FO 881/6994 (May 1897); Michel Lhéritier, Histoire Diplomatique De La 
Grèce De 1821 a Nos Jours, Vol. IV (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), 410.   
5 Robert N. Burr, “The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America:  An Exploratory 
Essay,” Hispanic American Historical Review 35, no. 1 (1955).   
6 Donald E. Worcester, “Naval Strategy in the War of the Pacific,” Journal of Interamerican Studies 
5, no. 1 (1963).   
7 Moreover, Chile furthered the image by employing German military instructors and adopting the 
spiked Prussian helmet for the army.   
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 Meanwhile, Argentina, which had a comparable population in 1870, 
underwent significant peaceful development as a destination for European capital 
and immigrants.  By 1900, Argentina had a population 50% greater than Chile’s, as 
well as three times the level of foreign trade, and growth trends indicated a further 
widening of the gap. 8  Given regional tensions and insecurity, Argentine fears grew 
that Chile would launch a preemptive strike before the disparity was insurmountable.  
In the 1890s, Argentine-Chilean tensions reflected a struggle for regional dominance.  
Ongoing boundary disputes provided an endless source of friction, raising the 
prospect of war in repeated crises from 1898 onwards.   
An increasingly intense naval arms race reflected these tensions.  The rugged 
terrain of the Andes made large scale land warfare difficult, while the War of the 
Pacific indicated the possibilities of naval conflict.9  In the early 1890s, Chile 
possessed clear naval superiority over Argentina, adding a battleship and two small 
cruisers in 1893.10  The two states embarked on both a qualitative and quantitative 
arms race, purchasing protected cruisers, then more powerful armored cruisers 
during the 1898 war scare.  The two fleets increased dramatically during the arms 
race, reaching a fever pitch in 1901-1902.  Purchases arranged in the last six months 
of the competition alone would have expanded the tonnage of the Argentine and 
Chilean navies by 88% and 50%, respectively.11  The Chilean fleet doubled in size 
over the decade, while the Argentine navy nearly quintupled.   
As in European geopolitics, conference diplomacy masked strategic 
maneuvers.  During a 1900 war scare, Peru and Bolivia exploited an upcoming Pan-
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completed.  George von Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone:  The Argentine Military and the 
Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902 (London: Praeger, 1999), 150-54.   
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American conference to advocate the principle of universal obligatory arbitration to 
force Chile to arbitrate their border.  Like Germany before the Second Hague Peace 
Conference, the Chilean government was concerned that the gathering could be used 
to spring a diplomatic trap.12  At the 1901 Pan-American Conference held in Mexico 
City, Chile appeared nearly isolated, with the majority of South American states 
supporting compulsory arbitration of past disputes, and Chile advocating only 
mandatory arbitration of future disputes.  Ultimately through diplomatic 
maneuvering, Chile persuaded Ecuador and Columbia to adhere to its view, but 
nonetheless appeared beleaguered and alone, suffering a diplomatic defeat.13   
 The strategic situation paralleled the later Anglo-German rivalry in several 
respects, including the existence of both qualitative and quantitative competition, 14 
and the use of both formal and informal arms control.  Chile repeatedly sought a free 
hand by affirming peace with its northern neighbors to allow a focus on its southern 
border, and by reaching a détente with Argentina that would force Bolivia and Peru 
to accept their existing borders.   Moreover, the relative Chilean decline intensified 
pressures with its government recognizing it had a window of opportunity to act 
before the Argentine Navy became too strong.  The possibility of a preemptive strike 
by Chile was as at its greatest in 1897-1902.  The Chilean posturing mirrored later 
policy debates within British and German circles as to the possibility of resolving the 
arms race through a unilateral strike.  Finally, the resolution of the Latin American 
arms race highlighted the potential role of international law in addressing strategic 
uncertainties and mistrust which was applicable to the later European naval arms 
race.   
 
Chile’s financial situation deteriorated steeply in early 1898.  Banking 
authorities indicated the state was spending around £445,000 per month maintaining 
its military on active status, with cash reserves dwindling to £593,000 by April.15  By 
July Chilean finances had collapsed, causing a run on the banks, and by August, the 
Chilean economy was at a standstill.  The freezing of credit and the lack of money 
                                                 
12 The European governments followed the conference closely, so the diplomatic lesson would have 
been known to Germany.  Moreover, some evidence suggests that Germany sought to prevent the 
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15 Gosling to Salisbury, Apr. 2, 1898, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/316, (1898) at 53.   
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led stores to close and left workers unpaid, further fueling animosity and the 
military’s determination to act.16  In response, the Chilean government removed its 
currency from the gold standard, and ordered the printing of $50 million.  In order to 
bolster confidence in currency markets, the law creating the new currency required 
that Chile begin stockpiling gold in order to redeem the paper currency for gold in 
January 1902.17   
After leading their countries to the brink of war, the presidents of Argentina 
and Chile sought to rebuild their relations.  The northern border question was 
resolved by early 1899, and Presidents Errázuriz and Roca planned a significant 
diplomatic gesture to confirm their reconciliation.  The two national leaders boarded 
their flagships and each led a naval squadron to the Straits of Magellan, where 
dignitaries from both states toasted their friendship.  During the four day visit, each 
took turns regaling and hosting the officers of the other navy at balls and dinners held 
on deck and ashore at Punta Arenas.  While the gathering signaled a détente allowing 
an easing of finances in both states, no fundamental breakthrough occurred, and no 
armament agreement was reached.18   
 
British Intervention and Resolution 
 The large British commercial interests in Argentina and Chile propelled 
Britain to take a central role in resolving the dispute.  The British government 
recognized that war would potentially have disastrous effects on British investments, 
and because of the increasingly interlocked balance of power system, would likely 
spill over into neighboring South American states.19  An Argentine-Chilean war 
would have given Peru and Bolivia the opportunity to profit from the Chilean 
distraction.  Brazil would have an interest in preventing Argentina from becoming 
                                                 
16 Gosling to Salisbury, Aug. 1, 1898, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/317, (1898) at 108.  In June, a 
Chilean newspaper calculated the relative balance of strength of the two navies, finding that Chile still 
retained a sufficient margin of force to attack.  Using an undefined “coefficient” to determine the 
strength of major fleet units, it arrived at the conclusion that Chile maintained a 510:457 superiority 
over its rival, although recent acquisitions of armored cruisers favored the latter state, accounting for 
100 and 300 points of the respective totals.  Gosling to Salisbury, June 28, 1898, in FO 16/316, at 203.     
17 Gosling to Salisbury, Aug. 3, 1898, in FO 16/317, at 113.   
18 Gosling to Salisbury, Mar. 1, 1899, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/324, (1899) at 48.   
19 Ardagh reflected on this risk in advocating Britain shoulder the immediate expenses of surveying 
the border.  “That alone would be a great gain, when the large financial interests of Great Britain in 
both Chili and Argentina are considered.  We must also reflect that if war broke out between those 
countries, it is not improbable that the conflagration might extend over adjacent states, so, on the 
whole, the extra cost of a Survey Party would be a well spent insurance.”  Memo by Ardagh, Chili-
Argentine Arbitration Tribunal, Dec. 28, 1901, in Argentina-Chile Boundary Arbitration, FO 16/356, 
(1896-1902) Part II, at 372.   
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too strong, and would therefore intervene on behalf of Chile.  If Peru intervened, 
Chile hoped it could gain support from Ecuador and Columbia, both of whom had 
border issues with Peru.  Given the potential for escalation, the British government 
perceived a necessity to defuse the crisis.   
Moreover, Robert Burr has argued that Great Britain needed to reaffirm its 
regional presence in South America following the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with the 
United States.20  Britain had relinquished its central role in the region by 
acknowledging American predominance in the Caribbean, and wanted to reassert its 
position in South America.  At the turn of the century, a perception of British decline 
existed in Latin America, with many in the region viewing early British defeats in the 
Boer War as a signal of the limits of the island nation’s power.21  The smaller Latin 
American nations increasingly sensed a shifting of power, with the prospect that they 
could someday fend off the great powers.  British involvement in resolving the 
regional tensions held the prospect of enhancing British prestige.   
Britain initially became involved in the crisis with respect to Argentine-
Chilean boundary delimitation, with the parties delaying final settlement into the 
1890s when increased activities in the region brought the parties into confrontation.  
In 1896, the two nations agreed in theory to arbitrate parts of their dispute, with the 
British sovereign acting as the arbitrator.  When crisis flared up in 1898, Salisbury’s 
government accepted the role, recognizing the risk open conflict would cause to 
Britain’s commercial interests in the region.22  According to Foreign Office records, 
the only time in modern history where the British sovereign had acted as an arbitrator 
in an international dispute occurred more than half a century previously when Queen 
Victoria arbitrated a dispute between France and Mexico in 1844.23  The Foreign 
Office saw arbitration as a thankless and dangerous task and approached the duty 
warily.24  Given this degree of caution and the rarity of British arbitration of 
international disputes, the government’s acceptance of the role is noteworthy.  A 
dangerous task was undertaken only because it was outweighed by the risk of war.   
                                                 
20 Robert Burr, By Reason or by Force, at 248.   
21 Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Jan. 19, 1901, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/331, (1901) at 55.   
22 Barrington to Villiers, July 13, 1898, in FO 16/356, Part I, at 22.   
23 Memorandum by Oakes, Chile-Argentine Arbitration, Nov. 7, 1902, in Argentine-Chile Boundary 
Arbitration, FO 16/357, (1902) at 399.   
24 “There is always some danger – especially in S. & C. America – of difficulties arising if our 
diplomatic or Consular officers are permitted to arbitrate.”  Foreign Office Memo, Aug. 26, 1901, in 
FO 16/331, at 316; “It would be a thankless and unsatisfactory office to judge from past history. . .”  
Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Aug. 26, 1901, in FO 16/331.     
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Even after the parties accepted arbitration, the case proceeded exceedingly 
slowly.  The parties initially submitted the relevant documents to the arbitrators, but 
Chile included a memorandum stating its case.  Argentina requested the right to reply 
to the Chilean statement, taking 23 months to prepare its argument.  As the crisis was 
reaching a fever pitch in late 1901, Chile had already taken seven months in 
preparing its own counter-argument, and it could be expected Argentina would take 
at least as long to respond, dragging the case on through 1902 despite the growing 
risk of war.25  The British organized a three-man arbitral panel, including General 
Ardagh, as a military officer of high rank, Thomas Holdich, a renowned geographer 
with experience in surveying operations, and Lord Macnaghten, an eminent jurist.   
Meanwhile, tensions continued to mount between the parties.  In 1901, both 
sides took actions in the Andes which were viewed as encroachments by their 
neighbor – Chile building roads in the mountains, and Argentina stationing police 
forces in the disputed territory.  By December, Argentina broke off relations with 
Chile and war appeared imminent.26  Chile mobilized its national guard and halted 
railroad traffic to concentrate troops.  The Chilean Minister sent mixed signals to 
British Consul Cusack-Smith.  Cheerily claiming that despite the concentration of 
troops he expected negotiations to proceed peacefully, he simultaneously asked for 
British good offices to resolve the matter.27   
While the immediate problems were patched over, William Barrington, 
British Minister Plenipotentiary in Buenos Aires warned that “[a]s matters stand, 
slight friction might lead to war;” while the same day the British consul in 
Valparaiso believed “Chili would welcome rupture though will probably not provoke 
rupture.”28  Argentina expressed exasperation at what it perceived to be Chilean 
breaches of an informal arms control agreement, and impatience to end the wasteful 
expenditure on armaments.  President Roca held that “[h]e was quite alive to the 
disastrous results inseparable from war should such a calamity ensue, but the armed 
                                                 
25 Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Dec. 23, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 367.   
26 Argentina maintained that while it called its ambassador home in the midst of the crisis, Chile 
continued to be represented in Buenos Aires, so there was never a complete rupture.  Barrington to 
Lansdowne, Dec. 22, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 352.  However, the underlying message of such 
an action taken at the height of a crisis, clearly indicated a break in relations.   
27 Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Dec. 12, 1901, and Dec. 13, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 339, 341.   
28 Barrington to Lansdowne, and Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, both Dec. 22, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part 
II, at 352, 353.   
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peace, which was the present state of the relations between the two Countries was 
very onerous and could not go on indefinitely.”29   
The British legations in Buenos Aires and Valparaiso sent a flurry of 
telegrams attempting to avert war.  At the New Year, after daily telegrams had been 
sent from both capitals throughout the previous month, an eerie silence sparked fears 
that war had broken out.  Both King Edward VII and Prime Minister Salisbury had 
their holidays interrupted as the government sought to respond to the crisis, 
indicating the severity of the situation and the importance of the matter to Britain.30   
While war had not commenced, the Foreign Office recognized that more 
direct involvement would be needed to defuse the crisis.  The perpetually postponed 
border survey, which was not scheduled to commence until all arguments had been 
filed by the parties, was immediately ordered into action.  Legally unripe, as the 
parties had not completed their arguments, the survey party was innocently renamed 
a “commission of enquiry.”  Despite the lateness of the season, with good 
mountaineering weather expected only until April, the survey party sailed from 
England in January with the express goal of cooling passions by demonstrating some 
sign of progress on the border question.31   
The Foreign Office issued to its legations draft telegrams to be sent to both 
capitals in the event of hostilities, indicating British action if war broke out.32  The 
legations in Buenos Aires and Valparaiso had already been ordered to communicate 
directly with one another, in order to save time and provide a second channel for 
Argentine-Chilean negotiations.33  In December 1901, and again when negotiations 
reached their peak in April and May 1902, almost daily messages were sent by 
telegraph in duplicate between the Foreign Office and the two legations.  Given the 
cost-paring nature of the Foreign Office, which required authorization for the 
smallest expenses, and the tendency of the legations to explicitly justify the sending 
of any telegram, the acceptance of this extraordinary expense was significant.34   
                                                 
29 Barrington to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, 381.   
30 Lansdowne had prepared a course of action if war appeared imminent, which specifically required 
approval of the King, who was at Sandringham, and Salisbury, holidaying at Hatfield.  They were 
duly contacted on December 30th when it was feared war had broken out.  Viliers to Salisbury, Dec. 
30, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 397.   
31 Holdich to Viliers, Jan. 6, 1902, in FO 16/356, Part III, at 453.   
32 Draft Telegram, undated, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 401.   
33 Foreign Office to Cusack-Smith, Dec. 12, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 338.   
34 Boyce has calculated that the expenses for the exchange of two ten-word telegrams between 
Australia and Great Britain, further away than Chile, but still a comparable distance, cost the 
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Up to this point the British government had shown reluctance to directly offer 
good offices without the request of both parties, and Argentina had consistently 
opposed British intervention due to the public outcry that would result.  However, the 
shock of the December 1901 war scare motivated the British government to action, 
and a new level of activity was undertaken to resolve the crisis.  Financial pressure 
was brought on the parties, as the arms race had largely been funded through loans, 
while Britain sought to negotiate a comprehensive settlement.   
The competition had reached a fever pitch in these months.  Argentina had 
previously warned Chile that any naval acquisition would be matched, establishing a 
tacit agreement on naval weaponry.  In early 1902, Chile purchased the recently 
completed protected cruiser Chacabuco and three destroyers to redress its declining 
strategic position under the guise of replacing outdated ships.  Argentina perceived 
this as a direct threat, as such warships would have no additional value in a conflict 
with Peru or Bolivia.  In response, Argentina authorized the immediate purchase of a 
pair of more powerful armored cruisers.35  Seeing its strategic situation slipping 
hopelessly away, Chile made an even bolder move, ordering a pair of 11,800 ton 
second-class battleships.36  Each battleship was nearly half-again as large as any 
previous acquisition by either navy, signaling a major escalation in the race.   
The British brought financial pressure to bear upon the two countries, 
indicating that no further credit would be forthcoming to finance the purchase of 
warships.  Privately, international bankers, including representatives of Barings 
Brothers, who had significant interests in Argentina, and Rothschilds, with a major 
presence in Chile, and Argentine financier Ernesto Tornquist, went further by 
seeking direct British facilitation of arms control negotiations, and by stating their 
                                                                                                                                          
equivalent of several weeks’ wages for the average worker.  While the government received 
reductions in return for subsidies, the cost was still extraordinary.  This rate was reduced for the 
colonies in half in return for government subsidies, still in effect in 1899.  Robert W. D. Boyce, 
“Imperial Dreams and National Realities:  Britain, Canada and the Struggle for a Pacific Telegraph 
Cable, 1879-1902,” English Historical Review 115, no. 460 (2000): 45, 66.  This was at a point when 
fiscal restrictions were so tight, the Chilean legation even asked permission to purchase a flag to 
replace the weather-beaten Union Jack hanging in front of their office.  Gosling to Salisbury, Mar. 7, 
1898, in  FO 16/316, at 36.   
35 Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 24, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 51.   
36 Chilean authorities had already held a lengthy meeting with British naval architect Sir Edward Reed 
in December, resulting in the order of the two vessels in Britain.  Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Dec. 
23, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 354.  The vessels were specially designed for Chile, for delivery in 
twenty months.  Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 8, 1902, in FO 16/ 357, at 17.   
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unwillingness to lend any more funds.37  However, the Chileans had their gold 
conversion fund.  Following the currency collapse and financial law of 1898, 
revenues had been raised to convert $50 million in printed money to gold by the end 
of 1901, but successive governments found the temptation of the fund too great to 
resist.38 As the new year began with crisis, the gold standard was not restored, and 
the Chilean government held this fund of ready cash as a weapon in its conflict with 
Argentina.39    
In the meantime, Argentina countered the Chilean purchase of second-class 
battleships with a pair of 14,850 ton first-class battleships.  Significantly, these 
Argentine warships would have been the only first-class battleships owned by a Latin 
American power, as previous arms acquisitions had featured vessels smaller than 
those operated by great power navies.  In reality, both the Argentine and the Chilean 
governments recognized the need to end the arms race.   
Chilean financial markets reacted poorly to rumors that the gold conversion 
fund might be raided, making further purchases unlikely.40  At the same time, 
Argentine President Roca acknowledged the “paralyzing effects” on credit caused by 
the arms race expenses, admitting that no further loans were available and his 
country could only continue by a fresh issue of paper money as well.41  Still, Chile 
was wary of making direct offers to Argentina, and initiatives were perceived as a 
sign of weakness by the Argentine press.42  More centrally, a deep-rooted mistrust of 
Chile required a firmer agreement than either the presidential meeting of 1899 or 
informal arms control had provided.  Back-channel negotiations through the British 
legations allowed a compromise to be arranged without exposing negotiations to the 
sensationalist press.  The utilization of a binding agreement provided greater 
confidence to both parties.   
 
The Pacts of May 
Great Britain played a central role brokering the treaties that ended the arms 
race, by serving as a channel for communication, by threatening the closure of 
                                                 
37 Barrington to Revelstoke, Mar. 25, 1902, in FO 16/356, Part III, at 600.  On the banking presence in 
Chile and Argentina, see Gustavo Ferrari, Conflicto Y Paz Con Chile (1898-1903) (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1968), 56.   
38 Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, June 18, 1901, and Nov. 18, 1901, in FO 16/331, at 138, 236.   
39 Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 8, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 12.   
40 Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 3, 1902, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/336, (1902) at 70.   
41 Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 10, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 29.   
42 Barrington to Lansdowne, Mar. 7, 1902, in FO 16/356, Part III, at 589.   
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financial markets, by agreeing to arbitrate future disputes between the parties, and by 
acting as a source of enforcement for the resulting Pacts of May.43  The Pacts of May 
involved a comprehensive solution of outstanding problems.  In addition to signing 
an arms control agreement, the parties completed a general arbitration agreement, a 
mutual declaration of non-intervention in political disputes, and a mutual declaration 
agreeing to appoint a British expert to complete the actual border delimitation 
reached through British arbitration.  Through international legal instruments, backed 
by British prestige, the two neighboring states had the confidence to securely limit 
armaments.   
The negotiations leading to the arms control agreement featured many of the 
methods of arms limitation utilized in later naval agreements.  The final agreement 
incorporated qualitative and quantitative limitations, fleet tonnage ceilings, and 
numeric ship balances.  The parties also showed an understanding of the problems of 
control and monitoring, opting against a complex formula in favor of a 
straightforward and easily verified agreement.   
 The immediate question related to halting the delivery of recently purchased 
warships.  The Argentine government sought an actual reduction in naval 
expenditures and suggested that each side sell the two most recently ordered 
warships – the two armored cruisers building for Argentina at the Ansaldo naval yard 
in Italy, and the two battleships ordered by Chile from Vickers.  Chile feared that the 
naval ratio would continue to favor Argentina, and sought to keep these new 
battleships while possibly discarding older warships.  Chile offered that each side 
purchase one of the battleships while cancelling the cruisers.44   
It appeared that negotiations had reached an impasse.  It was at this point that 
Argentina made its order for the pair of first-class battleships, and in reply Chile 
threatened to order a first-class battleship of its own.45  However, the British prodded 
the parties forward, demanding a halt to the arms race.  The Foreign Office explicitly 
instructed its agents in both capitals to insist that no further armaments be purchased, 
to “invite from them an undertaking that they will not engage in abnormal 
                                                 
43 The British role was expressly stated in the preamble to the resulting naval arms control treaty.  
“Convention between Chile and the Argentine Republic Respecting the Limitation of Naval 
Armaments, May 28 1902,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 3 Supplement (1907). 
[hereinafter 1902 Chilean-Argentine Convention].   
44 See Barrington to Lansdowne, May 17, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 90.   
45 Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 19, 1902, and Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 20, 1902, in FO 16/357, 
at 41, 45.   
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expenditures upon naval and military measures” and “[e]xplain that this friendly 
warning is one we cannot allow the Argentine/Chilian govt. to disregard.”46  Given 
Britain’s leverage as weapons exporter and lender, the parties continued the talks.  
The negotiations which had already been conducted through British agents, were 
now ordered to continue at British insistence.   
Chile sought arms control as part of a comprehensive settlement, including an 
agreement obliging Argentina to arbitrate any future disputes, and an undertaking of 
neutrality in any controversies involving third parties.  By binding Argentina to 
neutrality in continental affairs, Chile could finally resolve its border issues with 
Peru and Bolivia.  Argentina, for its part, preferred to negotiate an arms deal, while 
negotiations on arbitration and neutrality could continue afterwards.  Argentina 
feared that a treaty obligating detachment would provide Chile with a carte blanche 
to undertake further aggression against its northern neighbors.47  A declaration of 
neutrality would be tantamount to making Bolivia a Chilean satellite.   
As in the Anglo-German naval arms race later in the decade, the issue of 
linking arms control to a larger political settlement was discussed.  Connected to this 
issue was the larger question of aggressive behavior if neutrality had been pledged in 
regional disputes.  In addition to immediate questions of naval armaments, the 
powers had to wrangle with larger questions of a regional balance of power.   
The Argentine government desired arms control, with President Roca asking 
“how far Chile will go towards disarmament.”48  Argentina offered to cancel both the 
two battleships and two armored cruiser orders it had pending in return for halting 
the two Chilean battleships.  Argentina sought to leverage a larger paper program in 
gaining Chilean acceptance of arms control, by offering to cancel two ships under 
construction and two planned ships in return for two vessels.  At the same time, Roca 
depended upon the moral support of Britain to ensure observance of any agreement.  
Great Britain occupied a unique position in this regard, as Chilean ships were being 
built in a private British yard.49  Enforcement of the treaty was critical.  Britain 
wielded significant influence in regional politics, assuming the role intended for an 
international police in monitoring disarmament.   
                                                 
46 Draft Telegram, Apr. 21, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 47.   
47 Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 24, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 51.   
48 Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 30, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 63.   
49 The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 forbade the sale of warships to belligerents, but the law did not 
apply in time of peace.  Nonetheless, the British government exercised significant influence over the 
sales by private firms, as seen in their seizure of dreadnoughts being built for Turkey in 1914.   
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Chilean President Riesco responded that Chile could go as far as actual naval 
reduction, beyond cancelling current orders, but only if Argentina agreed to a 
statement of neutrality regarding Pacific questions.  A refusal would be deemed “an 
admission of determination to interfere in Pacific questions.”50  A telegram was 
immediately sent back from Argentina, disclaiming any interest in Pacific questions, 
but also expressing reluctance to put this in writing, fearing that arbitration of future 
disputes might signal an intention to ignore future Chilean aggression.51   
Chile desired that the parties reach an equilibrium in tonnage, fearing 
permanent naval inferiority if the current force ratio was enshrined in a treaty.  Chile 
offered to negotiate in London, and failing any decision, would let the Admiralty 
decide on the relative forces to be maintained by each party.52  Argentina had 
persistently objected to a larger British role in the parties’ dispute, and could not 
accept the infringement upon sovereignty of allowing a foreign government to dictate 
the size of their navy.  Moreover, Argentina raised relevant questions about the 
complexity of the Chilean proposal, preferring instead to cancel current contracts.  
Even the cancellation of current orders would hold headaches for the parties, as the 
contracts specified indemnities if the purchases were not completed.  However, 
gradual reduction would naturally result as older ships were retired, and the 
cancellation of current orders could be accomplished by sale to third parties, 
obviating any financial loss to the parties.  This would relieve the parties of the 
challenges of verifying compliance with any agreement, and obviate the need for any 
complex formula of naval parity to be reached.53  Ultimately, Argentina agreed to 
negotiate on the remaining issues simultaneously, although expressing doubts that 
agreement could be quickly reached.   
On this basis, the parties decided to limit naval armaments on a trial basis, for 
a period of five years.  In a five article agreement, the Chilean-Argentine Convention 
of 1902 froze armament levels and advocated further reductions.  The treaty provided 
for the sale of warships under construction and the dismantling of existing vessels.  
Article I provided the main regulation, explicitly referencing the need for a “just 
balance” between the naval forces of the two states to be achieved by reduction.54  
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52 Lowther to Lansdowne, May 20, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 100.   
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Beyond the cancelation of current warship orders, the parties agreed to negotiate a 
further reduction within twelve months.  The treaty forbade any increase in naval 
armaments for five years, unless eighteen months’ notice was given to the other 
party.55  It was left unclear whether the parties were obliged to give eighteen months’ 
notice prior to acquiring a warship, or prior to ordering the construction of a new 
vessel, which could take two or more years.  Instead of a detailed agreement 
discussing tonnage, artillery, or number of warships, the treaty generically bound the 
parties with regard to naval armaments, satisfying Argentine concerns regarding 
negotiations becoming bogged down in details.56  Indicative of current assessment of 
naval power, submarines were excluded from regulation along with coastal artillery 
and other harbor defenses.   
The bilateral agreement also addressed larger questions relating to the 
regional balance of power, recognizing the role of the naval race in exacerbating 
tensions over the boundary question.57  Specifically, it forbade the parties from 
selling warships to third parties “having questions pending” with either state.  This 
provision prevented the continuation of the arms race through proxies and explicitly 
recognized the larger context of their rivalry.58  Moreover, a mutual declaration of 
non-intervention was attached as a preliminary protocol to the arbitration agreement 
signed contemporaneously with the arms control treaty.  In the declaration, Argentina 
pledged non-interference in the external affairs of other countries, while Chile 
confirmed it had no plans for territorial expansion, “except such as resulted from the 
fulfillment of Treaties at present in existence or which might hereafter be concluded. 
. .”59  Both statements confirmed the Chilean right to negotiate a final settlement with 
Bolivia and Peru, without the specter of Argentine intervention.   
Both states ratified the agreements during the southern hemisphere’s winter, 
but not without internal dissent.  Explanatory notes and protocols were exchanged at 
the May signing, modifying the original agreement to assuage nationalist feelings.  
An explanatory protocol, concluded in July “in order to remove the slight doubts that 
have arisen,” further defined spheres of influence. Additionally, the protocol 
confirmed that the parties had the right to exercise “natural defense” in their 
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58 Id. Art. III.   
59 “General Arbitration Treaty between the Argentine Republic and Chile, May 28, 1902,” American 
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respective regions, Argentina in the Atlantic, and Chile in the Pacific.60  In this 
document, the parties agreed that the implementation of existing treaties could not be 
subject to arbitration, reaffirming Chile’s desire to settle its northern boundary 
questions without Argentine interference.  Moreover, Argentina was reluctant to 
reduce its extant fleet, and the Explanatory Protocol held that the creation of a “just 
balance” did not require any further sale of ships, and could be accomplished by 
disarming ships retained by each side.61  While the Chilean Congress passed the 
treaty as modified by the protocol and notes, there was some dissent from the 
resulting agreement.  The original treaty forbade any further purchases, while the 
July protocol eviscerated the obligation to reduce existing fleet levels.  The Chilean 
navy was not allowed to increase its armaments while Argentina was not required to 
decrease its navy, thus de facto Argentine naval superiority might be codified by the 
treaty.62   
After the initial indignation receded, Chile valued the newly enshrined 
entente with Argentina too much to disturb the settlement.  While Chile had not 
regained naval parity, Chile had assured peace with Argentina, allowing a stronger 
negotiating position from which to conclude negotiations with Peru and Bolivia.  
British arbitration of the Argentine-Chilean boundary was completed at the end of 
1902, providing a settlement of the border question.  The ultimate award granted 
Chile 54,000 square kilometers of disputed territory and Argentina 40,000 
kilometers.63   
After the announcement of the arbitration award in November of 1902, the 
parties finalized their naval reductions.  The May treaty had required the parties to 
meet within one year to set the “just balance,” anticipating a systematic reduction of 
their navies.  Meeting in Buenos Aires, the parties reached a further agreement in 
January 1903.  In this supplementary treaty, the just balance, “discreta equivalencia,” 
included the previously discussed sale of the two armored cruisers building for 
Argentina and the two battleships under construction for Chile.64  The agreement 
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specified that the warships could not leave their dockyards without the joint 
agreement of both parties.  Great Britain was given a monitoring role, as the ships 
were formally put at the disposal of the British government.65  If the ships remained 
unsold, they could not be reincorporated into their navies.66  To further adjust the 
naval balance, Chile was required to disarm its battleship Capitan Prat while 
Argentina disarmed two armored cruisers, the Garibaldi and Puerredon.67  
Disarmament was defined as removing the ships from a state of readiness, mooring 
them in a basin, discharging the crews beyond men needed for preservation, and 
landing all coal, powder and ammunition, small artillery, torpedo tubes and 
torpedoes, electric search-lights, boat, and stores.68  Neither party could rearm the 
disarmed warships without giving eighteen months’ notice.69   
The Chilean public expressed some regret at the arrangement, but most 
recognized the need for an agreement.  The supplementary agreement did not require 
congressional sanction, thus would not be scrutinized as thoroughly as the original 
Pacts of May.  While the arms race was halted, a mild blowback effect did result:  
Chile utilized funds from the sale of the battleships to complete a dockyard at 
Talcahuano.70   
Britain accepted its role under the agreement and the parties jointly 
authorized the sale of the four warships.  Ultimately, Britain purchased the two 
battleships in order to prevent their acquisition by a rival navy, and Japan bought the 
two armored cruisers, shortly before its 1904-1905 war with Russia.  Because of 
differences in armament and speed, the battleships did not fit tactically with other 
British battleships,71 providing a reason not to purchase privately-built battleships in 
the future.  Further negotiations were conducted by both Chile and Argentina for the 
sale of additional warships.  However, the use of joint negotiations indicated their 
desire for further economy was balanced by their need to maintain relative power 
towards one another.72  The Latin American crisis had been resolved, but the larger 
armaments competition remained.   
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Subsequent History of the Pacts of May 
 Ultimately, both parties upheld the treaty and the war scares evaporated.  
With the arrival of a new Liberal government in 1905, the Foreign Office did not 
forget the lessons learned.  Earlier that year, the British role in resolving the arms 
race was raised in the House of Commons, and remained part of the ongoing debate 
surrounding arms reduction.  William Randal Cremer, Liberal member for 
Haggerston and noted arbitration advocate, requested information on the Argentine-
Chilean naval arms treaty.  As the Latin American arms agreement had been 
accompanied by an arbitration treaty, Cremer asked about possible arms reductions 
with the French based on Britain’s existing arbitration agreement with its Gallic 
neighbor.73  In preparing the government’s reply, the Foreign Office circulated a 
memorandum detailing the naval agreement and the British role in resolving the arms 
race.74  Cremer’s exchange with Prime Minister Balfour highlighted radical Liberal 
desire for arms limitation, especially as the call for a Second Hague Peace 
Conference had been issued the previous autumn.  The Latin American model, as 
well as the British role in resolving it, was part of the Liberal Party’s frame of 
reference prior to assuming office that winter.   
In addition, the Argentine-Chilean model was raised in connection with a 
new arms race brewing in South America.  In 1906, Brazil embarked on a program of 
naval expansion following the loss of an ironclad in a harbor explosion.75  Seeking to 
regain the naval preeminence it possessed before the rise of Argentina, Brazil 
ordered three 13,000 ton battleships from Armstrong, threatening to reignite regional 
naval competition.76  Again, borders and the regional balance of power underlay the 
acquisitions as much as the prestige of naval preeminence.  Brazil was negotiating a 
border issue with Bolivia, while the Bolivians were receiving diplomatic assistance 
from Argentina.  Believing that Argentina would never directly challenge Brazil if 
the latter possessed naval superiority, Brazil sought to regain its former position.77  
                                                 
73 Cremer, Hansard 4th ser., CXLVII, 867-869 June 6, 1905.   
74 Memorandum, Arbitration and Disarmament Treaty between Argentina and Chile, June 5, 1905, in 
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75 Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 149.   
76 Dering to Grey, July 25, 1906, in Brazil, FO 371/13, (1906).   
77 Barclay to Grey, Oct. 5, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 246.   
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As a possible additional motive, Brazil possibly sought an alliance with the United 
States, and hoped to bargain from a position of regional preeminence.78  National 
interest coincided with political ambition.  The British minister plenipotentiary 
concluded that private interests played a significant role in the arms contracts, rather 
than any tensions with Argentina.79   
Argentine financier Tornquist, assisted by Revelstoke and Baring, again 
sought back-channel negotiations to resolve the issue, meeting on shipboard with 
William Buchanan, American delegate at the recently concluded Rio de Janeiro Pan-
American conference.  Tornquist, speaking on behalf of the Argentine President, and 
the American diplomat negotiated a compromise involving the transfer of warships 
between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.  Brazil would cede two of the three proposed 
battleships to Argentina and Chile, and in return would receive two Argentine and 
one or two Chilean armored cruisers.80  Buchanan suggested that Chile could play a 
pivotal role in convincing Brazil, if Chile stood by Argentina.  In this manner, Brazil 
could rebuild its naval position while maintaining rough naval parity with the other 
two powers.  Chilean President Alcorta agreed with the plan, but Buchanan was 
unable to convince Brazilian President Rio Branco of its wisdom.81  Buchanan 
attempted to persuade Britain to intervene by utilizing its financial position to press 
the countries to accept negotiations, specifically mentioning the British course of 
action in 1902,82 but ultimately the American initiative yielded no result.   
Sir Edward Grey reviewed the correspondence regarding this initiative, while 
the United States and Great Britain were both negotiating on a common armament 
platform prior to the Second Hague Peace Conference, and renegotiating the almost 
ninety-year-old Rush-Bagot Agreement.  These South American proceeding must 
have interested Grey.  The Latin American arms races and negotiations not only had 
an impact upon the naval race in Europe, but also provided evidence of the directions 
in which arms races evolved and could be ended.  After the abortive negotiations, 
Brazil rapidly switched its battleship orders to dreadnoughts, Britain’s new super-
                                                 
78 Baring to Mildmay, Oct. 12, 1906, enclosure in Minutes, Nov. 28, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 284.   
79 Barclay to Grey, Oct. 15, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 250.   
80 Confidential Negotiations with regard to the Brazilian Naval Armaments, enclosure in Minutes, 
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battleship.83  As no other navy possessed such powerful weapons, the acquisition by 
Brazil conveyed a potent political message and could potentially influence the 
European arms balance.  The Argentine-Chilean arms control treaty was raised again 
at the Hague, and provided a model for British arms control negotiations following 
the 1907 Hague Conference.   
 
Assessment of the Argentine-Chilean Naval Treaty  
 The British role in the 1902 Argentine-Chilean negotiations set a precedent 
for later discussions with Germany.  Both negotiations highlighted a number of 
similar issues.  These included the timing of political and arms agreements, whether 
neutrality allowed one state to pursue further aggression on the continent, the 
replacement of old ships to mask expansion, and the role of third parties in shifting 
the naval balance.  Just as Mediterranean concerns made a bilateral deal difficult for 
Great Britain and Germany, the role of Peru and Brazil made a bilateral deal difficult 
for Argentina and Chile.  However, Argentina and Chile accounted for this in the 
treaty by preventing arms sales to third parties.   
The Argentine-Chilean and the Anglo-German disputes differed in a 
fundamental way.  The Latin American powers could not violate the arms agreement 
without the complicity of one of the great powers, as they could not build their own 
battleships.  Verification and enforcement were simplified by the fact that British 
bankers funded naval expansion, and Britain’s naval yards were the main suppliers of 
warships.  The Anglo-German naval arms race differed in that the two states built 
their own warships.  In Europe, verification and the intricate issues of enforcement 
became essential.   
 In 1902, a legal agreement was necessary as détente and informal arms 
control did not fundamentally improve confidence.  The episode provided a material 
lesson to the British, indicating the need for a simple, easily verifiable agreement to 
increase confidence among the parties.  The lesson was not wasted, as the British 
approach to arms control in the decade prior to the First World War indicated a 
cognizance of these preconditions, and the Foreign Office framed initiatives around 
them.   
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Naval Arms Control in the New Century:  Precedents and Implications 
 
The 1902 Argentine-Chilean agreement built upon earlier nineteenth century 
negotiations, highlighting the possibilities of formal arms control agreements.  In 
1900, the technological differences between naval and land armaments provided 
different opportunities for regulation.  Naval construction was more easily verifiable, 
and Britain’s dominant maritime industrial position offered an enhanced ability to 
respond to rivals, making any breaches easily offset.   
Effective control and verification were central to the British naval arms 
limitation treaties of 1787 and 1856.  In the 1787 Anglo-French Naval Declaration, 
the parties sought limitations on naval preparation levels –confirmed through 
exchanges of information – rather than bolder limitations on overall forces, avoiding 
a more stringent verification regime because of fears that tensions would increase 
without increasing confidence.  The 1856 Black Sea negotiations witnessed intense 
discussions of how best to craft verifiable obligations.  The Foreign Office 
championed warship length and size as the benchmark for regulation, after reasoning 
that other regulations would be difficult to verify and easy to evade. 84  Warship 
length could be easily determined, and this could then be used to calculate weight, 
which in turn limited the space available for engines and guns.  Both speed and 
armament proved more difficult to regulate as the armament could easily be altered, 
and measurement of horsepower required intrusive inspections.  Size limitations 
provided indirect regulation.  Size limitations restricted the weight available for 
heavy engines, and the length necessary both for long broadside batteries and the fine 
hull lines associated with high speeds.  The size limitations relegated the naval forces 
to minor coastal ships, and the advent of heavier ironclad warships further reduced 
the value of such small ships.  Russian requests for armed transports or stationary 
hulks were similarly refused out of concern that treaty violations could be hidden, 
undermining confidence in the agreement.  As discussed in the first chapter, more 
complex regulations were avoided on the grounds that they would prove difficult to 
monitor and enforce.   
                                                 
84 In fact, the British consul at the Dardanelles expressed suspicions about Russian warships passing 
the Straits in 1857, because they were pierced for more guns than their commander disclosed, it being 
noted that while they were within the size limits, it was impossible to verify the size of guns they 
carried.  FO 881/1825, at 1.   
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 When the Foreign Office was called on to recast the Black Sea obligations in 
1870, statesmen entertained a wide range of options for limiting armaments, but 
narrowed them based upon criteria of effectiveness.  These ranged from the simple 
expedient of increasing the number or size of warships allowed, to complex plans for 
matching the Russians with equivalent ships.  The first proposal attempted to prolong 
the existing treaty, while allowing for technological changes ushered in with the 
larger ironclads.  The latter plan was specifically premised on a tit-for-tat theory – if 
the Russians understood that every warship they built would automatically be 
matched by an allied warship stationed in the Black Sea, Russia would have far less 
reason to inaugurate a costly arms race.85  Austria-Hungary even proposed the 
creation of a naval base on Turkish territory as a means of balancing Russian 
ambitions.   
The difficulties inherent in verification created impetus to craft simple 
provisions.  The Foreign Office had harbored concerns about Russian violation of the 
Black Sea Treaty from its signature, fearing that large ships of the line were illegally 
being built in Odessa.86  Complex regulations required either greater intrusion to 
verify or tacit acknowledgment that they could not be enforced.  For this reason 
during the 1870 crisis, proposals calling for the British to match Russian forces by 
sending equivalent warships into the Black Sea were dismissed.  Ultimately, Russian 
objections to any regulations killed these projects, although the Foreign Office had 
already recognized their impracticality.   
 The Anglo-French arms race between the 1840s and 1860s provided another 
source of precedents  The naval race with France centered on the bewildering pace of 
technological change and its corresponding effect on the naval balance between the 
two nations.  Over the course of two decades, steam propulsion was adopted, first 
through inefficient and exposed paddlewheels, and then through screw propellers.  
Solid shot was supplanted by exploding shellfire, and in response ironclad warships 
                                                 
85 Buchanan to Granville, Dec. 12, 1870, FO 881/1901.   
86 FO 881/1825, at 2.  The Russians inaugurated the Odessa Steam Navigation Company to provide 
vessels which could be quickly converted into warships.  Palmerston fretted that Russia could 
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were developed.  With the advent of each new technology, which the French 
government eagerly adopted, the naval race took on a new urgency.87   
In responding to recurrent naval scares and the rapid rise in construction 
budgets, leading figures in Parliament, including then-Prime Minister Robert Peel, 
Admiral Sir Charles Napier, and future Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli all sought 
a naval agreement with France.88  While discussions in Parliament did not culminate 
in an actual overture to France, Richard Cobden prepared thoroughly developed 
projects.  Cobden was an eager advocate of arms limitation for financial and 
philosophical reasons.  Despite his utopian predilections, the practical nature of his 
proposals stands out.  By eschewing radical pacifist arguments, and focusing upon 
the practicalities of arms limitation and the continued need for strong national 
defense, Cobden sought to convince skeptics that arms control was possible.89  His 
writings indicated the evolution of thought on the matter and the centrality of 
verifiable limits.  Rather than attempt to anticipate future trends in technology, 
Cobden claimed the disclosure of extant building programs and inspections would 
serve to limit the arms race as much as any formal limit.90  Exchanges of naval 
information were central to Cobden’s projects, as they would allow Parliament to 
defuse naval panics through the provision of accurate information.  Naval inspections 
were proposed on more than one occasion during this period.  France offered to 
allow British observers to visit French naval yards in 1853, and the Admiralty 
accepted a similar French offer in 1861.91  An international agreement would assist 
naval limitations by providing members of Parliament with the information 
necessary to justify an orderly program of naval construction.  Cobden sought no 
more than this from an agreement, as it would allow him to rein in naval 
expenditures.   
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The quest for simple, verifiable, agreements raised questions about the 
criteria used to benchmark limitation.  Cobden focused upon readily confirmable 
numerical counts of warships, rather than more complex formulae.  His proposals 
were based on an assumption of proportional reductions, implicitly refusing to 
reduce British strength relative to France.92  However, despite the immediate appeal 
of such a simplistic solution, Cobden’s system tended to ignore numerous factors 
influencing overall naval strength, and numbers were subject to political 
manipulation.  Cobden and advocates of limitation often counted total national naval 
forces, undifferentiated by total gun power or size, thus including numerous small 
British gunboats in the total count, despite their lesser firepower.  Naval advocates 
also countered that France kept vessels in a higher state of readiness, while Britain 
lacked crews to put its larger number of warships to sea at short notice.93  Moreover, 
each side included or excluded warships under construction to fit their arguments.  
Finally, both sides argued about the relative value given to different types of 
warships, as evidenced by arguments over whether or not “blockships” should be 
included in fleet lists.  These were old ships of the line converted to steam, but with 
weak engines which opponents claimed left them slow and unequal opponents to 
purpose-built steam warships.94  Nonetheless, the arguments raised over naval 
balances and the suitability of types of limitation indicated a robust debate on the 
topic, providing statesmen with a pragmatic basis from which to make later 
proposals.  These concepts figured prominently in later arms control negotiations in 
the twentieth century, finding expression in interwar naval arms control treaties.   
 
Verification and Naval Construction 
An appreciation of naval technology underlay concerns about verification.  
British policy was based on two premises, first that Britain could build more ships, 
more rapidly, than any potential opponent, and that naval attachés could discover 
foreign construction before any material shift in the balance of power occurred.  Sir 
                                                 
92 Id., 431.  Proposals centered on a bilateral solution to the Anglo-French race rather than a 
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competitor, Russia, manned nine steam ships of the line.  Data compiled from Gardiner, Conway's All 
the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905.   
93 See debate of July 29, 1859 and particularly the speeches of Cobden, Sir John Packington, and Lord 
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William White, Director of Naval Construction from 1886 to 1903, succinctly made 
this point:   
…[O]ur resources in shipbuilding, engineering, armour and armament are so 
much greater than the corresponding resources in any foreign country that the 
speed at which construction can be carried out is greater than that which can 
be attained abroad.  This fact is the key of the true policy in warship 
construction for the British Navy.  It is always possible for the Admiralty to 
know exactly what is being done abroad in all classes of ships, to wait until 
foreign vessels have been laid down, then to complete designs which shall be 
superior in offensive and defensive power, and to complete the vessels as 
soon as their possible foreign rivals.95   
 
Other leading figures at the Admiralty, from 1860s Sea Lord Viscount Eversley to 
Fisher, confirmed this long-standing policy.96   
By mid-century, nations could only improvise minor auxiliary warships in an 
emergency.  The advent of ironclads and the subsequent race to build heavier 
ordnance and armor further increased the difficulties in rapidly expanding a navy.  
Even if it had been possible for Russia to alter the Black Sea naval balance in the 
1850s by adding a few smooth-bore cannon to small war vessels, this type of 
improvisation could not alter the naval balance in the era of ironclads.  The 
sophistication and specialization of naval weapons favored verification.   
As long as the ironclad battleship remained the central element in strategic 
calculations of naval power, these beliefs about verification held true.  However, the 
rapid evolution of technology created uncertainty about the centrality of the 
battleship, and spawned weapons which could challenge its predominance, most 
notably the torpedo.  But despite concerns about the asymmetrical threat posed by 
cheap alternatives to ironclads, epitomized by the Jeune Ecole espousal of the 
torpedo boat in the 1880s, the battleship remained the key unit of measurement of 
naval power.97     
The battleships, which formed the foci of naval arms races, took an 
extraordinarily long time to complete.  In the 1870s and 1880s, construction times for 
foreign warships often exceeded a decade, while the British maintained shorter 
                                                 
95 Sir William White, “Modern Warships,” Journal of the Society of the Arts 54 (1906): 868.   
96 Lord George Eversley, “Naval Scares,” Contemporary Review 90 (1906): 632-33; Marder, ed., Fear 
God and Dread Nought, Vol. II, No. 351, at 431.   
97 Britain attempted to limit other naval weapons which posed challenges to its battle fleets.  British 
delegates advocated limits on submarines and torpedoes at the Hague in 1899, and also espoused the 
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construction periods.98  Britain’s answer to emerging naval threats, such as French  
steam-powered warships in the 1840s and 1850s and ironclads in the 1860s, relied on 
a rapid response from its industrial base.  Upon discovering a new challenge, Britain 
built battleships more rapidly and in greater numbers than its potential competitors.  
Thus while France repeatedly gained a temporary lead in the naval arms race 
between the 1840s and 1860s, the British quickly recaptured their position.   
Even if Britain could out-build a competitor, the challenge needed to be 
discovered in time to effectively respond.  In this regard, heavy battleships proved an 
advantages as they were easy to discover.  The construction of a large warship was 
difficult to conceal, particularly in an age when naval attachés regularly conducted 
visits of foreign shipyards.  As Cobden noted, “[i]t would be just as possible to build 
a great hotel in secrecy in Paris, as to conceal the process of constructing a ship of 
war at Toulon or Cherbourg.”99  Despite attempts at subterfuge by foreign officials, 
attachés were able to accurately assess foreign construction programs.100  Other 
means of securing information were also available, including royal visits, espionage, 
and publicly available scientific information.  Spies were able to smuggle plans for 
the first ironclad, the Gloire, out of France despite heightened security.101  Another 
colorful incident was related by Secretary of the Admiralty, Lord Clarence Paget, 
who visited the new ironclad as an English tourist, taking a rowboat out to the 
warship where he measured the height of the battery with his umbrella.102  When 
coupled with other intelligence sources, attaché visits provided Britain with the 
ability to estimate the type, number, and size of ships under construction as well as 
the rate of progress.  Moreover, the Foreign Office and Admiralty relied upon these 
intelligence sources in strategic planning.103   
The lengthy construction time, the ability to detect shipbuilding, and British 
capacity to rapidly build warships in response, made naval arms control feasible for 
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the British.  Moreover, Britain’s position as the dominant naval power further 
enhanced its position.  If an agreement had been entered into between Britain and a 
competitor, and the adversary sought to breach the agreement and overtake Britain’s 
position, the adversary would need to undertake a significant amount of construction 
in a short period of time.  The likelihood that this level of construction could be 
commenced and completed, before British intelligence learned of the breach, was 
slim.  In all likelihood, the competitor would be detected long before a violation 
could alter the fundamental strategic situation.  Ultimately the violator would be left 
in no better position than before breaching the agreement, while sustaining 
significant diplomatic damage for an act of bad faith.   
This situation contrasted starkly with that for land armaments.  Troop levels 
were inherently difficult to verify, and the great variety of military organizations on 
the continent made them difficult to quantify and compare.  Differences in active and 
reserve status, level of training, as well as colonial forces and gendarmerie, allowed 
ample opportunity to evade treaty obligations.  Unlike battleships which took years 
to complete, an army could be raised in months, if not weeks.  Similarly, small arms 
could be more easily stockpiled and concealed in warehouses.  These problems with 
land arms control were all raised at the Hague in 1899, indicating that limitation of 
military forces required far more invasive procedures.  Any security gained from 
such an agreement was far less certain.  Naval armaments provided an area far more 
conducive to treaty regulation through effective verification.  These premises of 
naval verification were questioned in the 1909 Dreadnought Scare, but at the turn of 
the century they provided a valid basis for a limited treaty restricting weaponry, 
without compromising British naval superiority.   
The Foreign Office rarely articulated how it intended its arms control policy 
to work.  However, when considered with Admiralty construction policy, Britain 
clearly sought to maintain superiority through faster ship-building aided by attaché 
verification, and easily verifiable arms control agreements.  Additionally, Britain also 
sought limited arms control agreements rather than broad treaties.  Combined, these 
strategies indicate that Britain intended naval arms control to function through 
limited agreements featuring effective verification.  Certainly British negotiations 
with Germany after 1907, and the focus on exchanges of information, indicate this 
policy-making direction.   
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 Whether or not the Admiralty viewed future conflict in Mahanian terms of a 
North Sea struggle in which numbers of capital ships alone counted, the public and 
the politicians they elected viewed naval security in these terms.  British foreign 
policy utilized battleships for deterrent and other diplomatic purposes, and the rise of 
naval competitors reduced their value.  As Churchill suggested, peace-time arms 
competition served as a form of proxy war.104  Arms control was meant to apply in 
times of peace, during which time it would influence foreign calculations as to the 
relative naval strength and the likely outcome of war.  Treaty regulation of 
battleships would have allowed Britain to continue to wield influence as a great 





Prior accounts of arms control initiatives between 1898 and 1914 have 
focused on the two Hague Peace Conferences and Anglo-German bilateral talks.  
However, British experience in legal negotiations for arms control extended 
considerably beyond that, including not only nineteenth century precedents, but also 
involvement in brokering the Argentine-Chilean naval arms control treaty of 1902, 
offers to negotiate a successor agreement including Brazil in 1906, and renegotiation 
of the Rush-Bagot Agreement in 1906-1907.  Great Britain herself was involved in 
two of the most significant naval arms agreements of the preceding century – the 
1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement and the 1856 Russo-Turkish neutralization of the Black 
Sea.  In these cases, significant strategic interests were managed through 
international law.   
 The sum total of these experiences in legalized arms control indicated a 
Foreign Office focus on workable regulations.  Effective verification, rather than 
international enforcement, provided naval limitation treaties their teeth.  Agreements 
required simplicity, to provide easily manageable obligations that would be 
understood and accepted by the public, and hence more likely to be upheld.  When 
entering a period of prolonged naval activity by all the great powers from the 1890s 
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without the necessity for its actual employment.”  Speech of Mr. Churchill, House of Commons, Parl. 
Deb., 5th ser., 1912, xxxv, 1573, Mar. 18, 1912.   
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onwards, Britain had a legal heritage upon which it could draw when fashioning its 
response.  Arms control and international law could, and did, play a role in 












 Lawyers’ and statesmen’s perceptions of international law and arms 
limitation evolved during the preparations for the Second Hague Peace Conference.  
The Conference witnessed a move away from a utopian role for law in regulating the 
international community, as discussed in international legal circles and in Parliament 
before the Conference, toward pragmatic steps moderating the arms race.  The 
government encouraged this shift by advocating limited international agreements, 
which it in turn put into practice in instructions issued to its delegates.1  Not until the 
First World War would the public dialogue return to the imperative of an 
“international federation” or a “league of peace” in halting the arms race.   
The shift in emphasis from disarmament to arms control paralleled a growing 
British interest in arms limitation as a means of preserving the United Kingdom’s 
naval position.  The rise of numerous great power naval competitors after 1900, with 
Germany, Japan, and the United States joining the ranks of traditional rivals France 
and Russia, gave rise to creative attempts to preserve British predominance.  
Ententes and alliances provided international means of maintaining British security.  
Arms limitation provided another extension of a diplomatic strategy.  Given the 
evolving geostrategic environment, the shift from disarmament to arms control 
reflected as much a shift in British interests as a growth in understanding of 
international law .   
Ultimately, the shift was both – an advance in perceptions of law as well as a 
calculated wielding of law by the British government.  The Foreign Office possessed 
a wealth of precedents for arms limitation by 1904, when American President 
Theodore Roosevelt called the Second Hague Conference.  In the years immediately 
prior to the 1907 gathering, the Foreign Office reviewed a number of these 
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1535, May 25, 1906.   
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agreements as part of active diplomacy, including the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement 
and the Argentine-Chilean treaties of 1902 and 1903.  Bolstered by these precedents, 
the government’s strengthened advocacy of arms control in 1907 compared to the 
1899 Hague Conference reflected a shift in national interests.   
 Yet official support for arms limitation spurred public perceptions of law.  
Prior to 1900, arms limitation discussion had been limited, and scholarly works often 
highlighted utopian concepts rather than practical solutions.  Even proponents of 
arms control differed over what role law should play.  Before the Second Hague 
Peace Conference, international lawyers believed that law might influence 
armaments policy in several ways.  First, international law could foster the creation 
of an international police power capable of enforcing disarmament, an unrealistic 
solution.2  Alternatively, lawyers believed that arbitration agreements, by peacefully 
resolving international controversies, would gradually reduce international tensions 
and lessen states’ interest in arming themselves.3  When addressing the issue of arms 
competition, international lawyers reflexively advocated utopian world government, 
and rarely recommended other models, such as arms control agreements or the rules 
of war.  The experience of the Second Hague Peace Conference shaped scholars’ 
perceptions of international law and the potential role it could play in foreign 
relations.   
 The debates prior to the Conference led to the crystallization of concepts, 
refining subsequent debate on arms control, moving the subject away from grand 
utopian schemes for “leagues of peace,” “international police forces,” and “general 
disarmament,” concepts which very few responsible statesmen considered practical.  
Emphasis in official discourse gradually shifted to limited goals of “exchanges of 
information,” “limitation of expenditure,” and eventually towards “arms control.”  
While the public debate often lagged behind the development of international law 
and proponents continued to herald the “general disarmament” of Europe, the British 
government framed the arms control question in a limited manner which it pursued in 
                                                 
2 Field, Draft Outlines of an International Code; see generally Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments; 
Scott A. Keefer, “Building the Palace of Peace:  The Hague Conference of 1899 and Arms Control in 
the Progressive Era,” Journal of the History of International Law 8 (2006). 
3 Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague and Its Bearing on International Law and Policy, 92.  
“Thither point too, though indeed from afar, those propositions for DISARMAMENT which now and 
then crop up, but which, quite naturally, fade away as quickly as they come, so long as the principle of 
arbitration does not prevail in Europe.”  K. P. Arnoldson, Pax Mundi:  A Concise Account of the 
Progress of the Movement for Peace by Means of Arbitration, Neutralization, International Law and 
Disarmament (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1892), 84. 
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direct negotiations with Germany.  Before the Conference, Unionist statesmen 
wishing to discredit the limitation of expenditure on armaments could refer to the 
folly of “general disarmament,” but afterwards they could no longer easily refute 
arms control by simply associating it with utopian dreams.  The arguments of arms 
control opponents also developed, by turning to concepts later systematized by game 
theory:  skeptics no longer bemoaned disarmament and the impossibility of creating 
an “international police force,” but responded to arms control theories, noting that 
Germany responded to British battleship construction cuts by increasing its own 
program.4    
Moreover, the Conference witnessed a broader linkage between arms control 
and the rules of war.  The public and statesmen increasingly recognized the 
connection between naval arms competition and the manner in which future naval 
war might be carried out, providing incentives to modify the latter in order to temper 
the former.  Statesmen argued whether alterations in wartime conduct could reduce 
the need for armaments, by limiting the use of certain weapons.  This in turn brought 
central questions of the efficacy of international law in time of war into question.   
 It must be noted that many members of the Liberal government and civil 
servants, such as Eyre Crowe, did not support the effort to limit armaments, and even 
among those who did support the arms initiative, like Sir Edward Grey,5 motivations 
were mixed.  It has been written elsewhere that the Liberal government faced an 
obligation to fulfill an election promise by lowering military expenses, and that the 
call for arms control was intended as much to appease the radical faction as to 
achieve any concrete results at the Hague.6  Even if the effort failed at the Hague, by 
placing the blame upon Germany, the Liberal government could satisfy its domestic 
constituency that it had tried to minimize costs.  But motivations for major initiatives 
are often complex, with different justifications being constructed to gain the 
adherence of different audiences.   
 
 
                                                 
4 Kenneth J Moll, “Politics, Power, and Panic:  Britain's 1909 Dreadnought 'Gap',” Military Affairs 29, 
no. 3 (1965): 137.  Minutes of Eyre Crowe, in Lascelles to Grey, Feb. 12, 1908, in G P Gooch and H 
Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War (London: H M Stationery Office, 1926-
1938), Vol. VI, at 132.   
5 Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1977), 36 et seq. 
6 Moll, “Politics, Power, and Panic:  Britain's 1909 Dreadnought 'Gap',” 134; Marder, Dreadnought, 
126; A J A Morris, “The English Radicals' Campaign for Disarmament and the Hague Conference of 
1907,” Journal of Modern History 43, no. 3 (1971): 371. 
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The Russo-Japanese War and the Hague Agenda 
 
 The Russo-Japanese War greatly shaped the British agenda at the Second 
Hague Peace Conference.  Numerous questions involving naval warfare came to 
prominence during the war,7 several of which related directly to arms control.  The 
use of naval mines and auxiliary cruisers foretold developing threats to British naval 
power, which the government hoped to restrain through law.  Indirectly, the 
destruction of the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima, together with the construction of 
the Dreadnought, provided the British with a “window of opportunity” to 
temporarily reduce naval construction, and bargain for limitations from a position of 
strength.  Finally, proponents of arms control specifically linked the topic to limits on 
the capture of maritime commerce, noting that other states could not be expected to 
sacrifice the defense of their trade without receiving guarantees that they would be 
protected in wartime.8   
The Admiralty recognized that the Russian use of auxiliary cruisers, or 
merchant ships converted into warships, posed a threat to British maritime trade.9  
The Russian auxiliary cruisers also violated an existing arms control regime by 
passing through the Turkish Straits in violation of the 1871 London Treaty.10  While 
the ships passed the Bosphorus with their guns in their holds, only mounting them on 
deck after commissioning as warships at Libau in the Baltic Sea, the British legal 
office held this to be a technical violation of the terms of the 1871 London Treaty .11  
The Russian action raised a question regarding the definition of “vessels of war.”  
This question could not fail to interest a British Admiralty conscious of national 
                                                 
7 Land warfare presented only minor legal issues, most notably unsubstantiated Japanese claims that 
the Russians used expanding bullets in violation of the 1899 Hague Declaration.  Amos S. Hershey, 
The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1906), 317-18. 
8 Lord Loreburn, Immunity of Private Property at Sea in Time of War, CAB 37/88/58, (n.d., c. Apr. 
1907), at 5; Pax, “The Exemption from Capture of Private Property,” The (London) Times, Mar. 30, 
1907, at 6 C.  Many remained skeptical regarding German claims that they built their navy solely to 
defend commerce, noting that the battleships the Germans built were unsuited for commerce defense.  
Marder, Dreadnought, 120.  At the very least, the true reasons for German naval growth would be 
exposed by removing the rationale of commerce protection.    
9 The Admiralty expressed particular concern that Germany, utilizing its large, fast, ocean liners, 
might engage in such conduct.  The use of ocean liners posed a unique threat as they could outrun any 
British cruiser capable of outfighting them.  The Germans, like other nations, had provided for these 
ships to carry artillery.  Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 102-04.     
10,Treaty of London, 13 Mar. 1871, Art. II, as cited in Hurst, ed., Key Treaties, Vol. II, 467. 
11 Law Officers of the Crown to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Oct. 29, 1904, CAB 37/72/134, (Nov. 2, 
1904).   
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dependence upon imported goods, and the latent threat posed by predatory cruisers to 
British commercial lifelines.12   
Naval mines posed another threat that the British sought to manage through 
either an outright ban or application of the rules of war.  Naval mines had proven 
effective in the Russo-Japanese War, at one point sinking or disabling half the 
Japanese battleship fleet.13  Moreover, as inexpensive weapons,14 they would allow 
small naval powers to pose an asymmetrical threat to the large British battle fleet, 
similar to the threat of torpedoes.  These weapons also constituted a humanitarian 
issue, as after the war, mines continued to sink Chinese vessels,15 and posed huge 
risks to commerce if major waterways were mined in future wars.  As Great Britain 
possessed the world’s largest merchant marine, it might suffer immensely in a 
conflict even if the British remained neutral, hence the government and public 
expressed broad support for some limitation on mine warfare.16   
In preparing for the Hague Conference, the government assumed that future 
wars would be limited, involving two to three great powers, not conflicts between 
grand coalitions of nations.  Therefore, neutral great powers would continue to insist 
on upholding international law, rather than seeing a total breakdown of law in 
wartime.  The Russo-Japanese War confirmed this expectation, as British and 
American protests against Russian conduct of its maritime war yielded immediate 
results.17  When the Russian Baltic Fleet fired upon British fishing vessels in the 
North Sea, the czarist government quickly accepted arbitration to prevent the crisis 
from adding a powerful adversary to the war.18  As the new government prepared its 
                                                 
12 Avner Offer, The First World War:  An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
217 et seq.; Avner Offer, “The Working Classes, British Naval Plans and the Coming of the Great 
War,” Past and Present 107 (1985): 204-26.   
13 Gardiner, Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, 216, 21-22.  Two battleships were 
sunk, and a third put out of service for many months.   
14 Two Japanese battleships, valued at around £3,000,000, had been destroyed by a weapon costing 
£10.  Captain Ottley to Fry, Sep. 1, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, Sep. 2, 1907, in Further 
Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference at the Hague, FO 412/89, (1907).   
15 Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference, 245. 
16 Unionists, Liberals, pacifists and Admiralty all expressed agreement on this issue.  See, e.g. 
Submarine Automatic Mines, in Miscellaneous, CAB 4/1/52B, (Mar. 13, 1905), at 1; expressing 
Balfour’s desire for a ban, see Memorandum, Oct. 25, 1905, in Correspondence Respecting the 
Convocation of a Second Peace Conference at the Hague, FO 412/79, (1907).   
17 John W. Coogan, The End of Neutrality:  The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights 1899-
1915 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 49-51. 
18 Foreign Secretary Lansdowne told the Russian ambassador that conflict had been avoided only with 
the greatest difficulty and that public opinion could not be restrained if another incident occurred.  
Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 29, 1904, No. 2, in CAB 37/72/137, (Nov. 3, 1904).  The British had 
mobilized the Channel, Home, and Mediterranean fleets, organizing at Gibraltar in order to facilitate 
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response for questions that Parliament and the public would undoubtedly raise 
regarding the utility of international law, it turned to the Russo-Japanese War as a 
paradigm to which future agreements would be applied.  Significantly, the 
government believed that during war, powerful neutrals could enforce bargains 
reached in peacetime, making it possible to utilize rules of war as a mode of arms 
control.   
 
International Law and Models for Arms Limitation 
 
Statesmen possessed a broad range of forms in which international law could 
limit armaments, and associated numerous types of treaties with reductions in 
expenditures upon armaments.  Alliances, ententes, and arbitration agreements 
reduced the need for weapons, while rules of war, the 1899 Hague arms declarations, 
and bilateral arms control treaties had provided direct limitations.  The British 
government analyzed all these models as potential means of bringing arms expenses 
under control.  Additionally, the government wrestled with the challenges of 
enforcing international law, shifting discussion away from broad international 
governmental institutions to robust state monitoring based on self-interest.   
The advent of a new Liberal government coincided with preparations for the 
conference, leading to a greater focus upon arms limitations.  Arms expenditures had 
not declined from the plateau reached during the Boer War three years before, and 
the new government had pledged in its election campaign to rein in the military 
budget.  As the government refined its position on arms limitation and national 
security, the discussion of goals, concepts, and models of international law became 
clarified.   
The government’s central goal lay in a desire to decrease tax burdens.  While 
humanitarian aspirations motivated many in the pacifist movement, and Liberal 
statesmen occasionally expressed lofty sentiments in favor of reducing the horrors of 
war, the official governmental focus remained on the expense of weaponry.  Sir 
Edward Grey specifically stated that the government sought not so much to “limit 
armaments” as to “limit expenditure upon armaments.”19  The Liberal government 
                                                                                                                                          
their interception of the Russian Baltic Fleet if necessary.  Hershey, The International Law and 
Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, 220. 
19 Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 15, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII, at 207.  
Grey objected to the use of the term “disarmament,” dismissing the goal as unrealistic, while an 
agreed ceiling on expenditures might be achievable.   
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did not intend to reduce the risk of war posed by armaments, but to diminish the 
heavy tax burden which led to a drift toward “revolution and misery.”20   
The British government possessed a wide range of legal concepts and models 
for pursuing arms control at the Hague Conference.  International law could 
influence the level of armaments in different ways, for instance, by reducing the risk 
of conflict, which in itself might aid in reducing defense outlays.   Former Foreign 
Secretary Lord Lansdowne noted that the European system of alliances reduced 
armaments by distributing the burden of defense among several states.21  
Membership in an alliance also served a deterrent function by increasing the costs of 
aggression against a state.  Lansdowne also posited that the Anglo-French entente 
was another means in which law could assist in limiting arms.22  By eliminating the 
sources of conflict between nations, ententes allowed states to reduce competitive 
armament.  Thus, by reducing the international tensions that contributed to 
armaments acquisitions, alliances and ententes could help reduce arms costs as 
effectively as an arms control treaty.   
The rules of war had also limited armaments in the past.  The 1899 Hague 
Conference resulted in a convention regulating actions in warfare, including the use 
of “needlessly cruel” or poisonous weapons.23  While the vague terms of this 
convention did not provide much guidance for states, they did signal a clear intention 
that the use of weapons would be subjected to limits, influencing further regulations 
on armament in the twentieth century.  Although earlier rules of war had not 
diminished the costs of armaments, current rules of war issues appeared more likely 
to do so.  The regulation of auxiliary cruisers could provide such a limitation if 
discussed at the Second Hague Conference.   
                                                 
20 Lord Avebury, Hansard, 4th ser., CLVII, 1523, May 25, 1906.   
21 Marquis of Lansdowne, Hansard, 4th ser., CLVII, 1543-1544, May 25, 1906.  Many international 
lawyers viewed the system of alliances and ententes as a step in the progressive codification of 
international law by gradually increasing ties between nations.  “There are already in existence certain 
symptoms which may be considered a partial beginning of disarmament.  Such are the military 
alliances which Great States make with one another.”  Alfred H. Fried, Friedenswarte, 1902 at 145, as 
quoted in Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments, 9.  Scholars generally recognized the system of 
alliances as a form of international law, as they were “treaties of union between two or more States for 
the purpose of defending each other against an attack in war, or of jointly attacking third States, or for 
both purposes.”  Oppenheim, International Law:  A Treatise, Vol. I, 595.   
22 Marquis of Lansdowne, Hansard, 4th ser., CLVII, 1543, May 25, 1906.   
23 Art. 22 of the 1899 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, stated that 
“[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,” and Art. 23 held 
that “it is especially prohibited:  a. To employ poison or poisoned arms. . . e. To employ arms, 
projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury.”   
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The earlier arms agreements in 1899 also developed partially out of the rules 
of war.  By outlawing the use of shells designed to diffuse poisonous gas, dum dum 
bullets, and exploding bullets, international law provided for a partial ban upon these 
weapons.24  Unlike later treaties which forbid the possession of weaponry, these 
early treaties allowed the states to manufacture the proscribed ammunition while 
banning their use against other parties.  Nonetheless, states recognized the difficulties 
in providing two complete sets of ammunition for their armies.25  Thus, a partial ban 
on use resulted in a de facto limitation on possession.   
Many parliamentarians and governmental leaders advocated the development 
of arbitration treaties as a means of limiting armaments.  Leaders often believed that 
arbitration agreements, by providing a peaceful means of resolving disputes, could 
lead to the gradual decline of war, and hence to the diminution of armaments.26  A 
substantial public debate grew out of this faith in arbitration, as many questioned 
whether disarmament should precede obligatory arbitration agreements, or whether it 
would naturally occur as a result.27  Arbitration advocates from the Anglo-American 
legal tradition viewed the question not only as a matter of prioritizing their energies, 
but also as a question of security:  If the most developed, and most pacific, nations 
disarmed in the face of “less civilized states,” they would merely place the future of 
civilization at the mercy of the heavily armed barbarians.28  This debate found its 
counterpart within British parliamentary discussions on the propriety and timing of 
arms limitations.  The government had to assure peace and security before reducing 
                                                 
24 At least these rules of warfare banned the use of weaponry amongst signatory states.  The 
obligations contained in the Hague Declarations of 1899, as well as the St. Petersburg Declaration of 
1868, were intentionally created as reciprocal obligations.  This meant that non-parties, in particular, 
colonized populations and the bulk of non-European nations recognized by Europe, could not rely 
upon these treaties.   
25 This question arose specifically in the 1868 negotiations leading the Declaration of St. Petersburg.  
During the negotiations, Russia wanted to maintain the right to use exploding bullets against enemy 
artillery limbers and ammunition boxes, while banning its use against men, which the delegations 
deemed to be impossible to regulate.  St. George to Secretary for War, Oct. 21, 1868, in FO 83/316.   
26 Speech of the Bishop of Ripon, House of Lords, Parl. Deb. 4th ser., 1906, clvii, 1523-1528, May 25, 
1906; holding that arbitration was preferable as it allowed the peaceful settlement of controversies, 
while allowing a nation to use force when necessary.   “I submit to you that as the principle of 
peaceful arbitration gains ground it becomes one of the highest duties of Government to adjust those 
armaments to the newer and happier condition of things.”  Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as quoted 
in Speech of E. Robertson, Secretary to the Admiralty, Hansard, 4th ser., CLXII, 75, July 27, 1906.  
Arnoldson, Pax Mundi, 84.  But see Richmond Pearson Hobson, “Disarmament,” American Journal of 
International Law 2, no. 4 (1908): 747-50, claiming that arbitration had not yet evolved sufficiently to 
foster disarmament, and that even greater international organization was needed prior to disarmament. 
27 “Compulsory Arbitration,” The (London) Times, July 24, 1907, at 4.   
28 Hobson, “Disarmament,” 747.     
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armaments.29  In fact, the premature discussion of arms limitation might only worsen 
tensions between the nations, while the development of arbitration might naturally 
improve relations.30   
Finally, both the Foreign Office and Parliament discussed two of the most 
successful arms control agreements in existence in the early 1900s, the 1817 Rush-
Bagot Agreement and the 1902 Argentine-Chilean naval arms agreement.  
Parliament contemplated these agreements as models of arms limitation, but perhaps 
unsurprisingly, in preparing for a global multilateral conference did not focus upon 
these bilateral treaties.  These agreements differed from the European situation in the 
scope for enforcement.  The Great Lakes agreement regulated a largely enclosed sea, 
rendering large-scale violations improbable, while the South American treaty 
involved two states incapable of building their own warships and dependent upon 
British financial markets for purchasing ships abroad.  This made violations nearly 
impossible without the complicity of Britain, creating a form of international 
enforcement through an actor external to the region.   
In contrast, the European naval balance involved numerous states, many of 
whom built their own warships.  In 1906 debates, Parliament almost exclusively 
focused upon a multilateral model for arms control, presuming that a large 
international organization would be required.  The unlikelihood of such a scheme 
succeeding fueled much of the legal criticism of the enterprise.  Such an 
unprecedented cession of sovereignty would incur a strong reaction in Great Britain, 
and undoubtedly in all the continental powers.  International law and international 
organization in the 1900s rarely exhibited such broad centralizing trends.  States had 
negotiated broad multilateral treaties and formed international organizations for 
numerous purposes, but had not ceded legislative and executive power as directly as 
disarmament required.   
 
A sugar convention negotiated in 1902 provided the only recent precedent for 
a strong international organization, albeit for a decidedly non-security related 
purpose.  The Convention Relative to the Regime of Sugar created an international 
body empowered to strike down national sugar tariffs that exceeded allowable 
                                                 
29 Lord Sanderson, Hansard, 4th ser., 1906, CLVII, 1529-1530, May 25, 1906.   
30 Hague Conference, Extracts from the Times, (Part 5), at 14-15, in Second Hague Peace Conference, 
Inter-Departmental Committee Papers, FO 881/9328*, (1906).   
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levels.31  This treaty, negotiated by the preceding Conservative government, created 
significant acrimony in Britain, leading Lansdowne to reason that the public would 
never accept similar levels of international regulation over arms construction.32   
Similarly, the Foreign Office expressed significant misgivings about the 1906 
Berlin Wireless Telegraphy Conference.  Britain possessed unique strategic 
advantages in its submarine telegraphic network and a growing Marconi wireless 
system and feared these advantages would be sacrificed through international 
regulation.33  Britain not only suspected the German hosts of the conference of 
preparing a legal trap, but also disliked treaty provisions that would allow 
international regulation of wireless telegraphy.  The draft treaty called for an 
international bureau to regulate wireless traffic through majority voting, a 
“monstrous provision” that would allow Britain to be outvoted by small states like 
Persia or Monaco with little stake in wireless telegraphy.34  While the Foreign Office 
preferred direct bilateral negotiations with the great powers on this topic, ultimately 
Britain participated in a broad multilateral conference in the belief that exclusion 
from negotiations would be more harmful to British interests.35  Britain could only 
influence international policy effectively by engaging with the world.   
Notably, neither party emerged as a sole champion of international law.  The 
prior Conservative administration negotiated the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Anglo-
French entente, as well as the Berlin Convention on Wireless Telegraphy and the 
1902 Sugar Convention.  Both parties recognized the advantages of international law 
in advancing British national interests.   
Underlying much of the public discussion on international law were lingering 
concerns regarding the force of law in a security context.  Critics of international law 
noted the fate of treaties in wartime, and rightly observed that a state could not 
depend solely upon international law for security planning.36  As treaty enforcement 
                                                 
31 Convention Relative to the Regime of Sugar, Mar. 5, 1902, Art. VII, in Despatch from the British 
Delegates, No. 4, (March 1902) at 6, Miscellaneous Papers presented to both Houses of Parliament.   
32 Marquis of Lansdowne, Hansard, 4th ser., CLVII, 1545, May 25, 1906.   
33 The Wireless Telegraphy Conference of 1906, CAB 38/13/14, (1906), at 3.  Great Britain needed a 
secure telegraphic system in time of war, and “[i]f there is the smallest doubt, we must be saved from 
international entanglements at any cost.”  George S. Clarke, Wireless Telegraphy, CAB 38/12/51, 
(1906), at 5.   
34 CAB 38/13/14, at 4.   
35 Id, at 6; Extract from Report of British Delegates to the Conference on Wireless Telegraphy at 
Berlin, CAB 37/84/76, (Oct. 23, 1906) at 2.   
36 John Walton, et. al., Right of Capture of Private Property at Sea, CAB 37/86/14, (8 Feb. 1907), at 
40-41.    
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often relied upon reciprocity, and at the most extreme, through the threat of war, the 
ability of a state to coerce an enemy belligerent appeared meager.  International law 
lacked a police force to carry out judgments, rendering any international tribunal 
powerless to enforce its decisions.37  The other means of wartime enforcement, 
through international public opinion and appeals to national honor, also seemed to 
possess limited value.38   
The government recognized the limitations of law, but held a more 
sophisticated view of what it could accomplish.  International law, by expressing 
commonly shared expectations of future behavior, could raise the political costs for a 
nation which later sought to breach an existing rule.39  Moreover, public opinion 
became relevant when a powerful neutral demonstrated a willingness to intervene on 
behalf of the law, as occurred over the issue of neutral commercial rights in the War 
of 1812.40  When preparing for the Hague, the Committee of Imperial Defence 
expressly recognized that law influenced state behavior, while it could never 
guarantee compliance.41   
The government further attempted to defuse criticism by disclaiming any 
intention of disarming at the Hague.  As Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman 
stated, “[w]ho imagines that the Powers going to The Hague Conference to deal with 
disarmament are to disarm themselves entirely and present themselves without 
defence among their neighbours?  It is not so.  We desire to stop this rivalry, and to 
set an example in stopping it. . .”42  The government, by assuring Parliament that it 
sought only limited gains at the Conference, responded to criticism by placing 
international law in the proper context of defense planning.  The government then 
                                                 
37 See, for example, id., at 2; C. Bellairs, Hansard, 4th ser., 1906, CLVI, 1397-1398, May 9, 1906; The 
Next Peace Conference:  “The Limitation of Armaments,” The (London) Times, July 20, 1906, at 4, 
col. A; Marquess of Lansdowne, former Foreign Secretary, Hansard, 4th ser., CLVII, 1544-1545, May 
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International Law.”.   
39 At the very least, as argued Lord Loreburn, the Lord Chancellor, when advocating new limits on the 
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40 Coogan, End of Neutrality, 18.   
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42 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Hansard, 4th ser., CLXII, 118, July 27, 1906.  See also Lord 
Fitzmaurice, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Hansard, 4th ser., CLVII, 1531-1532, 1535, 
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confirmed these broader views of law by formulating a pragmatic agenda to be 
pursued at the Hague.   
 
The Walton Committee and the Hague Agenda 
 
The British government prepared for the Second Hague Peace Conference in 
a more orderly fashion than it had in 1899, demonstrating a greater appreciation of 
the opportunity to secure a legal foundation for British interests.  Prior to the 1899 
Conference, Salisbury’s government did not extensively prepare British delegates or 
canvas the relevant departments regarding their interests in the various topics.43  In 
contrast, the Committee of Imperial Defence began preparations for the upcoming 
Hague Conference in October of 1905, by calling for input from various government 
departments on the topics likely to be raised.44  Ultimately the CID commissioned an 
Inter-Departmental Committee to review the agenda in June 1906, under the 
chairmanship of Attorney-General John Walton.  Over the next ten months the Inter-
Departmental Committee, or Walton Committee, met eighteen times, gaining the 
opinions of the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Board of Trade, and Law 
Officers of the Crown, and issuing its final report on April 11, 1907. 45  The Walton 
Committee reflected a broader range of opinion than that canvassed prior to the first 
Conference, providing a firmer basis for planning.46     
 The Walton Committee began its deliberations by requesting opinions on the 
major topics expected to be covered at the Hague, including the renewal of the 1899 
declarations on poison gas, dum dum bullets, and aerial bombardment, as well as 
assorted issues related to the laws of war.  Initially, the Walton Committee addressed 
neither arms control nor arbitration.47  Following the election of the Liberal 
                                                 
43 FO 881/9328*, (Part 5), at 2.   
44 The Hague Conference, CAB 38/10/76, at 1.   
45 Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee appointed to consider the Subjects which may Arise 
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47 The Hague Conference, CAB 38/10/76, at 2.   
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government, the CID added the topic of disarmament.  The Russian Circular issuing 
the call for the Conference did not mention arms control specifically, although it left 
the choice of topics open to the participating states.  This provided the Liberal 
government an opening for arms control discussions.  The large multilateral format 
and the discussion of “abstract questions” would allow diplomats to raise subjects 
without the same fear of being rebuffed as would occur in limited meetings of 
powers, like at the recent Algeciras Conference.48   
 
The Walton Committee and General Arms Limits 
First, the Walton Committee hoped to promote arms control at the Hague 
through the refinement of existing bans on weaponry.  The parties to the 1899 
Conference had issued declarations banning aerial bombardment, as well as the use 
of “projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious 
gases” and dum dum bullets.  The first declaration expired after five years, and the 
other two, neither of which Great Britain had ratified, were to be renegotiated.  While 
the British sought to retain the right to use dum dum bullets in their “small wars,” the 
Committee did not oppose the continuation of the earlier bans.49  Additionally, the 
Admiralty actively supported a limitation on aerial warfare, as this method of warfare 
would harm British interests as an insular power.   
The Walton Committee also sought restrictions at the Hague on the use of 
naval mines at the Hague, if necessary, through the expansion of the rules of war.  
The CID sought a ban on uncontrolled naval mines as far back as November 1904, 
with the concurrence of the Admiralty, and the conditional support of the War 
Office.50  Should delegates fail to agree on an outright ban on uncontrolled mines, 
the CID called for rules to regulate their use.51  The Admiralty, which previously had 
questioned the utility of treaty limitations on naval armaments, directly called for an 
international limit on mines, even if it required the convening of a special conference 
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devoted to the topic.52  Rules of war which limited the type of naval mines states 
could employ, would serve as a form of arms control, by banning mines that did not 
meet the qualifications.   
The Inter-Departmental Committee also sought to limit auxiliary cruisers 
through the rules of war.  In discussing the right of capture, the Walton Committee 
noted that very large and fast merchant ships posed a threat to British commerce and 
to the security of coastal communities exposed to bombardment.53  The Admiralty 
raised concerns that an attempt to prohibit the construction of merchant ships capable 
of conversion to auxiliary cruisers would require far too broad a regulation, 
sacrificing the British shipbuilding industry.54  Captain Ottley expanded upon the 
issue in a memorandum on contraband.  While noting that an attaché could easily 
determine if a ship was designed specifically as a warship, due to configurations of 
engine rooms and provisions for armored belts and decks, merchant ships intended 
for conversion could not be distinguished.55  Domestic law prohibited British 
subjects from exporting such ships as war material, but other states were not 
similarly bound. 56  The Walton Committee sought to respond to auxiliary cruisers 
through definition of ships of war, and by requiring conversion to warships to take 
place only in national territory, rather than on the high seas.57   
 
The Walton Committee and Naval Armaments 
Regarding the larger question of naval armaments, the Secretary of the CID, 
George S. Clarke, prepared the initial position for the Walton Committee.  As the 
political and military changes of the previous few years allowed Great Britain to 
pause in its naval construction, Clarke, hoped to propose a 10% reduction in military 
expenditure over the next three years.58  In addition, Clarke sought at least a 
temporary, if not a permanent modification of the two power standard.59  As the 
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government sought economy and enjoyed a position of strength, it could reduce 
expenditure upon armaments pending the results of the negotiations.  The 
government proposed to reduce the construction of heavy armored ships from four a 
year, as called for in the Cawdor Memorandum, to two battleships in 1907-1908, to 
be increased to three if efforts at the Hague failed to yield results.60  Campbell-
Bannerman hoped Great Britain could go even further.  In a letter to King Edward 
VII, the Prime Minister noted Admiralty plans to reduce construction to two 
battleships, stating “if . . . there is a substantial and earnest engagement on the part of 
the great powers to diminish prospective increase it will be for us to consider 
whether the two ships will be necessary.”61   
 The only criticism directed at Clarke’s memoranda related to his views on 
arbitration, indicating general acceptance of his views on arms limitation.62  
Recognizing that several of the powers, including France, Italy, and the United States 
welcomed a limit on armaments, and that Russian desire to rebuild its fleet would be 
tempered by difficulties in shifting funding, the CID recommended that a joint policy 
be adopted by the parties.  German policy appeared the main obstacle, and a clear 
statement by other nations would at the very least lay clear the responsibility for the 
arms race.63  This motivation for arms control discussions reflected Grey’s concerns 
that if the Liberal government could not uphold election pledges to reduce arms 
expenditures, the blame should be laid at Germany’s door.64  Great Britain could 
propose a five year limit on battleship construction to replacement tonnage.65  Even 
if the British made the proposal alone, no harm would result to the Imperial position, 
and it could serve to increase international confidence in a limit.  Clarke also 
recognized the linkage between arms control and other areas of international law, 
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including arbitration and the right of capture.66  Overall, Clarke saw the Hague 
Conference as an opportunity to educate international public opinion in the 
possibilities for international law to play a role in limiting armaments.67   
The Walton Committee continued to discuss legal limitations on armaments, 
utilizing a memo drafted by Foreign Office legal advisor Cecil Hurst.  Hurst, a 
trained international lawyer, again noted how a temporary limit on armaments 
needed to be a part of a broader movement towards utilizing law in foreign relations, 
the progressive codification of international law.68  An agreement only assisted 
national security if it constituted a “step in the direction of a more rational state of 
things.”69  Through the rationalization of foreign relations via the “mutual coercion 
by contract,” states could collectively maintain the strategic status quo.70  In order to 
resolve the question of enforcement, Hurst recommended that the agreement include 
at least three powers.  If one of the three breached the agreement, the other two could 
respond, and jointly, all three could respond collectively to an offensive action by 
any non-party.  A system of alliances, if coupled with arbitration clauses, would form 
the core of an armament agreement.71   
 Given Hurst’s criteria of reaching “a more rational state” through “marking 
time” in the relative balance of armaments, certain limitations would prove more 
profitable.  A total limit on construction would fail, as it would cause economic 
dislocation in the maritime and associated industries, leading to an outcry for the 
repeal of the agreement.  A size limitation would allow competition to continue 
unabated in other avenues, as would a limitation on numbers of ships.  According to 
Hurst, only a limitation on expenditure could preserve the status quo.72     
Hurst’s memorandum reflected a transition in international legal theory.  
While Hurst’s proposal spoke about the older goal of disarmament, and his 
conception of enforcement through concerted international action harkened back to 
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earlier calls for limitation through an international federation, the actual agreement 
he advocated constituted an arms control initiative, by seeking only the limitation, 
and not the outright abolition, of armaments.  Whereas disarmament required strong 
international institutions and participation by the majority of nations, the agreement 
detailed by Hurst called for participation of only several great powers.  The method 
of enforcement reflected the limited goal of altering an international arms dynamic, 
not of achieving the utopian goal of disarmament and was to be enforced through 
existing state practice rather than the creation of a utopian institution.   
Hurst’s optimism betrayed a certain amount of naivety, in his faith in the 
ability of a parliament to check the activities of a government, and in the assumption, 
which he only partly refuted, that states would enter into such negotiations with the 
same goal of peaceful progress.  However, instead of relying upon the intricate 
working of a grand international organization to uphold his system, he heralded a 
more limited form of enforcement through self-interest.  Hurst emphasized the self-
monitoring function performed by economy-minded legislatures, downplaying the 
risk of cheating in such an agreement.73  Even if imperfect, such a system could 
increase the political costs of treaty violations, making them less likely.   
 
The Walton Committee and Forms of Naval Arms Control 
 While considering the broad outlines of an agreement, the government still 
faced the question of the appropriate “yardstick” or “unit of measurement” of 
disarmament.74  Even if states agreed to limit their military forces, they needed a 
means of comparing relative military strengths.  Differences in income, geography, 
population, military organization, and even railroad networking, influenced relative 
capabilities, making a simple quantitative measurement of soldiers inadequate.  
Regarding naval limitation, various proposals had suggested ceilings on total number 
of battleships, gun caliber limits, and battleship size limits.  With the construction of 
the Dreadnought, the latter means of limitation, fixing battleship size at an arbitrary 
level, gained adherents.  President Roosevelt suggested that a size limitation on 
battleships, just below the level of the Dreadnought, would be the best means of 
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halting the naval arms race, as it would prevent competition engendered by replacing 
existing fleets with ever larger warships.75  
The Admiralty decisively shifted the British negotiating position away from a 
size limit on grounds of strategic advantage.  The British Navy traditionally built 
significantly larger battleships than those of other powers, as British service required 
them to remain on distant stations for longer periods of time.  This requirement 
mandated extra storage space for coal and provisions, and ship designs better capable 
of remaining on station in all weather.76  Moreover, the construction of smaller 
battleships would not yield any savings in expenditures, as three pre-dreadnought 
battleships would cost more in maintenance than two dreadnoughts.77  Finally, the 
Admiralty noted that an increase in size favored Great Britain because other states 
such as Germany and the United States possessed shallower harbors, limiting their 
ability to operate larger battleships.78  In addition to technical reasons against a size 
limit, the Admiralty claimed that such an agreement would pose a verification 
challenge.79   
The Admiralty did not object in the abstract to the limitation of new 
construction to replacement of existing tonnage, but questioned the wisdom of 
limitation.  Later regulators resolved several of the issues raised by the Admiralty at 
the Washington Conference in 1921-1922, including the questions of whether or not 
to include fuel and provisions in allotted tonnage, and the fate of old battleships 
removed from service.80  The Admiralty made the case that an attempt by a majority 
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of states to impose limitations on a minority at the Conference would merely increase 
the risk of conflict.81   
The Walton Committee accepted the Admiralty reasoning against the 
utilization of a size limitation, holding that the best forms of regulation would 
include either an overall military expenditure ceiling or an agreement on the total 
number of warships.82  The Walton Committee explicitly excluded the possibility of 
linking naval arms control to a reduction of land forces.  The Committee made 
acceptance of any agreement conditional upon adequate means of verification and 
with an escape clause allowing withdrawal in the case of violation by another party.83  
The Committee concluded by proposing that Great Britain restate the offer of First 
Lord of the Admiralty Goschen in 1899 and Tweedmouth in 1907, in which they 
offered to reduce British naval construction programs if the other powers would do 
likewise.84   
 
Final Preparations for the Conference 
 Between December of 1906 and the final report issued by the Walton 
Committee in April of 1907, it became clear that a broad naval limitation remained 
unlikely.  The Martens tour early in 1907, in which the Russian diplomat Martens 
visited the major European capitals in order to clarify the divisions between the 
powers, highlighted German opposition.  At home, the Admiralty sought to retain the 
right of capture, undertaking a major campaign to convince the Committee of the 
necessity of this position.85  This in turn would weaken the ability of the British 
delegates to negotiate for arms control in return for modifications to the rules of war 
at sea.   
After receiving the Walton Committee’s final report, the Cabinet engaged in 
lengthy discussions on the agenda for the Hague Conference.  Although the record is 
fragmentary, continuities emerge between the Walton Committee’s final report and 
the instructions ultimately issued by the Foreign Office to the Conference delegation 
in June.  The Cabinet agreed that arms control remained one of the two primary 
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British goals at the Conference.86  The Walton Committee recommended several 
avenues of arms control, through the direct limitation of naval armaments, through 
the development of the laws of war, and through the further refinement of earlier 
weapons bans.  While the first goal of a naval arms limitation was not likely to be 
achieved at the Hague, the remainder of the topics remained upon the agenda.87  
Moreover, the British pursued a limitation of expenditure on naval armaments, the 
manner agreed upon in the Walton Committee report, through its offer of an 
exchange of information at the Hague and through its negotiations with Germany 
following the Conference.  The exchange of information would assist by informing 
the powers of the manner in which their defense outlays were related.   
The instructions issued to the British delegation at the Hague recognized the 
difficult political climate.  German opposition made it impolitic to bring a detailed 
proposal, unless it appeared likely to receive a favorable hearing.  The Foreign Office 
requested that its delegates coordinate with the United States, Spain, and possibly 
Italy, on developing their arms control position, as these states had expressed an 
interest in the topic.  The progressive codification of international law still required 
that arms control be addressed at the Hague, even if no major accomplishments 
resulted, to prevent the appearance that the community was moving backwards.88  
The exchange of information proposal in the delegates’ instructions would provide a 
basis for further negotiations, and could assist in limiting expenditures on 
armaments.  This initiative would allow international law, in a very limited manner, 




 The British perception of the role of treaties in limiting armaments evolved 
between 1905 and 1907, reflecting an increasing awareness of the opportunities of 
law.  Debates in Parliament recognized the various means in which states could 
utilize law, and witnessed a shift away from grander regulatory schemes to more 
limited models.  Significantly, the dialogue shifted from disarmament to arms 
control.  At the same time, government preparation for the Conference reflected a 
sophisticated appreciation of international law, and a willingness to creatively 
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legislate solutions to armaments issues.  The government planned to utilize a number 
of limited regulations to check armaments, through the laws of war and possibly an 
exchange of information.  These plans, as developed by the Walton Committee, 
contrasted sharply with the public and Parliamentary assumptions prior to the 
Conference.   
 The types of regulations ultimately envisioned in the British delegation’s 
instructions required different checks and balances than those required for general 
disarmament.  Instead of requiring a super-national federation vested with 
enforcement powers, the proposed arms control agreements entailed the support of 
neutral public opinion.  By adopting models of arms control reliant upon neutral 
diplomatic pressure, the British implicitly assumed that future wars would continue 
to be limited in scale, with sufficiently powerful neutrals to coerce compliance with 
the law.  These models of international law also highlighted the function that the 
Foreign Office expected law to play, in helping set expectations for future behavior, 
while always recognizing that banned conduct could not be eliminated.  The 
government viewed international law not as an answer in itself, but as another tool at 









The failure of the Second Hague Peace Conference to resolve the burgeoning 
arms race between Germany and Great Britain has obscured the real achievement of 
the gathering.  Even before the Second Hague Peace Conference had met, pundits 
had dismissed the possibility that any disarmament might result from the gathering.  
As in 1899, no general limitation of armaments resulted, and the issue received even 
less discussion than at the earlier meeting.  Most historians have focused on the 
paltry results of the general quest to limit overall military budgets or force levels 
when discussing the law of arms control.1   
However, the 1907 conference resulted in several concrete improvements in 
the international law regulating armaments, refinements that acknowledged the 
nuanced role played by law in security questions.  While these limited regulations 
were unable to resolve the central questions relating to the arms race, they did 
confirm the role of international law in limiting armaments.  The acceptance and 
consolidation of this principle, that states could limit their right of self-defense 
through international agreement, has since formed the cornerstone of all arms control 
agreements.  Even Germany, which opposed the infringement upon national 
sovereignty inherent in arms control and which openly expressed doubts about the 
utility of regulating matters relating to national security, advocated international rules 
relating to declarations of war.  This indicated a tacit acknowledgement that law 
could play some role in advancing national security.  Germany feared a British 
preemptive strike upon its growing fleet as an alternative unilateral means of arms 
control,2 and believed that condemnation by the international community might make 
such conduct less likely.   
Moreover, several noteworthy features of the conference have not been 
acknowledged by historians.  International law evolved in several areas.  For 
instance, at the conference the British championed the abolition of naval mines as 
well as regulation of the conversion of merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers, both 
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limitations upon a state’s ability to arm itself.  The powers also forbade the 
bombardment of one another’s great cities, while retaining this tactic against colonial 
territories.  Significantly, both the Americans and British, who previously held the 
dubious distinction of being the only two great powers to refuse to sign the earlier 
armaments declarations, now championed arms control.   
Through these regulations, Britain exploited the rules of war to further arms 
limitation goals.  Rules of war differed in that they applied in time of conflict while 
arms control generally applied in times of peace.  These two types of regulations 
required different forms of enforcement, as belligerents, already waging war with 
one another, had limited additional means to uphold legal claims.  Moreover, the 
rationale for rules of war often included humanitarian goals in addition to pragmatic 
reasons, whereas states predicated arms limitation solely upon calculations of 
national advantage.  However, rules of war often overlapped with arms limitation 
when they created restrictions upon the ability of a state to arm itself, as in bans on 
arming auxiliary cruisers or on types of naval mines.   
The Second Hague Peace Conference witnessed a greater British engagement 
with the international community on questions of law relating to security than at any 
meeting of the previous half century.  While the British had attended the periodic 
international conferences in the latter half of the nineteenth century, they had 
frequently impeded sweeping changes in law, often expressly conditioning their 
participation on the exclusion of questions relating to naval warfare.3  Unlike at 
earlier meetings at St. Petersburg, Brussels, and at the Hague in 1899, in 1907 the 
British agreed to include numerous maritime questions on the agenda.  The changes 
in military technology since the advent of steam power, as well as decline in the 
relative British strategic advantage since the mid-century, underlay the new 
willingness to utilize law.  But the evolving British attitude towards the role of law in 
national security formed the necessary condition for this shift.   
Britain’s willingness to engage with the international community in setting 
rules relating to national security can be seen as part of that country’s shift away 
from “splendid isolation.”  However, Britain’s attempt to cement its national position 
through creation of rules of international law faced great challenges.  The field of 
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international law was heavily contested.  The final agreements often betrayed little of 
the intense divisions among states and even less of the sophisticated diplomacy that 
ultimately produced the compromises.  The negotiations leading up to the Hague 
Conference, as well as discussions at the Hague, showed a volatile, rapidly changing 
international community.   
Geopolitical differences influenced the legal stances taken by powers at the 
conference.  Diplomats often voted against their allies when negotiating rules that 
would affect them jointly in a future conflagration.  Divisions between great powers 
and minor states influenced positions on armaments, as with the proposed ban on 
naval mines.  Distinctions based on relative power even influenced discussions on 
judicial procedure, with the great powers seeking a predominant role on any 
international tribunal just as the smaller, and non-European, states sought 
confirmation of the principle of equality of states – one state, one vote.  Law 
reflected the political realities of international relations among the great powers, as 
well as between the great powers and smaller states.   
 
Diplomacy Prior to the Second Hague Peace Conference 
 
 President Roosevelt called for a Second Hague Peace Conference during the 
election campaign of 1904, but the powers displayed little immediate interest.  
Roosevelt timed his circular in a bid to garner the support of pacifists in an election 
year, 4 and once the election had been won, his interest in the topic waned.  
Roosevelt’s circular had been issued during the Russo-Japanese War, which removed 
these two great powers from immediate participation.  After the conflict ended late in 
1905, diplomatic formalities required that the Russian Czar be given the honor of 
actually calling the gathering, as he had done in 1898.  This meant that the 
conference would be postponed until the Russian government had stabilized its 
domestic situation.  The conference was moved from 1905 into 1906, and then 
scheduling conflicts with a gathering of diplomats in Geneva caused a further delay 
into 1907.   
Between 1904 and 1907, the nations had an opportunity to canvass their 
opinions on arms control, as well as adjust to changes in the geopolitical situation in 
the world following the Russian defeat in 1905 and the first Moroccan Crisis in 
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1905-1906.  Additionally, the construction of the British Dreadnought altered the 
pace of the naval arms race, creating opportunities for even more heated competition 
in battleships.  This whirlwind of change provided the backdrop to the Second Hague 
Peace Conference, and informed the choices of topics placed on the agenda.   
The British appeals to the international community reflected Liberal desire 
for financial retrenchment, in order to fulfill an election mandate.  Campbell-
Bannerman’s government had difficulty making the argument for limitation of arms, 
as he needed to assure domestic critics that British control of the seas remained 
secure while convincing foreign militaries that the British offer would truly result in 
a meaningful reduction of arms.  Predictably, the British Prime Minister received 
criticism from both domestic and foreign sources.  Balfour, leader of the Unionist 
opposition, highlighted the dilemma in a domestic Parliamentary debate, while 
Alfred von Tirpitz, Secretary of State of the German Imperial Naval Office, raised 
the same question from abroad.5   
While this dilemma did indeed trouble the British government, it was not as 
insurmountable as later historians have claimed.6  The British indeed sought an arms 
control agreement that would assure their continued predominance, but other 
agreements have similarly enshrined asymmetric strategic relationships.7  
International legal agreements had never been predicated upon symmetry of 
obligations, as states could accept whatever limits they deemed appropriate.  At the 
Hague in 1907, the British codified several other legal rules that uniquely benefited 
their strategic position.8   Campbell-Bannerman may have been too sanguine in his 
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Germany, to judge the fate of their prizes on the high seas, nor were they allowed to conduct prize 
court proceedings in neutral harbors.  “Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
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estimation that continued British predominance “implies no challenge to any Single 
State. . . . [and is] recognized as non-aggressive, and innocent of designs against the 
independence, the commercial freedom, and the legitimate development of other 
States. . .”9  But the task of convincing states to accept an asymmetric bargain did not 
prevent other similarly uneven agreements from being reached at the Hague.  As 
Britain lacked a large army and hence the ability to subdue any of the continental 
powers, it was reasonable for the government to expect that these states might be less 
worried about leaving Britain with a preponderant navy.   
Aside from Great Britain, the United States provided the strongest support for 
arms control at the Hague.  This was noteworthy, as the two Anglo-Saxon states had 
been the most reluctant to enter into the arms declarations at the 1899 Hague 
Conference, and had been the only great powers not to ratify all of these declarations.  
The conversion of the two states owed much to domestic developments.  While the 
new Liberal British government hoped to reduce funding of its military, the 
American government sought to limit unnecessary expenses resulting from weapon 
obsolescence.  Roosevelt’s government advocated an active role for military power 
in foreign policy, but hoped to limit the regular funding battles with a skeptical 
Congress.  President Roosevelt provided uneven support for the concept of arms 
control, simultaneously advocating a large navy to defend against aggression from 
the less-civilized states, while seeking economies to defuse domestic criticism.10   
The threat of added expenditures became particularly acute with the 
completion of the British Dreadnought.  In 1905, the year that the British launched 
the revolutionary battleship, the American Navy possessed a fleet of twelve 
battleships completed in the prior decade, and had an additional thirteen battleships 
in varying stages of completion.11  All twenty five would need rapid replacing if the 
Dreadnought became the new standard, squandering fully half of the American 
investment in battleships before their commissioning.  Facing domestic constraints 
on the size of battleships and seeking to prevent a qualitative race before the 
                                                                                                                                          
Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement 
(1908): Arts. 4 & 5.   
9 Henry Campbell-Bannerman, “The Hague Conference and the Limitation of Armaments,” 1 The 
Nation, Mar. 2, 1907, at 4.   
10 Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference, 122.   
11 Data compiled from Gardiner, Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, 114, 39-44.   
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Dreadnought became the new standard,12 the Roosevelt administration proposed a 
size limitation.   
The American approach sought to stem a qualitative arms race, as it still 
allowed states to build any number of battleships.13  The Americans hoped that 
Germany would support the proposal, as it would obviate the need to widen the Kiel 
Canal, which the larger dreadnoughts would require.14  American hopes were dashed 
however, as Germany rejected the proposal, the Kaiser noting “[a]blehnen!  Jeder 
Staat baut das was ihm paßt!  Geht keinen Andern was an!”15  Given German 
intransigence, and after the British expressed disinterest in this particular form of 
arms control, the Americans resigned themselves to building larger battleships.   
After the failure to gain support on a qualitative limitation, the Americans 
advocated a naval construction freeze.  A quantitative limit, if accompanied by 
sufficient publicity could shift the onus for its failure upon those states which refused 
to accept the limit.16  The “mobilization of shame,” as such measures have been 
termed in international law in a later generation, would assist in the realization of 
their goals.  This overestimated the value of public support for arms control, and 
exaggerated the role of public opinion in decision-making in many states, even 
perhaps betraying a lack of seriousness in the proposal.  The British Liberal 
Government welcomed such an initiative nonetheless, as it would at the very least 
allow it to justify increases in naval expenditures by placing the blame on Germany, 
which would undoubtedly reject such an offer.17  Germany had already obliged the 
British in this regard, making it known that it would refuse to attend the upcoming 
conference if armaments were placed on the agenda.18  An additional motivation for 
shelving the arms control proposals lay in concerns that their discussion could only 
worsen international tensions while having no chance of success.  Germany sought to 
prevent a recurrence of its humiliation at the Algeciras Conference the previous year, 
                                                 
12 It was not inevitable that the construction of a solitary larger warship would lead to a general 
increase in size.  The Italian Navy had built several revolutionary large battleships in the 1880s 
without resulting in the setting of a new standard for warship size.   
13 Gleichen to Durand, Sep. 2, 1906, enclosure in Durand to Grey, Sep. 7, 1906, Gooch and 
Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII.   
14 Frederick C. Leiner, “The Unknown Effort:  Theodore Roosevelt's Battleship Plan and International 
Arms Limitation Talks, 1906-1907,” Military Affairs 48, no. 4 (1984): 177.   
15 Marginal Note of Oct. 15, 1906, Pourtalès to Wilhelm II, Oct. 13, 1906, Lepsius, Bartholdy, and 
Thimme, eds., Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXIII.   
16 Grey to Durand, Nov. 6, 1906, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII.   
17 See Grey to Knollys, Nov. 12, 1906, Id.   
18 Lascelles to Grey, Aug. 16, 1906, Id.   
 172
and viewed the inclusion of arms control as a measure specifically intended to result 
in its isolation.19   
The German position on arms control influenced the stance taken by the other 
great powers, largely due to their inability to reduce defenses while Germany 
remained aloof.  Russia expressed no interest in hampering the reconstruction of its 
navy,20 recently destroyed in the 1904-1905 conflict.  While Russia needed to rebuild 
its army, the priority of Czar Nicholas II lay with the navy.21  Russia also emphasized 
the negative diplomatic consequences of an arms control discussion, and hoped to 
improve relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany by keeping the topic off the 
agenda.22  Russia, nominally organizing the Hague Peace Conference, sent a 
seasoned diplomat and international legal scholar, Feodor de Martens, to canvas 
opinion amongst the other European powers on the likely topics to be discussed.  
While the Russian professor was visiting London, Grey told Martens that the key to 
the whole question of naval expenditure lay between Germany and Great Britain, and 
that while the British did not seek to isolate Germany at the upcoming conference, 
they did intend to reserve the right to raise the question.23  Grey tentatively suggested 
that a bilateral agreement between the two countries would suffice, possibly one 
which would limit expenditure for a five year period.24   
Amongst the other great powers, Austria-Hungary echoed its German ally’s 
unwillingness to discuss arms limitations, striving to arm against Italy and Serbia.  
France had previously expressed lukewarm support for the British arms initiative, 
noting that they could not limit land armaments unless Germany took the lead.25  
                                                 
19 See Cartwright to Grey, Mar. 2, 1907, in Further Correspondence respecting the Second Peace 
Conference at the Hague, FO 412/86, (Jan. 1906-June 1907); Cartwright to Grey, Mar. 16, 1907, in id.   
20 However, the issue was not as straightforward as the ultimate Russian policy suggests.  Following 
the defeat at Tsushima, the Russian government debated the costs of rebuilding a battleship fleet, 
given expectations that conflict in Europe would begin prior to the completion of the new fleet, 
making the investment futile.  A significant faction advocated the short-term development of a coastal 
defense force of torpedo boats and submarines for sea denial in the Baltic.  See Evgenii F. 
Podsoblyaev, Francis King, and John Biggart, “The Russian Naval General Staff and the Evolution of 
Naval Policy, 1905-1914,” Journal of Military History 66, no. 1 (2002).  Had this alternative policy 
been pursued, it is possible that Russia would not have opposed naval arms control in 1907, given that 
their interests would have been similar to those motivating the Czar in 1898 – namely, preventing 
others from gaining a lead over Russia while she rebuilt her industries.   
21 Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 79. 
22 White to Root, Mar. 1, 1907, in U.S. Dep’t of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States with the Annual Message of the President 1907, Vol. Part II (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1910), 1100.   
23 Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 15, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII.   
24 Id.   
25 Bertie to Grey, May 17, 1906, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII.   
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Moreover, the French could hardly be expected to support a naval arms control 
agenda in the absence of an overall arms limitation, as it would result in the transfer 
of funding from the German Navy to the Army.26  Despite its misgivings, prior to the 
Martens Mission France acknowledged that it would participate in an arms 
discussion, not out of any interest in the topic, but in order to assuage domestic 
public opinion.27   
The opinions of six of the world’s great powers had been expressed at this 
point, with three opposed to discussion, two in favor, and one on the fence.28  On the 
continent, this left Italy, nominally the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but 
with pro-British inclinations.  Italy, the previous year, had sided against its German 
ally during the Algeciras Conference, and its reliability as a partner was in question 
at the time of the Hague Conference.29  The Italians again surprised their German 
allies by expressing support for an arms control discussion, and proposing a practical 
procedure for introducing the topic.  Procedural grounds had been raised as a 
diplomatic means of keeping the question of armaments off the agenda.  Italy 
suggested that armaments be included on the agenda as long as specific proposals, 
and not merely general discussions, were forwarded.  Under the Italian plan, 
consideration of concrete proposals would take place in two steps.  First, the powers 
would vote to determine whether or not the proposal was worthy of detailed 
discussion.  Only after passing this first hurdle would direct negotiations be 
undertaken.30   The Italian proposal would have relegated arms control to the end of 
the conference, which would have prevented it from playing an effective part in 
earlier bargains.  The Italians hoped that the provision of a veto, which the first step 
                                                 
26 As an article in the Matin put it, “it is quite certain that if Germany replaced the construction of four 
new armoured ships by the organization of four extra army corps, England would not have bothered 
much about it.”  Quotation in Morgan to Lister, Sep. 9, 1906, enclosure in Lister to Grey, Sep. 10, 
1906, in FO 412/86.   
27 Grey to Bertie, Dec. 5, 1906, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII.  More 
practically, Cambon suggested to Grey that instead of airing the question before a large multinational 
audience, a limited multilateral commission consisting of the great powers would be preferable.  
Alternatively, he recommended that the British and Germans compose their differences strictly on a 
bilateral basis.  Grey to Bertie, Feb. 14, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. 
VIII.   
28 Amongst the lesser naval powers, Spain had also expressed its support for the British arms agenda.  
Grey to de Bunsen, Feb. 28, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
29 Cartwright to Grey, Mar. 16, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
30 Egerton to Grey, Apr. 5, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
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implied, would assuage German concerns.31  However, this proposal apparently 
confirmed German fears.  While the Italian Foreign Minister claimed to be speaking 
on behalf of both his and the German government, von Bülow disavowed any prior 
acceptance of this proposal.32   
As this episode demonstrated, the alignments which had been set by the 
diplomatic revolution of 1904-1906 remained tentative.  Germany’s concern about 
isolation influenced its response to arms control at the Hague Conference.  The 
official German opposition to any discussion of armaments hardened with the Italian 
initiative, as previous German views as expressed in the press indicated an 
ambivalence about the topic.33  Yet if Germany feared isolation at the Hague 
Conference, then surely that risk would remain, even without a discussion of 
armaments, as there were other legal issues to be discussed which could have divided 
the powers.   
Moreover, the risk of German isolation on the specific issue of arms control 
was overplayed by contemporary diplomats, as Russia also expressed strong dislike 
of the topic.  Had the issue squarely arisen at the Hague, the three conservative 
Eastern monarchies of the old Holy Alliance, all opponents of arms control, would 
have found themselves united against the West, a situation that diplomats in the 
liberal states would not have welcomed.  Additionally, the German government 
probably feared that if armaments were discussed despite their opposition, it would 
appear as though Germany had been coerced into the discussions against its will, 
lending the appearance of another diplomatic defeat.34   
Diplomatic considerations loomed large in the background, but an essential 
element of the story was perception of international law.  German delegates doubted 
the workability of arms limitation for reasons that did not apply to arbitration or the 
laws of war, as they were at least willing to discuss these topics.  German concerns 
centered upon the enforcement of international law, and the ever present risk of 
circumvention of legal obligations.  Moreover, the use of a large multilateral 
conference as a forum for creating these obligations possessed the drawback that the 
fortunes of the great powers could be determined by the votes of “forty minor 
                                                 
31 The British in 1907 interpreted the Italian proposal in this light, recognizing the need to meet 
domestic criticism by at least discussing arms control at the conference.  See Foreign Office 
Memorandum, Apr. 8, 1907, enclosure in Grey to Carter, Apr. 8, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
32 Nicolson to Grey, Apr. 10, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
33 See Cartwright to Grey, Mar. 16, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
34 Id.   
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States.”35  German opinion did not believe that security could be enhanced through 
arms limitation, and that the risk of violations of an agreement would unduly threaten 
their position.36  As regarded naval armaments, the British possessed a unique ability 
to overturn agreements, given that their industry was the leading exporter of 
warships.  German skeptics rightly asked how an agreement could be enforced if 
dreadnoughts being built for Brazil could be requisitioned by Great Britain in a 
crisis.37   
As the German General von Endres put it, paraphrasing Treitschke, in the 
spring of 1907, “all Treaties are signed with the mental reservation that they will be 
binding only so long as the situation under which they were created does not 
materially change.  If in a Treaty conditions are imposed upon a State which hamper 
her welfare and are therefore not entered into voluntarily by her, she is then not only 
justified, but it is her duty to repudiate them at the earliest opportunity.”38  What the 
critique neglected, and what the British assumed, was that law could play a role in 
constructing state interests, and in constraining state behavior, even if it could not 
guarantee compliance.   
The multilateral negotiations regarding arms control prior to the 1907 Hague 
Peace Conference produced some of the most varied positions on the issue during the 
era, and overshadowed the actual discussions at the conference.  Conceptually, the 
discussions pointed to a number of methods of arms control that would be pursued in 
the following years.  Practical measures, such as qualitative limitations on battleship 
size, were introduced, although not to find favor until the 1921 Washington 
Conference.  The idea of a naval construction holiday was raised by the United 
States, and to a lesser extent by the British, as was a limitation on naval expenditure 
and exchange of information as means of building confidence and circumventing an 
                                                 
35 Id.   
36 “A Law or Treaty is only worthy of its name when there is some power behind it ready to avenge its 
contravention and to break any State or private resistance to the fulfillment of its terms.  Such an end 
as this the world cannot attain in an appreciable time, and until this time comes the only State that can 
assert its rights is the State that is strong enough to protect itself.  But this strength – this ultima ratio – 
lies in an armed force, and its extent depends on the measure of security that each State enjoys – or 
otherwise on possible threats from foreign adversaries.”  The Disarmament Question Before the 
Opening of the Hague Conference,” Kreuz Zeitung, Apr. 20, 1907, enclosure in Lascelles to Grey, 
Apr. 22, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
37 The Disarmament Question Before the Opening of the Hague Conference, Kreuz Zeitung, Apr. 20, 
1907, enclosure in Lascelles to Grey, Apr. 22, 1907, in FO 412/86.  Moreover, these fears would 
prove well-founded given British seizure of dreadnoughts under construction for Turkey at the 
outbreak of the First World War.   
38 Cartwright to Grey, Mar. 8, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
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arms race.  The French brought up arms control linkage, expressing the fear that a 
limit in naval armaments would merely lead to an increase in land armaments.  Even 
the Germans contributed to the debate by suggesting that if arms were to be limited, 
they should be made relative to population size– a move which diplomat Richard von 
Kühlmann assumed would allot Germany a larger naval force than that allotted to 
Great Britain, and thus ensure that the discussion of limitations would not take 
place.39   
 
The Second Hague Peace Conference Proceedings 
 
 In addition to the often recounted speech and non-binding resolution offered 
by Sir Edward Fry, significant, and at times, electric, discussions surrounded the 
other armaments proposals at the Hague.  The issue of naval mines revealed a 
division between large and small naval powers, as the cheap coastal defense weapons 
challenged the continued superiority of great power battleship fleets.  The possibility 
that merchant ships could be converted into commerce raiders, and then back into 
merchant ships, presaged a unique risk to British maritime commerce.40  Moreover, 
an imprimatur of legality upon such conduct would undermine the British advantage 
of possessing a world-wide network of naval bases, as these commerce raiders could 
seek refuge in neutral ports around the globe depending on whether they flew the 
naval ensign or a merchant marine pennant.  These issues mattered, not as abstract 
questions of law, nor as toothless concessions to a pacifist constituency, but as issues 
of sea power.   
 The British delegation at the Hague coordinated policy with the Foreign 
Office by submitting daily reports of ongoing sessions, regular memoranda detailing 
legal issues, and through a back-and-forth correspondence detailing evolving drafts 
of the conventions.  The delegation included seasoned diplomats Sir Ernest Satow 
and Sir Edward Fry, both distinguished international legal scholars, as well as Senior 
Foreign Office Clerk Eyre Crowe.  The delegation advanced concrete national 
interests through the use of international law at the Hague.  At the same time, it 
acknowledged the limitations inherent in the law.  Not only were the legal issues of 
                                                 
39 Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 29, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII. .  
Edward Grey prepared the rejoinder, noting that the population of British India would more than 
outweigh the German quota.  Marginal Note of Grey, in id.   
40 Matthew S. Seligmann, “New Weapons for New Targets:  Sir John Fisher, the Threat from 
Germany, and the Building of HMS Dreadnought and HMS Invincible, 1902-1907,” International 
History Review 30, no. 2 (2008): 316-17.   
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immediate consequence to Great Britain, but British statesmen approached these 
issues with an earnestness and seriousness of mind.   
 
 
The Arms Limitation Resolution 
 Even prior to the opening of the Conference, the powers had sought to 
circumscribe the anticipated arms limitation resolution.  The great lengths to which 
diplomats went in limiting this tepid document attests to concerns they harbored 
about its influence.  Chancellor von Bülow set the tone a little more than a month 
before the conference opened, by stating in the Reichstag that “[h]e had been 
counseled . . . to take part in the discussion just because it could not have any 
practical issue, and because by taking part in it he would escape misrepresentation. . . 
. [After rejecting that course, he held that Germany] will, however, leave the Powers 
who are sanguine that this particular discussion will prove successful to ‘conduct it 
alone.’”41   
 Prior to von Bülow’s pronouncement, the British had hoped at least to 
propose an exchange of information on naval programs, but feared that Germany 
would view such a step as a provocation.  In the absence of German participation, 
there would be no point in bringing a proposal, as none of the other powers could 
then accept it.  Great Britain would then be required to increase its naval construction 
program, although blame could be placed upon German intransigence.  Before 
abandoning the proposal, however, Grey sought American opinion, as he hoped to 
coordinate action with the United States on the issue.  American Secretary of State 
Elihu Root suggested that Britain should go ahead with the resolution for the sake of 
keeping the topic on the public agenda.42    
 The British delegation was instructed to raise the issue at the conference.  
Satow, in outlining British positions at the upcoming Conference, thought the British 
could offer to freeze military and naval levels at the status quo, “increasing neither 
the number of men, horses, guns, ships, tonnage, calibre of guns used respectively on 
land and at sea, on condition that the other Great Powers do the same. . .”43  This 
extraordinary proposal would have combined a number of features later included in 
                                                 
41 Untitled, The (London) Times, May 1, 1907, at 9, col. E.   
42 Grey to Bryce, May 6, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII.   
43 Note by Satow, May 13, 1907, Id.  Considering Grey’s fixation on limitation of military budgets, 
the absence of this method is interesting.   
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naval arms control in the 1920s and 1930s, including gun caliber and warship size, as 
well as warship numbers.  This memo also detailed the likely British stance on a 
number of other topics, indicating that the positions listed in it were fully considered 
and consciously adopted.   
 Russia, as convener of the conference, faced a delicate situation as it sought 
to reconcile the German position, with which it fully agreed, with British insistence 
upon a substantive discussion of arms control.  Fry, the senior British delegate, 
conferred with American, French, Russian, Italian, Portuguese, Japanese, and 
Chinese representatives on the question of armaments, agreeing that the conference 
would confirm the non-binding resolution of the 1899 gathering, but would not raise 
concrete measures.44  Russian first delegate Nelidov, elected president of the 
conference, stressed from the beginning that armaments should not be raised in such 
a manner as to disrupt the peace.  He accepted his duty, endeavoring “to keep peace 
among us by seeking points of contact and by avoiding everything that might bring 
out differences of opinion that are too violent” and warning the delegations “let us 
not be too ambitious, gentlemen.”45  The Russian diplomat saw armaments as an 
effect rather than a cause of international tensions, the opposite of Sir Edward Grey’s 
views.46  To the Russian, the sudden rise of Germany, Japan, and the United States 
upset the international balance of power, and in response armaments would continue 
to rise until states achieved a new equilibrium.47   
Fry coordinated with Nelidov, who in turn brokered begrudging consent from 
the German delegation, the parties agreeing on the limited goal of a resolution and a 
British offer for an exchange of information on naval construction.48  The parties 
pushed the discussion of the resolution late into the conference, in an August session.  
Fry spoke on the growth of armaments since the initial conference in 1899, noting 
                                                 
44 Fry to Grey, June 17, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
45 Nelidov, June 15, 1907, James Brown Scott, ed., The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences:  
Translation of the Original Texts, Vol. Conference of 1907, Vol. I (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1921), 47, 48.   
46 A year later, Grey would fully express his views on the Anglo-German naval arms race, noting that 
no other issue divided the two states, thus competition in armaments caused the rift, rather than 
followed it.  Memorandum by Grey, Aug. 6, 1908, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, 
Vol. VI.  This same outlook can be seen in the Foreign Office desire for an exchange of information at 
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addressing underlying international tensions.   
47 Fry to Grey, July 16, 1907, in Further Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference at 
the Hague, FO 412/87, (July 1907).  Moreover, Nelidov later stated that Great Britain was merely 
“giving expression to its own preoccupations,” in leading the crusade for arms limitation.  Nelidov, 
Aug. 17, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings I, 92.   
48 Fry to Grey, July 16, 1907, in FO 412/87.   
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that several powers sought to reduce the pace.  International law required state 
consent to this significant constraint on sovereignty, and states had to balance any 
legal compromise against their duty to defend themselves.  However, given the self-
perpetuating nature of the arms race, an exchange of information on naval 
expenditures could educate legislatures on how interrelated their naval programs 
were.49  When proposing an exchange of information on behalf of his government, 
Fry did not specify the actual information to be exchanged, but the proposal included 
the construction of new ships and their expense.  Moreover, he laid the foundation 
for bilateral negotiations with Germany after the conference.  If as Nelidov 
suggested, the question was no more ripe for a multilateral solution in 1907 than it 
had been in 1899,50 perhaps direct discussions with Germany on the narrower issue 
of an information exchange might yield fruit.   
 The conference reiterated the resolution of 1899, noting that “in view of the 
fact that military burdens have considerably increased in nearly all countries [since 
1899] . . . the conference declares that it is highly desirable for the governments to 
undertake again the serious examination of this question.”51  While the hortatory 
phrase did not create a distinct legal obligation, given its wording, it affirmed the 
desirability of ending the arms race as a legal principle.  Of all the binding and non-
binding documents resulting from the conference, including thirteen conventions, 
two declarations, and five voeux, it was significant that this was the only resolution.  
The use of a resolution instead of a voeu in this instance indicated a higher standing 
for arms control.  Technically, the former statement indicated the existence of a 
principle of law, while the latter only expressed a wish, making the resolution a 
binding agreement.  However, the form of expression did not create an obligation to 
take any steps, only declaring “that it is highly desirable” and not mandatory, for 
states to “undertake an examination,” a weak obligation in itself, not even requiring 
any concrete results.52  As the conference included the resolution in the final act, as 
opposed to a separate agreement, such as the declarations and conventions, parties 
could not refrain from signing it.53  Nor did it require domestic ratification; it 
                                                 
49 Fry, Aug. 17, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings I, 88-90.   
50 Nelidov, Aug. 17, 1907, Id., 93.   
51 “Final Act, Oct. 18, 1907,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908).   
52 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Vol. 1, 137.   
53 Technically, a party generally had the right to make interpretive declarations and reservations upon 
the signing of a treaty, which could release them from specific obligations.  However, as a practical 
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emerged as a perfected legal obligation.54  While no direct obligation flowed from 
the arms control resolution at the Hague, by enshrining the desirability of arms 
limitation as a principle, it laid the basis for future regulation.55   
 
Balloons and Aerial Bombardment 
 After the arms resolution, the renewal of the 1899 declaration forbidding 
aerial bombardment has been the most studied arms control precedent of the 
conference.  The earlier ban contained an agreement among the parties to forbid the 
“launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other new methods of a 
similar nature.”56  In 1899, aircraft technology was in its infancy, and military 
experts were uncertain whether the new weapon would tend to make warfare less 
humane or more humane.  Therefore, the declaration remained in effect only for five 
years,57 allowing observers to assess aerial developments in the interim.  The 
obligation expired in 1904 and was submitted to the conference for renewal.   
 While military advocates saw the unknown potential of airpower as reasons 
for maintaining state freedom, others perceived a necessity of halting the 
militarization of the sky before it occurred, justifying a ban at the outset.  Lord Reay, 
of the British delegation, asked “if it is not enough to have two elements in which the 
nations may give free scope to their animosities and settle their quarrels without 
adding a third?”58  As Lord Reay noted, the development of airpower had not 
progressed so far that states could not limit it.  The further development of military 
aircraft would tend only to increase national reliance upon such weapons, making 
them more difficult to regulate in the future, and causing a further increase in 
                                                                                                                                          
matter, the inclusion of the resolution in the final act of the conference implied the general consent of 
the parties.   
54 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, 139.   
55 As a point of law, as opposed to the practical question of limiting the pre-war arms race, this should 
not be underestimated.  A similar principle of law, the Martens’ clause, which noted vaguely that the 
means of injuring an enemy are not unlimited, has since developed into a key premise underlying the 
laws of warfare.  “Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Oct. 18, 1907,” 
American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908): Art. 22.   
56 “Declaration Concerning Aerial Bombardment, July 29, 1899,” American Journal of International 
Law 1, no. 2 Supplement (1907).   
57 The declarations regarding poison gas and dum-dum bullets remained in effect until renounced, thus 
were not on the 1907 agenda.   
58 Lord Reay, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 148.  Fortunately, following this pious 
speech, no one noticed that Great Britain remained the only great power outside the terms of the 
Aerial Bombardment Declaration.   
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military budgets.59  Moreover, the addition of this “third element” would pose 
particular strategic risks to Great Britain, by enabling continental powers to bypass 
British command of the seas and strike directly against England.60   
 The emerging norms against aerial bombardment were as much a part of the 
development of rules of war as they were a part of arms control.  The resulting treaty 
regulated wartime conduct – the “discharge of projectiles and explosives from 
balloons. . .”61  This overlap led some delegations to prefer regulation of aerial 
bombardment over an outright ban.  By utilizing existing legal norms which 
prohibited the bombardment of undefended cities, aerial bombardment of military 
targets would remain legal.  The French delegation, in particular, preferred this 
method,62 and their diplomats brokered a modification of the rules of land warfare in 
this regard by adding the words “by any means whatever” after the words “[i]t is 
forbidden to attack or bombard undefended cities” in Article 25 of the Convention 
Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare.63  This separate regulation 
created another source of legal obligation, binding non-signatories to the Aerial 
Bombardment Declaration.64  However, the Declaration created a broader rule, 
applying to all aerial bombardment, whether of military targets or undefended cities.   
                                                 
59 Id.  The British were not alone in advocating this stance.  Austro-Hungarian delegate Szilássy noted 
that aerial bombardment in 1907 was “not indispensable” making regulation more practical.  Szilássy, 
Aug. 7, 1907, Id., 146.  The regulation of aerial bombardment included an interesting question – did 
law follow military technology, or could it lead.  While the British, Austro-Hungarian, and other 
delegations believed that law could lead, by stifling a new technology, other delegates believed that 
law could only follow military developments, and channel conduct into acceptable bounds.  Italian 
delegate De Robilant held that scientific progress could not be halted, “to-morrow we will have 
armored automobiles armed with rapid fire guns . . . and it will become more and more difficult, . . . to 
prevent balloons from being armed in their turn and using their arms.”  De Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, 
Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 150.   
60 It would be another one to two years before the British public truly awakened to the risks of aerial 
warfare, and this belated recognition was partly occasioned by the early cross-channel flights by 
Bléroit, partly by belief that bomb-carrying German airships were already prowling over English 
skies.  Alfred Gollin, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and Their Government, 1909-
1914 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 49, 70-71.  Nonetheless, the War Office recognized the threat and 
gave its wholehearted support to international regulation.  War Office to Foreign Office, July 8, 1907, 
in FO 412/87.   
61 “Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907,” 
American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908).   
62 Renault, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 147.   
63 See Amourel, Aug. 14, 1907, Id., 14; “Hague Land Warfare Convention 1907,” Art. 25.   
64 “1907 Hague Aerial Bombardment Declaration.”  The Italian delegate Tornielli expressed the 
opinion that the use of two separate legal instruments indicated that the general prohibition contained 
in the rules of war did not cover aerial bombardment and sought express inclusion of a prohibition.  
Tornielli, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 153.  This different interpretation took on 
practical dimensions following Italian aerial bombardment of Libyan villages in the 1911-12 Italo-
Turkish War.  See “The Use of Balloons in the War between Italy and Turkey,” American Journal of 
International Law 6, no. 2 (1912).   
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European concerns centered upon the burgeoning German aeronautical 
technology and the necessity to counter it.65  Delegates expressed misgivings about 
their indefensible “aerial frontiers.”66  As a practical matter, the Aerial Bombardment 
Declaration did not prohibit the construction of military aircraft, nor did it ban other 
military uses besides bombardment, thus states still needed to prepare aerial 
defenses.67  French opposition to the declaration, and support for the rules of war as 
an alternative, should be viewed with this in mind.   
Germany ultimately voted in favor of a further temporary ban, but it could 
emerge at the end of the active period of the declaration with an extant aerial 
weapon.  Germany also conditioned its vote upon unanimity.68  This declaration 
never achieved unanimity, and was notable for the paltry number of states ratifying 
it.  By 1914, only fifteen states had ratified it, the United States and Great Britain 
being the only great powers among them.69  The Declaration only applied 
reciprocally, and the entry of a non-signatory into a war terminated any obligations.70  
Given these weaknesses, international law made no claims of guaranteeing security.   
The British delegation acknowledged these weaknesses when framing its 
position, recognizing that French and German advances in aviation meant that Great 
Britain would have to keep pace.  International law could not substitute for defense 
planning.  However, the development of international public opinion could 
contribute to security.  Even if France, Russia, and Germany refused to sign the 
resultant declaration, the new rule would still be in the British interest as a 
“Declaration signed by perhaps over thirty Powers carries some weight and, by the 
action of public opinion, is a strong factor in inducing other Powers to join it.”71  
                                                 
65 An Italian delegate actually pointed out that the advances made by its ally Germany were forcing 
the pace of development.  See de Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 150.  
Germany possessed an advantage in dirigible aircraft construction, while France led the world in 
airplanes.   
66 Szilásy, Aug. 7, 1907, Id., 146.   
67 This is not unusual in arms control, and is sometimes referred to as a “no first use” rule.  The 1925 
Geneva Protocol forbid the use of chemical weapons, while still allowing possession.  This served a 
deterrent function, by allowing states to retaliate if a violation did occur.   
68 Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 149.   
69 Scott, ed., Hague Conventions, 223-24.  In contrast, Great Britain was the only great power not to 
have ratified the 1899 declaration.  However, all the great powers did sign the Convention Regarding 
the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, with only Italy having failed to ratify it by 1914, increasing 
the likelihood that aerial bombardment would fall under legal prescription in a future conflict.  Scott, 
ed., Hague Conventions, 222-23, 36, et. seq.   
70 1907 Hague Aerial Bombardment Declaration.   
71 Memo by Sir E. Elles respecting the Three Declarations of 1899, Enclosure No. 2 in Fry to Grey, 
Aug. 13, 1907, in Further Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference at the Hague, FO 
 183
Over time, an international consensus might emerge that could prevent a new 
weapon from achieving legitimacy.72   
Not only were states uncertain whether legal guarantees would apply in the 
case of future conflict, they lacked a basic understanding of how aerial warfare might 
be conducted.  Delegates tended to analogize aerial warfare to maritime warfare, and 
as a result applied ill-fitting legal concepts.   De Robilant noted the inapplicability of 
the 1856 Declaration of Paris to aerial warfare, fearing that “aerial privateers” would 
descend upon cities.73  The Italian delegation also expressed concern that because 
airships other than dirigibles could not be steered while in flight, aerial bombardment 
by such vessels could not be targeted.  De Robilant recommended that only dirigibles 
be authorized to conduct bombardments, and further specified regulations bringing 
aeronauts under military supervision, to prevent the development of aerial 
privateering.74   
The initial 1899 declaration had been intentionally framed as a five year 
regulation in order to allow future law to evolve along with changes in technology.  
Since that time, only the zeppelin appeared capable of military application in the 
immediate future, heavier than air craft lacking reliability, range, or payload for 
military use.  However, delegates lacked the comfort with the technological 
questions necessary to advance new legal concepts, and retained the original 
wording.  The parties did make one significant alteration to the 1907 declaration, 
lengthening its effective duration.  The new declaration would remain in force until 
“the close of the Third Peace Conference. . .”75  If statesmen were unprepared to 
develop new regulations for aerial warfare, they did choose to keep the issue on the 
international agenda, effectively linking another arms control issue to the progressive 
codification of international law at the Hague.   
                                                                                                                                          
412/88, (Aug. 1907).  As evidence, the author of this passage noted that Great Britain had been 
induced to accede to the Expanding Bullets Declaration by weight of public opinion.   
72 Similarly, the customary prohibition on chemical and biological weapons slowly developed during 
the twentieth century, and despite similar predictions early in the century that these scourges would 
become hallmarks of modern conflict, their use has been decidedly limited.  See Scott A. Keefer, 
“International Control of Biological Weapons,” Nova Journal of International and Comparative Law 
6 (1999).   
73 De Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 151.  However, it should be noted that 
prior to the First World War, most pilots were self-trained enthusiasts, rather than militarily instructed 
soldiers, thus might not necessarily fall under military discipline.  In the conflicts involving airpower 
prior to 1914, the pilots were often mercenaries hired following the outbreak of war.  See Wilmot E. 
Ellis, “Aerial-Land and Aerial-Maritime Warfare,” American Journal of International Law 8, no. 2 
(1914): 261.   
74 De Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 151.   




 Submarine mines posed an emerging threat in 1907.  Prior to the Russo-
Japanese War, mines had only been used for harbor defense, the 1904-1905 conflict 
pioneering the widespread offensive scattering of mines in enemy waters.76  The 
British Admiralty had perceived the danger of submarine mines, and even before the 
Hague Peace Conference, it had suggested that a special international assembly be 
devoted to banning the weapon.77  The Admiralty recognized that a complete ban 
would be difficult to attain, and as an alternative sought three basic regulations, 
including provision of devices on automatic mines that would render them harmless 
in a fixed period, provision of devices that would make anchored mines harmless if 
they broke loose from their anchor, and a territorial restriction of submarine mines to 
the territorial waters surrounding an enemy’s military harbors.  The Admiralty 
realized that the international community would be less likely to accept the third 
regulation, but generally hoped to “induce all Europe to fall in with our own 
humanitarian views. . .”78  This standpoint was based not upon utopian goals but 
upon an analysis of Great Britain’s strategic position.  At the Hague, the British 
delegation adopted this stance, arguing for the island nation’s strategic imperatives in 
the language of humanitarianism.   
 Captain Ottley, the naval expert attached to the British delegation, summed 
up his country’s official attitude towards arms control, noting that “our attitude 
towards such questions should be based entirely upon their effect upon the influence 
of sea power.”79  That being said, British proposals were framed with a humanitarian 
viewpoint, “the indubitable fact that any such restrictions would be specially to the 
advantage of this country has been purposely kept out of sight.”80  The movement of 
British fleets had been restricted by the introduction of all types of submarine 
weapons, and as a belligerent or as a neutral, Great Britain would benefit from a ban 
on naval mines.  This goal would be opposed by smaller naval powers who benefited 
                                                 
76 Ottley to Fry, Sep. 1, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, Sep. 2, 1907, in FO 412/89, No. 7.   
77 Submarine Automatic Mines, Mar. 13, 1905, at 1, CAB 4/1/52 B.   
78 Id.   
79 Ottley to Fry, June 21, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, June 24, 1907, in FO 412/86.  Ottley also 
presented a novel proposal to ban the use of torpedoes at night, ostensibly to prevent the occurrence of 
another Dogger Bank type incident.  However, he noted that Great Britain possessed more submarines 
than Germany, and that unlike torpedo boats, these vessels could effectively fire torpedoes during 
daylight.  Ottley, Restrictions on the Use of Locomotive Torpedoes at Night, Enclosure No. 2, in Fry 
to Grey.   
80 Ottley to Fry, June 21, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, June 24, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
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from the cheap defensive weapon.  Therefore, the British delegation would need to 
stress the humanitarian value in order to overcome opposition.  Ottley recognized 
that British security could not be fully assured by successfully negotiating a treaty, 
thus continued vigilance was required.81   
The effectiveness of a treaty in wartime depended upon the coercion of 
neutrals as well as the threat of retaliation by belligerents.  In peacetime, a treaty 
would need to be coupled with the public will to enforce it, without creating an 
overreliance upon legal solutions.  The Admiralty remained troubled by the prospects 
for international law, commenting on Ottley’s memo that “the existence of an 
international rule on the subject may give a sense of false security which may be fatal 
in its effects.”82  Yet while expressing the misgivings that law might actually detract 
from security, the Admiralty was unwilling to forgo the potential benefits of a ban, 
and continued its support.   
 When the Conference opened, Ottley started the first session on naval matters 
with a strong maiden speech describing the effects on neutral commerce if a heavily 
travelled strait, such as Gibraltar, Dover, or the Danish Sund, were to be infested 
with mines.  Fully developing the humanitarian chord, he described how the 
destruction of a large luxury liner, with a thousand passengers, would constitute an 
unparalleled catastrophe.83  The Dogger Bank Incident would pale in comparison.  
British senior delegate Satow later developed the theme obliquely, averring that even 
the most balanced neutral would find it difficult not to retaliate.84  No military 
necessity could justify such a possibility, and the British government presented its 
proposal to prevent such a risk from materializing.   
At the conference, the British raised the most fully developed mine proposal, 
which formed the basis of discussions.  The British plan called for a prohibition on 
unanchored mines, while Italian and Japanese proposals merely desired that such 
devices become harmless a certain time after being laid, and a Spanish proposal 
called for the creation of an international body which could authorize the laying of 
mines.85  The Spanish proposal envisioned far greater international regulation than 
                                                 
81 “There will always be a lingering doubt in the mind of an Admiral commanding a fleet as to how far 
he is justified in accepting a mere paper assurance from an enemy, as being really a binding and 
effective guarantee against a treacherous torpedo attack at night.”  Id.   
82 Admiralty to Foreign Office, June 28, 1907, in FO 412/86.   
83 Ottley, June 27, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 524.   
84 Satow, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 381.   
85 Id., 526.   
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anyone else desired, and quickly disappeared.  However, the Italian and Japanese 
proposals gained traction as alternatives to an outright ban, finding favor among the 
second-ranked naval powers.  Germany also brought a proposal to ban unanchored 
mines for a period of five years, drawing dissent from its Italian ally.86  Ultimately, 
given various experts’ opinions on the feasibility of safety devices being attached to 
mines, the majority of smaller naval states voted to retain legality, while regulating 
usage.87   
The other feature of the British proposal to draw strong opposition related to 
the areas where mines could be strewn.  Article 4 of the British draft proposal limited 
mining to territorial waters88 of the belligerents, or up to ten miles from shore 
batteries or military ports.89  Rear Admiral Siegel, the German naval expert, noted 
that in a future war, an enemy might undertake a distant blockade.  In order to 
effectively counter a distant blockade, it might be necessary to sow mines beyond the 
limits of the territorial sea.90  In an argument foreshadowing the declaration of a war 
zone in 1915, the German delegation advanced the concept of the “theater of war” 
allowing the use of mines anywhere “an operation of war is taking place or has just 
taken place, or upon which such an operation may take place in consequence of the 
presence or the approach of the naval forces of the two belligerents.”91  Satow 
disagreed with a broadening of the area, protesting that vagueness would allow mines 
to be used anywhere.92  In the absence of agreement on the point, the final treaty 
omitted the provision.   
In justifying their negotiating stance, the German delegation expressed well-
reasoned misgivings that a concise code of the laws of war would not be honored by 
                                                 
86 Id., 391-92.  The British delegation doubted the sincerity of the German proposal, Commander 
Segrave, a naval expert, claiming that the offer was only made after it was clear that a majority would 
oppose it.  Memo by Commander Segrave, Enclosure No. 1 in Fry to Grey, Sep. 30, 1907, in Further 
Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference at the Hague, FO 412/90, (Oct.-Dec. 1907).  
The United States also unsuccessfully attempted to reintroduce a total ban of unanchored mines.  
Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 405.   
87 Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 405.  Article 1 of the final convention prohibited the laying of 
unanchored mines that did not become harmless after one hour, anchored mines that did not become 
harmless if they broke free from their moorings, and torpedoes that did not become harmless when 
missing their target.  “Convention Relative to the Laying of Submarine Mines, Oct. 18, 1907,” 
American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908).  The weapons remained legal as 
long as they met the safety requirements.   
88 Legal authorities generally defined territorial waters as three miles from the low water mark of the 
coastline.   
89 Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 662.   
90 Siegel, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 380.   
91 Id., 417.   
92 Satow, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 382.   
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a state in extreme circumstances.  As this would only weaken the entire system of 
international law, German delegate Marschall argued it would be preferable for law 
to be vague on these points.  Moral obligations would suffice to limit egregious 
conduct, “[t]he officers of the German navy – I loudly proclaim it – will always 
fulfill in the strictest fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of 
humanity and civilization.”93   
Other philosophical questions relating to the juxtaposition of law and war 
came into focus in the submarine mine discussions.   Statesmen questioned whether 
greater ferocity of war tended to deter states from fighting or whether war should be 
humanized.94  As with aerial bombardment, a debate emerged over whether law 
merely followed technology, or whether technology would follow the law.95  
According to one view, once a weapon had been used, law could no longer 
successfully prevent its development, while the opposite opinion held that the 
evolution of technology could be framed by legal regulation.   
The resulting convention reduced the humanitarian claims of all the parties to 
open hypocrisy.  Despite the oft-repeated concerns about untethered mines floating 
the seas to wreak untold havoc upon neutral vessels, the obligations contained in the 
convention were predicated upon reciprocity.96  This meant that the participation of a 
non-ratifying belligerent in a conflict would have freed all combatant nations to 
strew mines, regardless of the consequences to neutrals.  If the parties had truly been 
motivated by concerns about the effects of belligerent conduct upon third parties, the 
obligations would have been general.   
 The submarine mine negotiations overlapped with other topics of naval 
warfare.  British delegates successfully prevented minefields from being considered a 
legally effective form of blockade, a definition that would have altered the rights of 
neutral merchant shipping in mine-infested waters.97  On the other hand, the British 
                                                 
93 Marschall, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 385.   
94 Satow, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 381.   
95 At stake was the question of whether mines could be fitted with devices rendering them harmless 
within a fixed period of time, or after becoming untethered.  Expert opinion was mixed.  A Dutch 
delegate suggested that if the law was set, surely “science will not be slow in finding means to meet it 
satisfactorily.”  Röell, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 417.  On the more general question of an outright ban on 
unanchored mines, it was argued that once a weapon had been used, it could no longer be forbidden.  
Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 404.    
96 “1907 Hague Submarine Mines Convention,” Art. 7.   
97 Article 2 contained a provision banning the use of mines “with the sole object of interrupting 
commercial navigation.”  Id.  The phrase “sole object” caused some concern.  Like the ban on artillery 
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failed to convince the other delegations that the presence of a minefield before an 
otherwise undefended city rendered the unfortunate locale liable to naval 
bombardment.98  The resulting convention was a decided compromise, failing to 
meet British goals of banning unanchored mines and limiting the area of mining 
operations.  The preamble to the convention admitted as much, “[c]onsidering that 
although in the present state of affairs it is impossible to prohibit the use of 
submarine mines, it is important to limit and regulate such use. . . . Until such time as 
it shall be found possible to regulate the matter in such a manner as to offer to the 
interests involved the proper guaranties. . .”99 the present regulation would have to 
suffice.  The delegates intended the entire matter to be reexamined at the next Hague 
Peace Conference, giving the convention a duration of seven years, and specifically 
requiring a further discussion of the matter at that point.100   
However, the Admiralty did succeed in achieving two of the three aims it had 
set out in the CID memorandum of 1905, gaining requirements that unanchored 
mines be fitted with devices rendering them harmless in a fixed period and that 
anchored mines must become harmless if they broke loose from their anchor, while 
failing to establish territorial restriction of submarine mines.  The government had 
recognized all along the difficulties in securing agreement on a complete ban, setting 
realistic legal goals, based upon a thorough understanding of the island nation’s 
strategic needs.  Law was never intended as a substitute for defense, but when 
skillfully crafted could augment national security.   
 
Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships 
 The final major arms control issue discussed at the Hague in 1907 related to 
the conversion of merchant ships into warship.  A recent study has indicated that 
British perception of the threat of converted merchant cruisers played a larger role in 
policy formation than previously acknowledged.101  In addition to providing an 
impetus for the construction of the new battle cruiser, the threat of the converted 
merchant cruiser spurred the British decision to control these weapons at the Hague.   
                                                                                                                                          
shells designed for the “sole object” of spreading poisonous gas, it did not prohibit the use of weapons 
for more than one purpose.  Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 414-15.   
98 “1907 Hague Submarine Mines Convention,” Art. 1.   
99 Id.   
100 Id., Arts. 11 & 12.  The specificity of these provisions would prevent the question from 
disappearing from the Hague agenda, a threat faced by overall arms limitation.   
101 Seligmann, “New Weapons,” 316-17.  In effect, this is a return to Marder’s history of British naval 
policy.  Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 102-04.   
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The issue as formulated at the Hague centered on when and where a merchant 
ship could be converted into a warship, with delegates generally conceding that a 
state could legally authorize a conversion of its own vessels.102  While the discussion 
was framed around the legality of wartime conduct, or the laws of war, it affected 
national armaments and thus formed a measure of arms control.  Captain Behr, 
Russian naval expert, crystallized the issue, and expressed the matter as a limit to 
“the right which a belligerent has to increase his naval forces.”103   
Great Britain possessed an unparalleled network of naval bases, providing it 
with a significant strategic advantage when facing other naval powers.  The British 
had little need for neutral overseas bases, and could afford to deny the use of these 
ports to all powers.  The British went to the conference seeking to reduce the 
potential threat from fast converted merchant cruisers by limiting the circumstances 
under which a vessel could become a warship.  By only legally recognizing the 
conversions that took place in national ports and territorial waters, belligerents would 
be deprived of the opportunity to enlist cruisers in neutral waters.  States such as 
Germany or Russia, hemmed inside narrow seas and lacking major overseas bases, 
would have little opportunity to commission merchant cruisers, particularly after the 
British initiated a blockade.  Absent such a restriction, these states could fully avail 
themselves of all the ports of the world in their guerre de course against British 
commerce.   
The German delegation analogized converted merchant cruisers to militias on 
land, claiming the right to commission them anywhere.104  The Russian, Italian, and 
French delegations quickly agreed with the German stance.105  Similar to their stance 
when advocating restrictions on naval mines, the British framed their arguments 
from the standpoint of neutrals and humanity, claiming that neutral shippers would 
be unable to determine legitimate warships.106  Italy proposed a compromise 
solution, allowing conversions on the high seas, but only for merchant vessels 
outside national waters on the outbreak of war.107  This would have allowed a one-
                                                 
102 Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 747.   
103 Behr, Aug. 3, 1907, Id., 920-21.   
104 Siegel, July 12, 1907, Id., 811.   
105 Id., 811-14.   
106 Lord Reay, July 12, 1907, Id., 813.  Belligerent warships possessed certain rights to stop and 
inspect neutral cargoes on the high seas, creating a risk if a neutral merchant ship failed to recognize 
and halt for a converted merchant cruiser.   
107 Fusinato, Aug. 30, 1907, Id., 991.   
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time opportunity for merchant ships to convert into warships, limiting the long-term 
risk from converted merchant cruisers.  Unwisely, the British, as well as the 
Japanese, rejected the compromise, and scuttled the possibility of any limitation upon 
conversion.108   
A subsidiary issue related to reconversion of merchant cruisers back into non-
combatant merchant ships.  In the absence of regulation, a ship could transform itself 
into a warship on the high seas in order to attack commerce, then reconfigure itself as 
a merchant ship so as to gain access to neutral ports at the end of a successful raid.  
Austro-Hungarian legal expert Lammasch proposed a ban on this type of vessel, 
which he colorfully labeled a “naval hermaphrodite.”109  The British delegation 
seized upon this possibility to argue in favor of neutral rights, but ultimately lost this 
point when rejecting the Italian compromise.110   
The final treaty attempted to protect neutral rights by requiring that 
conversion of merchant ships take place in conformity with the Declaration of Paris 
of 1856, which included placing the crew under military discipline, and placing the 
vessel under the direct supervision of the commissioning state.111  The belligerent 
commissioning the converted merchant cruiser had a duty to inform neutrals of the 
conversion “as soon as possible” – a vague standard in an age prior to the general 
adoption of wireless telegraphy.112  Like the Submarine Mine Convention, the 
Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships mentioned 
the failure of the parties to reach a general agreement on the core issues in its 
preamble, but unlike the other agreement did not specify that the issue would be 
reviewed at a future gathering.113   
 Conversion of merchant ships also touched upon other legal issues at the 
Hague Conference, including the definition of warships, and days of grace.  The 
latter referred to a period often allowed to merchant vessels to leave port at the onset 
of a conflict.  The British delegation noted that the issuance of days of grace had 
been a matter of convenience, not of customary obligation, and that it would not be 
extended to vessels the British government deemed capable of conversion into 
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111 “Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships, Oct. 18, 1907,” 
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merchant cruisers.  The British delegation did not achieve as many of its goals in this 
topic as it had in other areas.  The unwillingness to compromise on a key issue 
prevented any legal standard from being framed, leaving future belligerents in an 
uncertain position.114  The British government, for its part, intended to enforce its 




 From the point of view of the British delegation, the results of the Second 
Hague Peace Conference were mixed.  The British delegation introduced significant 
innovations into the laws of war at sea, gaining acceptance of its concept of distant 
blockade in return for limitations on the right of capture of neutral vessels.  The 
conference regulated submarine mines about as well as the Admiralty had hoped 
possible.  The prohibition on aerial bombardment was renewed, although ominously 
far fewer states had signed the document at the close of the conference.  Regulations 
on conversion of merchant ships into warships attempted to allay neutral concern 
while failing to address core British concerns about commerce raiders.   
 Britain successfully exploited the rules of war to advance arms control goals.  
The Admiralty recognized advantages in regulating naval mines and auxiliary 
cruisers, as a means of maintaining naval superiority.  On the larger question of a halt 
in the arms race, no concrete advance emerged.  However, even before the opening 
of the conference, none was anticipated.  The British placed a realistic proposal to 
exchange information before the international community, and gained recognition for 
the principle of arms limitation.  The government had achieved the basic goals it had 
set for itself.  By pragmatically viewing what could be accomplished, and by 
carefully assessing what value these legal accomplishments would have, the British 





                                                 
114 There were two arguments currently advanced at the time of the conference regarding state 
freedom of action in areas where the law remained silent. The older view held that in the absence of 
clear regulation, a state remained free to take any action desired.  See generally George B. Davis, 
“The Launching of Projectiles from Balloons,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 3 
(1908).  The newer view, as contained in the Martens’ clause, held that the unwritten law of nations 
still forbade some conduct.   
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 Unsurprisingly, the Hague Conference failed to resolve the central challenge 
of the naval arms race.  Pre-conference diplomacy, which laid bare German 
objections, had presented the only real prospect for an agreement.  However, the 
gathering did result in a number of arms-related advances, through regulation of 
naval mines and the conversion of merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers.  More 
importantly, British negotiating strategy altered from the First to the Second Hague 
Conference.  Britain realized the need to engage with the international community.  
While Britain stood out in 1899 as the only state to refuse ratification of any arms 
limitations, in contrast by 1907 Britain championed all arms limits.  Moreover, the 
armaments resolution at the 1907 gathering provided Britain with the opening to 
continue bilateral discussions directly with Germany.  After 1907, British proposals 
for exchanging information provided the model for progress.   
Despite the impasse at the Hague, the Foreign Office continued to incorporate 
international law into strategic planning, recognizing law’s potential in the 
management of the burgeoning naval arms race.  International law had evolved since 
the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899.  Legal discussions on arms limitations 
increasingly distinguished between arms control and disarmament.  In addressing 
security concerns, British diplomats crafted legal solutions, codifying the rules of 
naval war and regulating emerging aerial navigation.  These developments were all 
influenced by arms limitations.  Proponents optimistically linked rules of naval 
warfare to arms reductions, reasoning that security of maritime commerce would 
reduce German need for a navy.  Zeppelin scares and the perceived need to shape the 
rules of aerial warfare before they entered the realm of practical experience heavily 
influenced the regulation of aerial navigation.   
The naval arms race between Britain and Germany influenced the 
development of arms control concepts.  The Liberal government exhibited 
ambivalence about negotiations with Germany, and policy shifted in the years before 
1914.  German reluctance to negotiate and refusal to separate armaments from 
political questions made Grey’s Foreign Office wary of a diplomatic trap.  British 
politicians expressed concerns that willingness to negotiate would show weakness, 
spurring Germany’s naval ambitions.  The concomitant suggestion was that Britain 
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should increase its naval construction to signal a determination to win the race.  
Additionally, the Admiralty wavered between the advantages of openness and that of 
secretiveness in construction policy.  Ultimately, German demands for concessions 
outweighed the potential benefits of arms limitation, preventing a deal from being 
reached.   
Coming to power pledged to reduce naval expenditure, the Liberal 
government would have faced considerable discontent from its radical back-benchers 
if arms control efforts were abandoned.  While statesmen debated whether or not 
arms control was a good idea or if Germany would consent to agreement, they 
accepted that such an agreement could be reached through a treaty.  Statesmen 
believed that international law could limit tensions within the confines of the existing 
international system, without the creation of powerful international institutions.  The 
British response to the 1909 Dreadnought Scare highlighted this point.  The scare 
fully exposed the German naval challenge, while undermining the premises on which 
British construction policy rested.  Suddenly the public feared that Germany could, 
undetected, build as many ships, and as rapidly as Britain, allowing no time for a 
response.  Here, law could play a concrete role in security, by formalizing attaché 
visits and exchanges of information.  Significantly, the only Anglo-German arms 
treaty to reach the drafting stage before the war was an exchange of information 
agreement.   
Britain took a central role in the development of arms control in the decade 
prior to the First World War.  While ultimately fruitless, the efforts indicated that 
contemporary statesmen possessed a more sophisticated assessment of international 
law than is often acknowledged.  Arms control was perceived as possible within the 
existing international system, and without the need to create utopian international 
institutions.  The failure to realize these goals should not obscure this fact.   
 
The Evolution of International Law, 1900 - 1914 
 
Between the First Hague Conference and the outbreak of World War I, the 
pace of change within the international legal system accelerated.  This in turn 
inspired a richer discussion of arms limitation law, leading to a fuller debate on the 
issues at stake.  Increased communication between academic and governmental 
lawyers, typified by the mixed delegations of military, diplomatic, and academic 
figures at The Hague, fostered a cross-fertilization of ideas.  The Foreign Office 
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followed proceedings at interparliamentary conferences and scholarly gatherings, 
using their draft agreements in framing British policy at the Hague and elsewhere.  In 
1898, textbook discussions of arms limitation were spotty and incomplete.  By 1914, 
an emerging awareness of precedents and concepts was taking shape.   
Underlying this trend was a shift towards international regulation of a range 
of issues.  The movement for progressive codification of international law, working 
through multilateral treaties applicable to the majority of the world community, set 
the core method.  The focus upon multilateral instruments was striking. 1  Bilateral 
agreements had been far more prevalent before the mid-nineteenth century, but 
afterwards states moved increasingly towards multilateral agreements.  These new 
instruments were forward-looking, setting rules for future conduct rather than 
resolving past disputes, and often open, capable of being adhered to by any state.2  
The 1856 Declaration of Paris set an early example, followed most importantly by 
the Hague Peace conferences, the first of which included twenty-six states, and the 
second forty-four.  Notably, regulation of warfare and armaments featured 
prominently in this development, including the 1864 Geneva Convention and the 
1868 St. Petersburg Declaration on Exploding Bullets.   
Furthermore, the era saw the emergence of international institutions and 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  The 1899 Hague Peace Conference resulted in the 
formation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, an entity still in existence and an 
ancestor of modern international institutions.  Moreover, the growing network of 
arbitration treaties provided a formalized method of dispute resolution.  Such a 
network suited Britain’s national interests, and maintained its position as a global 
power when facing disputes with smaller countries. 3   
At the same time, scholars increasingly acknowledged “commons problems”4 
and sought international solutions.  International legal scholarship increasingly 
reflected upon problems of interdependence and sovereignty.5  After the turn of the 
                                                 
1 Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, 513.   
2 Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 192-93.   
3 While the arbitration treaties posed no insurmountable obstacle for a great power to avoid, they 
effectively bound smaller nations which could not afford to refuse arbitration with a great power.  
Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, 523.   
4 Commons problems, such as the over-grazing of common land by sheep, are problems caused by the 
cumulative actions of many individual actors, which are incapable of solution by any single actor 
alone.   
5 Thomas Baty, International Law (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909), vii. “Since the 
Hague Conference of 1907 it has become increasingly evident that the nineteenth-century conceptions 
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century, the question of armaments increasingly presented itself as a commons 
problem, to which lawyers’ attention was drawn.  In his inaugural lecture at the 
London School of Economics, Professor A. Pearce Higgins noted the prominence of 
the question of armaments, along with the rise of arbitration, as the two striking 
features of the era.6  According to this view, no single state could safely disarm in the 
midst of armed neighbors, yet all had a common interest in limiting the arms 
competition.7   
As lawyers turned their attention towards solving the problem of armaments, 
debate sharpened.  While nineteenth century discourse reflexively categorized all 
limits as disarmament, newer legal works increasingly recognized a distinction 
between arms control and disarmament.8  As the legal advisor to the Quai d’Orsay 
pointed out, “[w]e may say, moreover, that the term “limitation of armaments” is not 
synonymous with “disarmament,” and in no way excludes the possibility of war.”9  
Newer works also acknowledged more of the arms limitation precedents set in the 
nineteenth century.10  Academics advocated specific realistic solutions, while noting 
the obstacles to limitation.  These academic discussions influenced policy-making as 
the Foreign Office and Admiralty utilized foreign law journals and books in 
formulating positions on international law.11   
Many of the precedents and projects for arms limitation were recorded in the 
works of Hans Wehberg.  Wehberg, who as a young pacifist wrote on maritime war 
                                                                                                                                          
of International Law must be revised. Independence is rivaled by Interdependence.” [Emphasis 
added.]  See also, Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 181 et. seq.   
6 Higgins, The Binding Force of International Law, 29-30.  See also, Sir Thomas Barclay, Problems of 
International Practice and Diplomacy:  With Special Reference to the Hague Conferences and 
Conventions and Other General International Agreements (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1907), 125.   
7 “Every individual in every civilized community has been obliged to give up some degree of liberty 
in order that he may have his compensation in a greater degree of security.”  Walter S. Logan, “The 
Mountains Were in Labor and Brought Forth a Mouse,” Lend a Hand 17, no. 3 (1896): 188.   
8 See Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy, 123 et. seq.; Wehberg, Limitation 
of Armaments.  The trend was reflected in international conferences as well.  The 1906 meting of the 
Interparliamentary Union held discussions on “limitation of armaments.”  Interparliamentary Union:  
Official Report of the Fourteenth Conference held in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords, (1906) 
at 127.   
9 Jarousse de Sillac, “Periodic Peace Conferences,” American Journal of International Law 5, no. 4 
(1911): 978.   
10 The Czar’s program for the First Hague Peace Conference was an early compilation, although 
focused on academic projects.  This program was circulated among the twenty-six attendees of the 
gathering and followed the assumptions of progressive codification through a systematic review of 
existing works on armaments.  See Documents Relating to the Program of the First Hague Peace 
Conference:  Laid before the Conference by the Netherlands Government.  Among British works, 
Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy. is representative.   
11 See Admiralty to Foreign Office, July 3, 1914, in Correspondence respecting the Third Peace 
Conference, FO 881/10528.   
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and arms limitation before 1914, gained prominence as an international lawyer after 
the war, participating as a member of the German delegation at Versailles and then as 
a judge at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.12  His 1914 Limitation of Armaments 
captured the evolving legal tradition, recognizing distinctions between older concepts 
of disarmament, and newer ideas of arms control.  By the eve of the First World War, 
precedents such as the 1787 Anglo-French naval agreement, the 1817 Rush-Bagot 
Agreement, and the 1902-1903 Argentine-Chilean treaties were all becoming part of 
the lexicon of arms limitation.  Additionally, newer agreements such as the 1905 
Swedish-Norwegian treaty, and the growing literature on arms limitations projects, 
were circulated.   
The wide range of precedents and possibilities reflected both old and new 
thinking on the topic.  Some authors clung to older utopian models of disarmament, 
seeking an international police force to uphold arms limits, while arbitration 
advocates argued for the creation of a world court before turning to the armaments 
question.13  The central question of enforcement was addressed through a number of 
different means.  Scholars noted the provision within the Argentine-Chilean treaties 
for arbitration to resolve disputes.14  A 1905 Swedish-Norwegian convention, which 
called for the dismantling of fortresses and creation of a neutral zone, also contained 
notable precedents for international verification and enforcement.  Article 5 of this 
agreement set up a system of verification through a three party commission, while 
Article 8 required the submission of disputes relating to the agreement to an 
improvised arbitral tribunal.15  This treaty utilized existing systems of arbitration and 
attaché inspection, allowing individual states to police the agreement rather than 
depend upon the creation of an international police force.  Similarly, a 1913 project 
by Ludwig Quidde16 moved the topic decisively away from utopian institutions, 
incorporating numerous avenues for states to self-enforce.  This draft featured 
                                                 
12 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 215-16.   
13 Proposal of Duplessix in The Official Report of the Seventeenth Universal Congress of Peace, 
(1909) 410 et. seq.; which recognized disarmament as distinct from arms limitation.  See also Hobson, 
“Disarmament,” 746-47.  Hobson went so far as to link world peace and arms limits to robust naval 
power.  See also Proposal of Richet at the 1910 Universal Peace Congress, in Wehberg, Limitation of 
Armaments, 46-47.   
14 Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments, 24; Wehberg, Die Internationale Beschränkung Der 
Rüstungen, 334-35.   
15, Convention Relative to the Establishment of a Neutral Zone and to the Dismantling of 
Fortifications, Arts. 5 & 8, Parry, ed., Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 199, at 285.   
16 Quidde was a Reichstag member and a leading figure in the pre-war German peace movement.  
Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World without War:  The Peace Movement and German 
Society, 1892-1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 85-88. 
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safeguard provisions, including a termination clause allowing parties to opt out of 
rules in case of a violation, and an overall focus on state enforcement of 
obligations.17  While self-enforcement was allowed in general international law, it 
was noteworthy that the draft eschewed more utopian measures.   
Many authors opined that budget limitation were more politically expedient 
than qualitative or quantitative restrictions on weapons.18  The linkage between naval 
and land armaments, which had led France before the 1907 Hague Conference to 
prefer German naval investment as a means of limiting the German army, was 
acknowledged.  One anonymous author sought to measure armaments through a 
“unit of war,” allowing either 50 tons of warships or 10 soldiers for every 700 
inhabitants of a country, with the state free to invest these units as it thought best.19  
These concepts presaged later French positions in interwar arms discussions, with 
their quest for fleet tonnage allotments and land-sea linkage.   
Naval arms control concepts became more detailed, and increasingly 
recognized the ways in which warships could be effectively regulated.  Tonnage and 
numerical limitations, as well as limits on gun caliber, featured prominently.20  
Additionally, authors further investigated the dynamics of the arms race, and noted 
means for arms limits to be circumvented.  Limitation in one area could lead to 
increased expenditures in other areas, a concept later known as the “blowback 
effect.”  A numerical limit on battleships could lead to an increase in size of smaller 
vessels, perhaps provoking a race in the next ranked category of warships.21  This 
accurately predicted the naval arms race in “treaty cruisers” following the 1922 
capital ship limitation at the Washington Conference. Another German author 
suggested that only an unrealistic total cession of construction would resolve this 
problem.22   
                                                 
17 Speech of Quidde, 1913 Universal Peace Congress, in Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments, 91-94.   
18 Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy, 130, 82.   
19 Proposal of Anonymous Author, Völkerfriede (1909) at 53, as quoted in Wehberg, Limitation of 
Armaments, 74-75.   
20 Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy, 130.   
21 Von Ahlefeld, “A Basis for an Anglo-German Agreement,” Deutsche Revue, May 1912, at 142, as 
quoted in Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments, 63-64.  Ahlefeld even suggested that arms limitation 
was more popular in Britain due to the development of the battlecruiser, as an intermediate type that 
would continue to be built after a limit on battleships was in place.   
22 L. Persius, Berliner Tageblatt, Mar. 27, 1913, as quoted in Id., 64-65.  The German delegate to the 
Hague in 1899, Baron von Stengel, stated such a limitation would be not only unrealistic, but suicidal.  
“Wenn jetzt die friedensfreunde verlangen, daß das Deutsche Reich auf diesen Ausbau und eine 
weitere Verstärkung seiner Seemacht verzichte, so muten sie ihm wahrlich ein geradezu 
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Quidde’s draft agreement provided responses to many of these questions, and 
suggested a number of forms of regulation ultimately adopted at the Washington 
Conference in 1921-1922.  At the 1913 Interparliamentary Conference held at the 
Hague, he called for size and numerical limitations on battleships, with a minimal 
age before replacement was allowed.  Additionally, his draft anticipated the situation 
of the Turkish dreadnoughts, nearing completion in Britain on the eve of the First 
World War, by extending treaty regulation to private companies.  Finally, his draft 
dealt with “donated weapons” such as the Canadian dreadnoughts, preventing 
circumvention of the agreement through third-party gifts and purchases.23   
Legal scholars also took up the role of non- parties in designing treaty 
regimes.  Legal works increasingly debated the optimal negotiating format for arms 
control, noting the failure of the multi-state Hague Peace Conferences to achieve 
results.  The Argentine-Chilean agreements were advocated as a model for Anglo-
German talks, but many recognized that third parties undermined a bilateral 
solution.24  In the aftermath of the Second Hague Peace Conference, with another 
Hague gathering not scheduled until 1915, the 1908 London Universal Peace 
Congress proposed a limited multilateral negotiation between the great powers.25  
Ultimately, this limited multilateral gathering was never held, although the Foreign 
Office had come to the same conclusion about negotiating formats.  When important 
maritime warfare issues remained unresolved at the Hague, Grey invited the great 
powers to discuss the rules at a conference to be held in London.   
 
The London Conference of 1908-1909 
 
The Foreign Office called the London Conference in order to settle maritime 
law issues left unresolved at the Hague Conference.  The British delegation at the 
Hague viewed the large multilateral gathering as an impediment to progress, 
                                                                                                                                          
selbstmörderisches Vorgehen zu.”  Stengel, Der Ewige Friede, 31-32; Stengel, Weltstaat Und 
Friedensproblem, 137.   
23 Quidde, Draft of an International Treaty for the Limitation of Armaments Submitted to the 
Twentieth Universal Peace Congress at the Hague in 1913, Arts. 5, 8, & 9, as quoted in Wehberg, 
Limitation of Armaments, 79 et. seq.  Chuchill intended on excluding donated Canadian dreadnoughts 
from the Anglo-German fleet ratio he proposed in 1912.   
24 Schücking, Die Organisation der Welt, (1909) at 78 et. seq., as quoted in Id., 56.   
25 Proposal of G. H. Perris, in The Official Report of the Seventeenth Universal Congress of Peace, 
(1909) at 116-117.   
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particularly where smaller states sought an equal role in rulemaking.26  The Hague 
Conference had negotiated an agreement for an International Prize Court, which 
would hear appeals from national prize courts.27  In order for Britain to accept this 
international authority, the law the court would apply needed to be clarified.  The 
London Conference was intended to codify customary rules relating to blockade, 
contraband, auxiliary merchant cruisers, and the destruction of prizes, thereby 
providing guidelines for the International Prize Court.   
The Conference resulted in a grand compromise codifying a list of 
contraband items and authorizing distant blockade, two British goals, while ending 
the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to conditional contraband, a 
German goal.  This latter conditional contraband agreement would allow shipment of 
goods to Germany through a neutral Netherlands in wartime.  The Admiralty also 
hoped to regulate the conversion of auxiliary merchant cruisers, another failed goal at 
the Hague.  At the very least, the Admiralty sought a list of vessels which might be 
possibly converted into warships in wartime.28  The failure to gain this point caused 
to a sharp division between the Admiralty and Foreign Office, requiring the matter to 
be placed before the Cabinet, and nearly causing the collapse of the bargain.29  The 
Admiralty raised its proposal for a list of vessels again during exchange of 
information discussions with Germany, indicating the continued importance the 
Admiralty attached to these auxiliary warships.   
Historians have noted that the Declaration of London, had it been ratified, 
would have prevented Britain from interdicting trade to Germany through the 
Netherlands, which would prove to be a significant means of cutting off German 
trade during the First World War.  Two main explanations have been advanced to 
explain British advocacy of an apparently inopportune agreement in light of future 
conduct.  Some have focused on neutral rights, believing that American opposition 
would have prevented a vigorous application of commerce warfare.  Only 
unexpected American acquiescence allowed the British campaign in 1914.30  The 
                                                 
26 Fry to Grey, Oct. 16, 1907, in FO 412/90.  Legal theorists echoed the judgment, Walter Schücking 
dismissing the “fetish of unanimity.”  Schücking, The International Union of the Hague Conferences, 
216.   
27 Prize courts determined the legitimacy of captures of merchant ships. 
28 Memorandum by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Sep. 29, 1908, at 20, in London Conference on 
International Maritime Law, ADM 116/1079, Part 1, (1908-1909).   
29 See correspondence around Dec. 15, 1908 Grey Memo Dec. 14, 1908; Greene to Crowe, Dec. 23, 
1908; Greene to Crowe, Dec. 30, 1908, in ADM 116/1079, Part 2.   
30 Coogan, End of Neutrality, 240 et. seq.   
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other theory holds that the Admiralty never intended to honor the agreement in 
wartime.  This builds upon an exchange between the CID Assistant Secretary 
Maurice Hankey and First Lord McKenna.  McKenna reassured Hankey that Britain 
would exploit the first pretext to tear up the treaty in wartime.31  Recent scholarship 
by Christopher Martin questions this second interpretation, and provides a 
convincing variation on the first explanation.32  Martin holds that small neutral 
maritime powers could exert sufficient pressure to prevent a broad British 
interpretation of belligerent rights.33  This explanation reaffirms the expected role of 
neutrals in upholding the system of international law, even in wartime.   
Beyond this issue, the London Conference provided broader insights into 
British expectations of international law, including Foreign Office views on the 
formation of law and the role of neutral states in enforcement.  The Foreign Office 
sought to use a gathering of the great powers to legislate for the world.  Significantly, 
Britain attempted to legitimize its own interpretations of maritime law within the 
international community to reduce the risk of third power intervention in future 
British wars.  Moreover, both the Admiralty and the Foreign Office relied on 
scholarly writing on maritime law, indicating the great extent to which these works 
reflected existing legal practice.34   
Grey invited the great powers Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States to the gathering, also extending invitations to 
Spain and the Netherlands for diplomatic reasons.35  Notably, the ten parties 
probably alone possessed the industrial capacity to build their own dreadnoughts.  
All but the Netherlands built dreadnoughts within a few years of the conference, the 
Dutch plans for construction being only curtailed by the outbreak of the First World 
War.36  Thus, the conference reflected a dividing line in naval power excluding 
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32 Christopher Martin, “The Declaration of London:  A Matter of Operational Capability,” Historical 
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33 Id.: 742-44.   
34 See Memorandum by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Sep. 29, 1908, in ADM 116/1079 citing the 
1882 Institute of International Law meeting in Turin.   
35 Grey to Herbert, July 15, 1908; Grey to Howard, July 1, 1908, both in London Conference on 
International Maritime Law, ADM 116/1080, (1908-1909).   
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weaker states, as all other smaller dreadnought-operating navies purchased their 
weapons abroad, and generally lacked the ability to maintain them.37   
Grey’s Foreign Office sought to impose great power-made law upon the 
world, legitimizing a trend in international law towards great power primacy.  
Generally, treaties only bound the parties ratifying the document.  Yet by crafting a 
treaty with the most interested powers, the Foreign Office sought to provide a 
formidable statement of international customary law binding all states, one which the 
planned International Prize Court would be likely to uphold.   
Is it likely that a court having a majority of judges whose countries 
negotiated, and subscribed to, the Declaration of London would come to any 
other conclusion than that the rule upon which the States most directly 
concerned had, in spite of wide divergence in geographical position, in 
historical traditions, and in national interests, unanimously agreed, truly 
represented the justice and equity of the cases.38   
 
British instructions held that the government “. . . would find it difficult to be 
satisfied with any merely conventional stipulations of limited application, that would 
leave it uncertain whether the International Court might not by its decisions 
introduce rules and principles of naval warfare which would unduly fetter the 
operations of His Majesty’s ships.”39  Britain hoped to avoid “conventional 
stipulations” of “limited application,” by providing an international customary 
standard applicable to the entire world community.  This would eliminate the risk 
that the International Prize Court would reach surprise decisions upsetting British 
expectations about rules of maritime conduct.   
By setting universally accepted rules of naval warfare, Grey hoped to reduce 
the risk of third party intervention in Britain’s wars.  Britain recognized it could no 
longer afford to anger powerful neutrals and sought compromises which Britain 
could enforce.40  As a Foreign Office memoranda disclosed to the Cabinet, Britain’s 
bargaining position had to reflect the changed strategic circumstances over the past 
century:   
                                                 
37 Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 157, 76, 83.   
38 British Delegates at the Naval Conference to Grey, Mar. 1, 1909, No. 21, ¶ 40, in ADM 116/1087 
Correspondence and Documents respecting the International Naval Conference Held in London 
(1908-1909); see also Draft Letter from Grey to Lord Desart, Dec. 1, 1908, ¶5, in ADM 116/1079, 
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39 Id., ¶6.   
40 See Memoranda on Meeting in Sir E. Grey’s Office, Dec. 15, 1908, in ADM 116/1079, London 
Conference on International Maritime Law, Part 2, (1908-1909).   
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It is, however, impossible to reproduce the conditions of the Napoleonic 
wars, or for this country to enforce as against neutrals the belligerent rights 
which Great Britain enforced a century ago.  What enabled her to enforce 
such rights at that time was the fact that no neutral Power was in a position to 
compel the observance of neutral rights; even confederations of neutral 
Powers failed to do so.  To-day such conditions no longer exist, there are 
foreign nations sufficiently powerful at sea to render it impossible for Great 
Britain in any given war to treat neutral ships and neutral goods in a way that 
is obviously contrary to the established practice of nations.41   
 
A clear code of maritime law would set international expectations and prevent 
expansion of wars.  “It would tend to draw a ring fence round the belligerents, and 
eliminate the risk of a simultaneous contest with a second Power.”42   
Ultimately, the House of Lords refused its assent to the agreement, fearing 
that Britain had sacrificed too much of its belligerent rights in return for uncertain 
guarantees.  First, Conservatives feared that other states would refuse to honor their 
obligations in wartime, while Britain would be bound to uphold obligations due to 
neutral pressure.  Additionally, opponents to the treaty believed that without the 
unfettered ability to block trade into Germany in wartime, Britain could not continue 
to act as a great sea power.  The Declaration of London was the most contentious 
issue of international law facing the Foreign Office prior to the First World War.  It 
raised direct questions of the utility of international law in regulating state behavior.  
The Foreign Office still perceived law as a means of shoring up its strategic position 
in the world, yet had to convince a reluctant public about the wisdom of restricting 
naval warfare, Britain’s unique advantage as a great power.   
 
Aerial Warfare and Preparations for the Third Hague Peace Conference 
 
British attitudes towards international law can also be gleaned from the Paris 
Aerial Navigation Conference of 1910.  While initially disinterested in the topic of 
aerial navigation, the Foreign Office belatedly recognized that the proposed treaty 
would affect British security.  Germany proposed a right of over-flight of foreign 
territory, which would allow German reconnaissance by privately-owned aircraft 
based in smaller states such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark.43  At this 
                                                 
41 The Declaration of London from the Point of View of the Belligerent Rights of Great Britain, Feb. 
1, 1911, in CAB 37/105/6 (1911).   
42 The Declaration of London from the Point of View of its effects on Neutral Shipping and 
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43 The International Conference on Aerial Navigation, July 11, 1910, CAB 38/16/11, (1910) at 2.   
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point, private aviators operated most aircraft, allowing their access to neutral territory 
while possibly skirting neutral obligations to prevent belligerent operations from 
their territory.44   
Additionally, the Foreign Office position shifted from opposing what was 
viewed as a bad treaty to seeking a multilateral convention in order to preempt 
Germany.45  Without a general convention, Grey feared Germany would bully its 
smaller neighbors into bilateral agreements providing broad rights of over-flight.46  
Britain organized neutral states against the threat to their liberty, similar to British 
action at the Brussels Conference of 1874.47  No treaty resulted from the conference, 
but the negotiations indicated a British desire to exploit law to augment national 
security.   
Following the failed 1910 Aerial Navigation Conference, Britain quickly 
formulated national laws regulating, and hence claiming, its own airspace.  Aerial 
warfare increasingly became part of the international agenda as military applications 
became viable.  Between 1911 and 1914, states gained experience with aerial 
warfare, 48 necessitating the improvement of military technology, while the topic 
became more prominent on the international agenda.   
The 1899 Hague declaration banning aerial bombardment had a five-year 
limit, to allow regulation to evolve as experience with the technology increased.  In 
contrast, the 1907 gathering renewed the agreement until the close of a Third Hague 
Peace Conference, tentatively scheduled for 1915.  In the meantime, experience with 
aerial warfare brought concrete precedents.  In the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912, 
Italy employed dirigible airships against villages in Tripolitania.49  The Balkan Wars 
witnessed all belligerents operating airplanes flown by foreign mercenaries.  The first 
instance of air-sea warfare arguably occurred in a Mexican insurrection in 1913.  
This inconclusive episode involved an aircraft operated by a “Constitutionalist” 
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faction dropping bombs on the federal gunboat Tampico, while sailors on the 
gunboat fired rifles at the airplane, everyone missing their target.50   
The first conflict to raise legal questions about the use of aircraft was the 
Italo-Turkish War.  While Italy had ratified the 1907 Hague Declaration forbidding 
aerial bombardment, Turkey was not a party.51  The agreement, applied on a basis of 
reciprocity, allowed aerial bombardment in conflicts involving non-parties.  
However, both states had adhered to the Hague rules of land warfare.52  These rules 
contained a prohibition on the bombardment of undefended places “by whatever 
means” which at Italian instigation had included aerial bombardment.53   
In the years after the Second Hague Peace Conference, military planners 
increasingly anticipated aerial warfare would play a significant role in any major 
European war.  As noted presciently in the pages of the American Journal of 
International Law, while a Third Hague Peace Conference scheduled for 1915 might 
consolidate regulations, “wars do not wait on conferences…”54  Britain, like its 
continental neighbors, continued researching aerial warfare, including aerial 
bombardment at sea and over land.55  The Royal Flying Corps experimented with 
torpedoes, and by 1914 included 100 pound bombs in its arsenal.56  The Corps also 
began testing incendiary bullets, capable of igniting the hydrogen in airships, as a 
defensive weapon.57  While these weapons were intended to provide defense against 
airships, these experiments raised questions about violations not only of the 1907 ban 
on aerial bombardment, but also the 1868 prohibition on explosive bullets.   
When questions were raised regarding treaty obligations, Grey decided that 
although the drafters had not contemplated such use in 1868, and probably would not 
have opposed it, the plain terms of the agreement bound Britain.58  The 1868 ban on 
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exploding bullets posed a greater obstacle as it had been ratified by most European 
countries.  In contrast, Great Britain and the United States were the only parties to 
ratify the 1907 aerial bombardment prohibition.  While all the great powers had 
ratified the 1907 convention on rules of war outlawing the bombardment of 
undefended places, the aerial bombardment of defended locations such as enemy 
troop concentrations and warships was still allowed.  Moreover, many of the Balkan 
powers had yet to ratify this convention, which would have justified its non-
application in any war involving these states.  The Hague regulations did not forbid 
acquisition and testing of military aircraft, as did other arms control regimes in the 
twentieth century, but only restricted the use of such weapons.   
Aerial warfare remained largely unregulated, and as its threat increased, 
Britain viewed international law as a possible solution.  In 1910, the Foreign Office 
specifically stated that the topic should be avoided at the upcoming Hague Peace 
Conference.  However, by 1914 the Foreign Office included the topic as one Britain 
hoped to see discussed at the gathering.59  This paralleled Britain’s shifting views 
about investment in aerial technology:  Initially the government opposed innovations 
which might weaken its insular position, as it had opposed submarines, but once the 
technology had been adopted by the other powers, British policy had to evolve.60   
At roughly the same time, the Foreign Office also called on legal advisors to 
provide an opinion about the legality of exploding shells filled with poisonous gas.  
The War Office had procured a new gas shell, and posited that as the “sole purpose” 
of the ammunition was not the diffusion of asphyxiating gas, it was not prohibited.61  
In the discussions which ensued, the Foreign Office provided varied legal positions 
on such conduct, and approvingly cited academic Pearce Higgins as a leading 
authority on the topic.62  After noting that this would virtually make the declaration a 
dead letter, as all explosive shells arguably lacked the sole purpose of diffusing gas, 
the plain language of the agreement was noted.  Lawyers could only look beyond the 
language of a text if the wording itself was vague, and the present agreement was 
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clearly drafted.63  The 1899 negotiations witnessed a debate over the advantages of 
highly specific regulations as opposed to agreements expressing a larger spirit.  Yet 
even technically correct legalistic arguments had to account for likely objections.  
The Foreign Office had to chart national strategy around an uncertain set of 
circumstances.   
Britain began preparations for the Third Hague Peace Conference in early 
1914.  The Foreign Office noted that a number of “legacy” topics from the Second 
Hague Peace Conference would be raised at the next gathering.  The 1907 mine 
convention called on parties to renew negotiations, and the aerial bombardment 
declaration only remained in effect until the close of the upcoming conference.  
Additionally, the 1907 armaments resolution called for continued study of the 
question.  The Foreign Office anticipated further discussions of maritime issues, 
which would include naval mines, but had no intention of raising the larger 
armament issue at the new gathering.  Notably, statesmen recognized that scholarly 
international legal conferences would influence the agenda.64  In preparing for the 
upcoming conference, the Foreign Office sought to prepare draft agreements in 
advance, rectifying what was seen as a shortcoming in preparations for the last 
conference.  Given the turmoil of the eighteen months prior to May 1914, Grey saw 
little prospect of a gathering taking place in 1915.65  Ultimately, this was correct, but 
for very different reasons.   
 
Anglo-German Naval Arms Control and International Law 1908-1914 
 
 Between 1908 and 1914, Anglo-German naval arms limitation negotiations 
reflected pragmatic views of international law.  International law provided an asset 
that allowed parties to communicate vital interests to both domestic and foreign 
audiences, strengthened mutual interests, and increased predictability in international 
affairs.  While other arms treaties, such as the Argentine-Chilean and Rush-Bagot 
agreements, strengthened mutual interests between the parties, there appeared little 
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prospect of an Anglo-German accord warming relations, given the incompatible 
British and German goals for negotiations.  Yet international law could still play a 
key role by increasing predictability, fostering greater transparency in naval 
construction.  Given the growing perception of a German naval challenge, the 
Foreign Office sought an agreement for this reason.  During the Anglo-German arms 
negotiations from 1908 to 1914, British expectations of international law influenced 
the Foreign Office’s stance.  The British government believed international law 
could contribute to an agreement by de-politicizing arms construction and by 
increasing predictability.  British support for an arms treaty reflected a belief that law 
mattered.   
 The following sections will assess the legal underpinnings of the British 
negotiating stance in the arms discussions.  Previously unutilized Admiralty and 
Foreign Office materials will be incorporated, providing new evidence of British 
arms control strategies.  These materials support the argument that law played a 
significant role in arms control strategy.  The Foreign Office intended a legally 
binding agreement to reduce the risk of a German breach, by setting terms clearly in 
writing.  In turn, the British government sought terms which could be easily 
monitored through existing diplomatic practices, especially attaché inspections.  
Efforts to reach an exchange of information agreement confirm this expectation of 
law, with the Foreign Office attempting to depoliticize attaché visits, removing them 
from the whims of the admiralties.  Much of the larger concern about arms control 
centered on the difficulty in using a bilateral agreement to halt a more general arms 
race.  Finally, the possibility of a non-binding understanding to halt the arms race 
provided further evidence of what statesmen expected law to contribute to an 
agreement.   
 
British Naval Construction Policy 
The Admiralty had consistently followed a naval construction policy that 
maximized the strengths of British industry.  Britain relied upon its ability to build 
ships faster than any competitor, and in larger numbers.  Such a policy could be 
utilized to either hasten or hinder the adoption of new technology:  In the mid-
century rivalry with France, Britain awaited French construction of both steam-
driven ships-of-the-line and ironclad battleships, answering the Gloire with the 
superior Warrior.  Fisher utilized this policy in advocating new technology, 
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incorporating more advanced weapons upon confirmation that German construction 
was tied to an inferior type:   
THE GREAT SECRET IS TO PUT OFF TO THE VERY LAST HOUR THE 
SHIP (big or little) that you mean to build (or PERHAPS NOT BUILD HER 
AT ALL!).  You see all your rivals’ plans fully developed, their vessels 
started beyond recall, and then in each individual answer to each such rival 
vessel you plunge with a design 50 per cent better! knowing that your rapid 
shipbuilding and command of money will enable you to have your vessel fit 
to fight as soon if not sooner than the rival vessel.66   
 
The construction of the Invincible exemplified this exploitation of secret construction 
and disinformation.  The German navy, convinced that Britain’s new armored cruiser 
would be armed with 9.2 inch guns, responded with their equivalent 8.2 inch gunned 
Blücher.67  However, the British battlecruiser was instead armed with a 12 inch gun 
main armament, solidly outclassing its German rival, and rendering it obsolete before 
completion.  The introduction of the Dreadnought, then the 13.5 inch gunned super-
dreadnoughts, and the fast 15 inch gun Queen Elizabeth similarly utilized superior 
industrial resources to quickly trump capital ships built by competitors.   
This policy not only depended on rapid construction methods, but also 
presumed that foreign construction would be detected with sufficient time to 
respond.  Notably, White asserted that the Admiralty could always uncover 
construction plans of its foreign rivals.68  Existing practices of naval attaché visits, 
together with public sources of information on warship construction and the lengthy 
period it took to complete a battleship all combined to make this “wait-and-see” 
approach viable.   
 
The Dreadnought Scare of 1909  
 The premises that underlay this construction policy collapsed in 1909.  
Suddenly, fears arose that Germany could build as rapidly as Britain, in as large 
numbers, and in a new environment of secrecy.  These fears crystallized at the same 
time as the Dreadnought erased the comfortable margin of superiority in older 
battleships, raising concerns that Germany could out-build Britain.  The standard 
international practices involving attaché visits to foreign naval yards complemented 
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British construction policy, allowing timely receipt of information.69  In 1907, the 
year of the Hague Conference, a reduced naval program of one battleship was 
justified, partly on information gathered by the British naval attaché in Germany.  
The attaché personally viewed five of the six German battleships under construction, 
including three of the four dreadnoughts being built.70  Britain had initiated the 
policy of secrecy in capital ship construction with the Dreadnought, which coupled 
with the rapid construction time of the warship increased the political impact of its 
completion.  As mentioned above, the Admiralty utilized secret construction with the 
Invincible.  Germany, in turn, began restricting attaché access – weapons 
manufacturer Krupps forbade attaché access to heavy gun, armor, and projectile 
manufacturing facilities in 1907 and shipyards reduced visits in 1909 before ending 
them completely in 1910.71   
British inability to confirm German construction fueled suspicions precisely 
when German capabilities were being reassessed.  Revelations of German 
construction practices and capacity brought Britain’s previous policy into question.  
Evidence suggested that German shipbuilders were stockpiling nickel steel, guns, 
and other time-sensitive capital ship components.72  In capital ship construction, 
turrets and heavy guns needed the greatest lead-time, requiring ordnance contracts to 
be placed prior to laying down the hull.73  The record-breaking construction time for 
the Dreadnought had only been accomplished by borrowing four turrets destined for 
two other battleships.74  The shift to dreadnought-type battleships with their “all-big-
gun armament” increased the importance of turret and gun manufacturing as a 
determinant of construction capacity, as it greatly increased the number of heavy 
guns and turrets carried by battleships.75   
Simultaneously, the Admiralty questioned earlier assumptions about longer 
German construction times, reaching the sobering conclusion that Germany could 
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build capital ships at the same rate as Britain.76  In January 1909, the Admiralty 
avowed that the German Navy would possess seventeen capital ships by early 1912, 
and estimated that Germany might have as many as twenty-one if full capacity was 
realized.  Against those numbers, Britain would possess a slim margin of superiority 
under then-current construction programs, with eighteen dreadnoughts.77  While 
Britain possessed a preponderance in pre-dreadnought battleships, both the public 
and politicians increasingly believed only dreadnoughts mattered.78   
The immediate solution, encapsulated in the slogan “we want eight, and we 
won’t wait,” called for a dramatic increase in British naval construction.  Historians 
have questioned whether the scare was manufactured to secure warship orders, 
although recent scholarship confirms that the perception of threat by the navy was 
genuine.79  Regardless, Grey and the Foreign Office responded to the German naval 
expansion as a genuine threat, and guided the Cabinet in countering this challenge.  
Four capital ships were authorized for immediate construction, and another four 
contingent ships, technically part of the following year’s naval budget, could be 
started if deemed necessary.  Ultimately all eight were commenced in 1909, along 
with two battlecruisers commissioned by Australia and New Zealand, bringing the 
total of capital ships begun to a staggering total of ten.80   
 Britain followed established international legal protocol and requested 
clarification about the apparent arms build-up and German intentions.81  German 
Ambassador Metternich claimed that private companies stockpiled materials prior to 
receiving contracts and commenced several ships before their allotted dates under the 
Navy Law at the shipbuilders’ discretion.82  Nonetheless, inability to determine 
German ship construction, coupled with misstatements about the extent of the 
German naval program, left significant suspicions.  Planning British shipbuilding by 
worst-case scenario seemed the best reply.  The long term solution pursued by the 
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Foreign Office included an agreed arms limit as well as an exchange of information 
to clarify German intentions.   
 
Anglo-German Negotiations 1908-1912 
Under the Liberal government, Britain had reduced its naval program from 
the four armored vessels called for annually in the Cawdor Memorandum.  Yet 
British unilateral moderation had only been met by an escalation of German efforts 
in 1906-1907.83  King Edward VII raised the issue of armaments while visiting 
Germany in the summer of 1908, but the monarch lacked interest in his role as 
emissary, and nothing came of the endeavor.   
Anglo-German naval arms negotiations began in earnest with the summer 
1909 accession of Theobald von Bethmann Holweg to the Chancellorship in 
Germany.  In October, Germany began negotiations with Britain for both a political 
treaty, guaranteeing British neutrality in the event of a continental war, and a naval 
agreement, focusing on capital ship numbers and fleet ratios.  The negotiations 
stalled over two elements.  First, the timing of the political and naval treaties 
hampered negotiations, with Germany seeking a political treaty first, while the 
British Foreign Office viewed a political treaty as worthless unless naval spending 
was limited.  Eventually, the parties agreed to negotiate both treaties simultaneously, 
but British suspicions about the political treaty never receded and ultimately came to 
overshadow interest in a naval treaty.  Second, Germany refused to reduce its overall 
naval construction program.  Germany offered to reduce its construction tempo for 
the next few years, with the understanding that later annual programs would have to 
be increased in order to complete the fleet by 1920.  This offer would have reduced 
annual construction programs through 1911 from four ships to three, while requiring 
an increase over the two ships planned annually from 1912 to 1918 to make up the 
difference.  Faced with an offer which ultimately would not reduce naval 
expenditures, the Foreign Office stalled.  However, by August 1910 the Foreign 
Office reconsidered, and agreed to negotiate on the basis of no increase in 
construction to prevent further inflation of costs.84   
Negotiations continued sporadically from autumn 1909 to the summer of 
1911, Britain seeking a pause in the winter of 1909-1910 and again in the winter of 
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1910-1911, as the Foreign Office contemplated replies to unsatisfactory German 
offers.  German Admiral Tirpitz’s original plans held that a large German fleet, even 
if smaller than the British Navy, would pose such a threat in war that Britain would 
become more amenable to German diplomatic goals.  Tirpitz wrongly assumed that 
Britain’s rivalry with France and Russia was incapable of solution, so that if faced 
with a German threat, Britain would be forced to back down in order to focus upon 
its permanent enemies.  In order for the German threat to materialize, Germany had 
to pass through a “risk zone” after Britain recognized the threat but before the 
German navy was too big for a preemptive strike.  But as Britain gradually 
recognized the German threat and increased its navy in response, the risk zone 
lengthened indefinitely, posing an insoluble problem to the Tirpitz Plan.  In response, 
figures in both the German Army and Foreign Ministry sought to exploit the naval 
race in a bargain with Britain that would end an apparently futile build-up.  Tirpitz 
held out before 1909, buttressed by the fixed long-term construction set in 
Germany’s Naval Law, but increasingly he recognized the need to bargain with 
Britain.85  The British eight ship construction program of that year rendered a rude 
shock, and the increasingly irresistible demands of the army for a larger share of 
military funding necessitated an agreement to prevent Germany from losing ground.   
In May 1911, Germany withdrew its offer to slow the construction tempo, 
claiming that it could no longer do so while still completing the fleet on schedule.  
The Agadir Crisis in July 1911 halted negotiations until the end of the year.  By 
1912, increases in French and Russian military programs required an increase in 
funding to the German Army, with the British Admiralty recognizing this would 
divert funds from the German Navy.  With this background, in February 1912, non-
governmental contacts by German industrialists brought about an abortive discussion 
in Berlin led by the British Secretary of State for War, Viscount Richard Haldane.  
While Grey had been willing to negotiate a colonial concession, Germany 
overplayed its hand.  Prior to the meetings in Berlin, Bethmann Holweg announced a 
new naval Novelle, predicating negotiations on the rate of increase of the German 
fleet.86  Haldane could only warn Germany that any increase would be met by a two 
to one response.  Following the unsuccessful conference, Germany offered to cut a 
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battleship from the planned expansion, harkening back to Britain’s tepid offer in 
1906, derided by Arthur Lee in Parliament as a “piece of toasted cheese to catch 
unwary mice.”87  Unsurprisingly, Britain refused to budge.  Both sides had 
misinterpreted the other’s intentions, and the negotiations confirmed the gap between 
their positions.  Subsequently, the Foreign Office sought no direct negotiations on 
the question, fearing the discussion would only worsen relations.  Following the 
failure of negotiations, Churchill made his naval holiday offer in the spring of 1912, 
coupling it with a threat to respond at 2:1 for any German construction above the 
stated program.   
German insistence on a political treaty guaranteeing British neutrality 
undermined arms negotiations.  Throughout the period 1909-1912, leading figures 
echoed Sir Eyre Crowe’s fears that a political agreement, guaranteeing Germany 
against unprovoked British attack would undermine Britain’s ententes with France 
and Russia.88  The diplomatic cost greatly outweighed the advantages to be gained 
from meager German arms offers, diminishing the desirability of a treaty.   
While interest in an agreement wavered, statesmen had firm expectations 
about what benefits an arms control treaty would bring.  Numerous legal negotiations 
indicated that policy-makers recognized that treaties would be enforced through self-
help.  The legal concept of self-enforcement in turn harmonized with Admiralty 
construction policy.  If Britain discovered that extra warships were being built in 
breach of an agreement, the Admiralty would need to quickly discover the violation, 
and then utilize superior industrial facilities to rapidly respond.  In a prospective 
agreement, Britain enjoyed unique advantages both from its predominant fleet, which 
would provide a buffer against violations, and from its industrial might, which 
allowed a rapid, overwhelming response.   
These conditions applied throughout most of the preceding century, except 
during the period around 1908-1911, before the numerical lead in dreadnoughts 
reaffirmed Britain’s position.  During this transition period, the Admiralty altered its 
naval calculations to take into account the slim margin of superiority and the ability 
of Germany to rapidly close the gap.  Cabinet notes from 1909 indicate these 
calculations were being made, as government leaders estimated the length of time for 
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Germany and Britain to build a battleship, while querying “when we get the evidence 
is it too late?  You are not sure till the ship is a year old.  Only safe policy is to keep 
ahead.”89  Similarly, when Germany offered to convert an exchange of information 
agreement into what would essentially be an annual arms limit, Kiderlen chided his 
British colleague that the exchange would only relate to one year, too short a period 
to alter the balance.90  The key point is that both sides understood the dynamic of 
naval construction and how this dynamic affected treaty enforcement.   
A purely bilateral arms control agreement could be enforced by state action.  
However, the multilateral dimension of the naval arms race complicated matters.  
When discussing the possibility of converting an exchange of information agreement 
into an annual naval arms treaty, Crowe noted the matter touched  
…upon one of the most fundamental difficulties which as I have repeatedly 
pointed out, stand in the way of HMG making an agreement respecting 
limitation of armaments with one Power only, whilst third Powers, some of 
them allied, and others perhaps in secret understanding with Germany 
(Turkey, Brazil, Sweden?) remained free to build what they liked as rapidly 
as they liked. . . .  If the limitation of armaments is to have any practical value 
for this country, it must be based on a far more comprehensive foundation 
than the present German proposal…91   
 
A naval arms treaty needed to address third-party construction as much as potential 
German violations.   
 
Global Naval Arms Competition and International Law 
 
The advent of the Dreadnought brought a radical change in naval arms 
competition as the new type of battleship became universally adopted.  In calculating 
naval balances, the Admiralty had to consider not only the balance in the 
Mediterranean, but also Latin American, Far Eastern, and Greco-Turkish rivalries 
when calculating the potential naval strengths in the North Sea.  While regional 
considerations were not new, the extent to which peripheral navies influenced the 
balance of power was novel.  The Foreign Office advocated a number of legal 
responses, including escape clauses in any Anglo-German agreement and innovative 
declarations which would bind the entire international community.  Conversely, 
Foreign Office diplomats also discouraged regional arms agreements which 
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threatened British strategic interests. While Britain completed no naval arms 
agreements, the intensity of these deliberations indicates that the Foreign Office 
possessed a greater appreciation of the strengths of law than had previously been 
acknowledged.   
 
 
The Dreadnought Revolution 
 Before the dreadnought, a greater diversity of battleship types coexisted.  
Small powers generally built coastal defense battleships which could be ignored in 
great power calculations because of their limited suitability for fleet actions.  After 
1906, the dreadnought became a universal currency of naval strength, with small 
powers building or purchasing their own, significantly altering naval calculations.  In 
1896, the great powers possessed 96 first class battleships built or building, to 2 built 
among the smaller states.92  In 1912, the ratio was 101 great power dreadnoughts, to 
11 small power vessels, either built or under construction.93  These 11 ships 
constituted a larger potential force than that possessed by any great power besides 
Britain, Germany, or the United States, and nearly equaled the 12 dreadnoughts built 
or building by the latter.  The range of small state dreadnoughts comprised a naval 
force in its own right.   
The rise of small power capital ship fleets was new and upset systematic 
calculations of naval strength.  A Cabinet paper in 1912 noted that:   
[British naval power] will be diminished with the growth not only of the 
German Navy, but by the simultaneous building by many Powers of great 
ships of war. . . .  The existence of a number of Navies all comprising ships of 
high quality creates possibilities of adverse combinations being suddenly 
formed against which no reasonable standard of British naval strength can 
fully guard.94   
 
Moreover, smaller powers lacking stable finances or government were often the 
purchasers of dreadnoughts, with little evident capacity to maintain these expensive 
warships for long.  This raised the specter that dreadnoughts would return to the open 
market.  As Churchill stated a year later:   
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The simultaneous building by so many powers great and small of capital 
ships, and their general naval expansion, are causes of deep anxiety to us.  
Germany may fall behind in the race she has herself provoked, and we may 
yet be left to face a great preponderance of loose Dreadnoughts wh[ich] at 
v[er]y short notice, a diplomatic grouping or regrouping may range against 
us.95   
 
Arms Control and Austria-Hungary 
Since 1909, the Foreign Office knew that Italy and Austro-Hungary planned 
to build dreadnoughts.  While these two German allies competitively armed against 
one another, Britain needed to calculate these fleets when assessing naval 
requirements.  This became a matter of increasing urgency by 1912, with the 
completion of the first Austro-Hungarian dreadnought.  One solution involved a 
division of responsibilities with France, with that nation protecting mutual interests 
in the Mediterranean while Britain protected the French northern coast against 
German attack.  While the Foreign Office avoided legal obligations to France in the 
1912 Mediterranean agreement, this type of arrangement paralleled British thinking 
prior to the Second Hague Peace Conference, when Parliament explored different 
models for limiting arms through law.   
Additionally, the Foreign Office contemplated arms control with Austria-
Hungary.  At the height of the Agadir crisis, Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-
Secretary at the Foreign Office, hinted to the Hapsburg Foreign Minister that Austria 
could act “as a drag on any ambitious naval policy which the German government 
might be tempted to pursue,” causing a minor scandal in the Austro-Hungarian 
press.96  A year later, a newspaper report, believed to be officially inspired by the 
Austrian government, suggested that its naval program might be dropped in return 
for security guarantees.  Churchill sought to exploit this opening, advocating that 
Britain provide the Mediterranean powers with a treaty guaranteeing their 
possessions, and an unlimited arbitration agreement with Austria-Hungary as a 
means of abating the naval rivalry in the region.97  This updated version of the 1887 
Mediterranean Agreement borrowed much from contemporary international law, and 
from the Argentine-Chilean model in particular, with its package of arbitration, 
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guarantee, and armaments treaties.  Despite Churchill’s eagerness, Grey ended the 
project, reasoning it lacked official support in Austria.98   
 
Arms Control and Latin America 
The resurgence of Latin American naval rivalries further complicated the 
European balance.  Brazil ordered a pair of dreadnoughts in Britain, to be 
commenced in 1908, and contemplated a third, drawing a reluctant Argentina into an 
arms race.  Argentina sought British assistance, referring directly to Britain’s role in 
concluding the successful 1902 agreement with Chile.99  While acknowledging the 
earlier precedent, the Foreign Office held unequivocally that an arms deal would not 
be in Britain’s interest:   
We are not asked to recommend this proposal to the Brazilian gov[ernmen]t  
and, even if we were, it would scarcely be to our interest to do so.  The three 
battleships will do us no harm as long as they are retained by the Brazilians 
(in whose hands they will probably deteriorate rapidly), whereas the addition 
of even one of them to the navy of “another Power” might necessitate an 
increase in our own naval estimates.100   
 
If “another Power,” meaning Germany, purchased the two ships, Britain 
would be forced to add to its own program.  The two Brazilians ships could have 
provided Germany with parity or even an advantage.  Given German capacity to 
build ships at the same rate as Britain, this addition would greatly spur the Anglo-
German arms race by evening the odds.101  Further documents reiterated the point 
that dreadnoughts in Argentine or Brazilian hands would rapidly deteriorate,102 
removing the risk of their influencing the European balance.  Accordingly, the 
Foreign Office refused Argentine requests for intervention.   
The Argentine government hoped Brazil would cancel its program, or at the 
very least, transfer one ship to Buenos Aires, keep one, and sell the third on the 
                                                 
98 See notes attached to Churchill’s Secretary to Grey, Aug. 1, 1912, FO 800/87.   
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100 Notes attached to S. American Armaments, Aug. 11, 1908, in FO 371/403.  Grey minuted these 
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world market, saving Argentina the expense of purchasing its own dreadnought 
squadron.103  Ultimately, Brazil recognized that Argentine construction would spur 
Chilean building, and that Chile would assist in maintaining a balance against its 
eastern neighbor.104  Chilean support for Brazil doomed the Argentine arms control 
project.   
The possibility of a regional arms agreement reemerged in early 1911.  By 
that time, Brazil possessed two dreadnoughts and was building a third, Argentina had 
started two battleships of its own in reply, and Chile was following suit.  In 1910, 
Brazil suffered a naval mutiny, cooling its desire for dreadnoughts.  Brazil’s third 
dreadnought, under construction at Armstrong’s yard, was up for sale and Brazil 
appeared poised to sell its other two.  Brazil could not divest itself of these vessels if 
its neighbors were building their own, but Argentina was also willing to dispose of 
its dreadnoughts.105  Upon realizing that the Latin American states were reaching an 
arms agreement on their own accord, the Foreign Office nearly panicked.  “There 
seems to be a risk of five 1st class battleships – 3 Brazilian & 2 Argentine – being put 
on the market more or less simultaneously.” 106   
The Foreign Office revised earlier views that the dreadnoughts would rapidly 
become worthless, expressing a fear that if Germany purchased the warships, it could 
quickly refurbish them and add them as potent units of the fleet.   
As German policy seems to be to reduce the present naval inequality between 
herself & Great Britain at about any cost it would conceivably be worth her 
while to give a fancy price for these ships – which after a short period of 
docking would be as good ships as any at present afloat - & with our present 
very narrow margin of superiority the sudden acquisition by Germany of two 
first class fighting ships would be a serious factor in the political situation.  
107   
 
Since 1908, the possibility of instability caused by a regional arms limit had only 
grown as the number of dreadnoughts in question expanded.   
                                                 
103 Townley to Grey, Aug. 10, 1908, in FO 371/403.   
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106 Notes attached to Brazilian Dreadnoughts, Feb. 27, 1911, in FO 371/1071.  In 1911, Britain had 27 
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107 Notes attached to Sale of Dreadnoughts, Feb. 13, 1911, No. 5136, in FO 371/1071.  The Admiralty 
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in FO 371/1071.   
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In 1903, the Admiralty purchased the two Chilean battleships at the center of 
the Argentine-Chilean arms race, but these warships proved difficult to incorporate 
in the British fleet because of technical differences.108  Similar challenges in 
incorporating the Brazilian ships may have reduced Admiralty interest in the 
vessels.109  Thus Britain may have had little interest in purchasing the expensive 
warships, yet found it necessary in order to stave off a German acquisition.   
Britain could have played a significant role in resolving the regional arms 
race, possessing the same assets enabling enforcement as in 1902.  Similarly to the 
Argentine-Chilean negotiations, in 1908 the warships in question were building in 
British yards and British financiers could exercise a check on excessive naval 
programs.  While the Brazilians opposed a limit in 1908, all parties expressed a 
degree of interest in limiting armaments by 1911.  British inaction prevented further 
instability in the European naval balance, at the expense of heightened South 
American rivalry.110   
These proceedings, which occurred at the same time as the Anglo-German 
negotiations, undoubtedly influenced Crowe’s wariness when Germany sought to 
modify the exchange of information into an annual naval arms limit.  The Foreign 
Office founded its attitudes towards arms control agreements on calculations of 
British interest, opposing limitation when it appeared to introduce greater uncertainty 
in the European balance of power.  In this case, rather than fearing law was 
impractical the Foreign Office worried that it would prove effective.   
 
Multilateral Challenges and International Legal Strategies 
Given the uncertainty created by the global dreadnought rivalry, the Foreign 
Office sought an escape clause in any Anglo-German agreement, hampering 
negotiations.  Similar challenges had hampered earlier British negotiations.  When 
contemplating an arms limitation offer to Russia in 1838, Lord John Russell noted: 
It will be necessary not to bind ourselves with respect to our own force, the 
Navy being our principal arm, and we having to consider other Powers, and 
their strength at sea, as well as Russia.  Still, a friendly representation may do 
                                                 
108 Gardiner, ed., Conway's 1906-1921, 39.   
109 However, the Brazilian dreadnought purchased by Turkey ultimately found its way into the British 
Navy on the eve of the First World War.   
110 Ultimately, Argentina and Brazil kept two dreadnoughts apiece, Brazil selling its third battleship to 
the Ottoman Empire before completion.  Chile ordered two super-dreadnoughts from Armstrong, 
which were seized before completion at the start of the Great War.   
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good, though it may not altogether preclude the necessity for strengthening 
our Navy.111   
 
Germany’s initial offer in November 1909 called for a three to four year limit 
on the number of capital ships, “which neither of the two countries shall yearly be 
able to exceed.”112  Crowe expressed a fear that Britain would be bound “not only as 
against Germany, but as against the rest of the world. . . .  She may leave her allies to 
build fleets, or she may conclude fresh alliances with the owners of fleets, or buy 
their ships for a future contingency.”113  The Foreign Office stalled, eventually 
replying to the proposal in 1910 that Britain would “seize the opportunity of knowing 
exactly what Germany proposed to build, to reduce our Naval construction as far as 
we safely could having due regard to our position as a Power to whom strength at sea 
meant everything.”114  When pressed again for a firmer commitment, Goschen 
equivocated, claiming His Majesty’s Government “would on their side restrict their 
shipbuilding programme to what was necessary to preserve a safe proportion to the 
existing German programme as long as the latter continued to be, as it necessarily 
was at present, the chief factor in determining British naval construction.”115  Crowe 
ultimately sought draft clauses of an agreement that would preserve British freedom 
to build against third parties, so as to maintain the two-power standard.116   
Another legal response lay in the creation of a doctrine binding the entire 
legal community.  The evidence suggests that in 1909 Britain contemplated a novel 
strategy to bind the international community through a bilateral Anglo-German 
declaration.  Hardinge provided an intriguing reference in August 1909.  When 
preparing a memorandum on a possible limit, he told Grey that “‘Declarations’ are in 
vogue and I think it is the form most suitable for any agreement to which we and 
other Powers can subscribe.”117  The treaty would not only be open to third parties, 
but then-current British legal doctrine implied a special significance for declarations.  
Standard international law did not differentiate between forms of agreement,118 but 
the Foreign Office had been seeking support for a distinction at the London 
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Conference of 1908-1909.  At that gathering, the Foreign Office argued that while 
conventions bound only the parties to the agreement, a declaration could frame a 
general rule of international law binding upon the whole community. 119  While it is 
unclear if the Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office knew that such a distinction had 
been advocated by his government at a major conference held in his capital in the 
previous year, knowledge of this distinction might imply that he intended to create a 
rule binding the entire international community.   
A tension had evolved within international law between concepts of 
sovereign equality and formal recognition of a special role for the great powers.120  
This special role had been justified as necessary for the maintenance of a balance of 
power.  While the great powers possessed a de facto ability to shape the diplomatic 
environment, efforts to legitimize this distinction conflicted with principles of 
universality.  At the Hague conferences, the small powers had espoused the 
preeminence of sovereign equality, but at a practical cost of impeding negotiations.  
After the interminable discussions at the Hague, the London Conference represented 
a swing back towards the special role of the great powers, as well as an attempt to 
crystallize that distinction.  British arms control efforts took place in this evolving 
legal environment, reflecting tensions in the international system.   
 
Exchange of Information Negotiations 
 
 In the midst of the Dreadnought Scare, Grey suggested an arms agreement to 
Metternich.  Metternich ruled out the possibility of a reduction and reaffirmed 
Germany’s adherence to its Navy Law.  Grey countered by offering to regularize an 
exchange of information.121  Reiterating the point a week later, Grey suggested the 
only solution  
was for the two Admiralties to put all their cards on the table, and to let the 
Naval Attachés see all the yards in which ships were being built, in order to 
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learn all the facts, not of course as to the designs, but as to the actual progress 
of shipbuilding.122   
 
Subsequently, the exchange of information negotiations ran parallel to the broader 
quest for a naval arms limit.  Given the immediate role an exchange of information 
agreement would have on arms procurement, these negotiations were much more 
focused than the arms limitation talks, and came close to yielding a practical solution 
to the arms race dynamic.  Significantly, an exchange of information agreement was 
viewed as an alternative that would allow Britain to maintain its construction policy.   
The exchange of information negotiations between 1909 and 1911 offered an 
alternative form of arms control.  An exchange of information agreement would have 
provided Britain with the essential information to frame its shipbuilding policy, 
offsetting the apparent ability of Germany to construct capital ships as rapidly as 
Britain.  In mid-1910, Anglo-German naval arms limitation discussions had reached 
an impasse, focusing on either cutting the German Navy Law or retarding the 
construction tempo of German ships.  Attempting to rekindle discussions, Grey 
suggested a third possibility – an agreement not to increase naval construction 
coupled with an exchange of information.123  Despite concern expressed in German 
quarters that an exchange of information would only exacerbate tensions, Admiral 
Tirpitz agreed to discussions.  By early 1911, the framework of the exchange had 
been negotiated and the form of the agreement was under discussion.  Negotiations 
hit obstacles in the spring and summer of 1911, but by May of that year discussions 
had proceeded enough for the Foreign Office to place the issue before the Cabinet.  
By August, the Agadir Crisis halted talks until Germany revived the topic in 
November.  Internal British correspondence intensified in December 1911-January 
1912, with the Admiralty significantly reducing the information sought from such an 
agreement.  A final agreement was nearly reached in early 1912, only to be eclipsed 
by the naval arms discussions of the Haldane mission, before the topic faded from 
the agenda.   
The Admiralty and Foreign Office had experience with information 
exchanges from other negotiations.  While negotiating with Germany in the summer 
of 1911, the Foreign Office brokered a similar exchange with Japan.  Article VII of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance mandated regular consultations by naval and military 
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authorities, which the Admiralty interpreted as requiring the parties to “exchange full 
information as to their intended building programme each year in advance.”124  
Marder noted that the exchange included intended building programs, technical data, 
as well as force dispositions and other elements of intelligence.  He claimed the 
Admiralty exploited the exchange of information as defense against Japan, in case 
the alliance was not renewed.125  The government recognized the strategic potential 
of such an arrangement, reinforcing the point that the Anglo-German negotiations 
were not novel.   
 The exchange of information discussions contained two major elements, an 
exchange of written details of upcoming construction programs, and procedures for 
attaché visits to confirm these details.  The Admiralty initially sought information on 
dimensions of vessels, protection, armament, speed, horsepower, as well as when 
ships would be laid down and completed.126  The Admiralty communicated its terms 
to the Foreign Office in December 1910, which forwarded them to the German 
Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in February 1911.127  The Germans agreed 
to these terms in March, but requested simultaneous exchanges of information 
between October 1st and November 15th while leaving the details of inspection visits 
for naval authorities to arrange.128  Moreover, the German government sought to 
make the information provided by each party binding, preventing either party from 
adding ships or altering their qualities upon learning the construction program of the 
other.129   
 Before the agreement had been completed, the Admiralty was rethinking the 
wisdom of the proposal.  Internal Admiralty correspondence indicated intense 
debates over the exchange of information.  After receiving Kiderlen’s memorandum, 
Grey requested the Admiralty’s opinion.  First Sea Lord Arthur Wilson averred 
“[t]he action of the Foreign Office in making these proposals at all is extremely 
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unfortunate.”130  Graham Greene, then Assistant Secretary to the Board of Admiralty, 
drafted two letters in reply to the Foreign Office.   
One version highlighted Admiralty reservations about and opposition to the 
exchange of information.  Objections arose from the impossibility of binding the 
government not to alter its naval program after details had been exchanged, as 
required in the German draft.  Britain also had an advantage as Germany set its 
numbers in advance with its Navy Law.  “This has been hitherto a great advantage to 
us and it is advisable to call attention to it as little as possible.”131  Additionally, 
details would have been exchanged prior to presenting them to Parliament, and the 
country would have been bound even before the government had assented to the new 
building program.  Alternatively if the Admiralty had been allowed to present the 
program to Parliament before exchanging details with Germany, the information 
would already have been public.  Finally, as Germany was not Britain’s only naval 
rival, it would have been impossible to base its program solely on German 
construction.  The Admiralty segregated ship numbers from construction details in 
this draft, noting that details were often modified before the ship was laid down, and 
sought to retain flexibility in this area.  Ultimately, the letter expressed a hope “that if 
circumstances admit of the whole matter being quietly dropped without ostentation 
or giving offence it would be very desirable to do so.”132   
 The Admiralty never sent this letter to the Foreign Office, instead concealing 
its internal deliberations, while accepting and altering the exchange of information.  
Two exchanges of information were now envisaged – the first, stating only a “bare 
number of ships of each type,” would be exchanged at a predetermined annual point, 
and the second, including technical details of tonnage, speed, and armament, would 
be submitted at the laying of the keel.133  Subsequent historians have focused on the 
timing issues raised by these two submissions of information. 134  Depending upon 
the submission date, one party might have been advantaged over another if the 
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exchange occurred before programs were determined.  Moreover if exchanges of 
information were simultaneous, when the parties would forward technical details 
remained unclear as these usually evolved after the annual program was set.135   
The real issue laid not in the timing of the exchange but in British desires to 
hide details.  The Admiralty’s desire for secrecy became more salient in 1911.  In 
July, a similar internal debate occurred, with two letters drafted for the Foreign 
Office, one favoring a less-revealing exchange, and the other upholding a wide 
exchange.136  In spite of shifting priorities, the advantages of openness continued to 
outweigh the advantages of secrecy.   
Following the Agadir crisis, negotiations lapsed until Germany reopened the 
matter in November 1911.  The Foreign Office provided the Admiralty with another 
opportunity to revise its goals.  The Admiralty considered forwarding the Germans 
the August 21st letter, but ultimately drafted a new statement of policy, changing the 
handling of technical details.  The initial draft noted “that it would be preferable to 
let drop altogether the proposal for the interchange of technical information except 
data of a most general character.”137  Yet the Admiralty ultimately was unwilling to 
abandon the project, and again submitted terms for exchanging technical 
information.   
The Admiralty noted that the more detailed the information to be exchanged, 
the greater the difficulty in verifying it, creating risks of mutual suspicion and 
recrimination.  Moreover, the Admiralty disowned any intent to pry into special 
features of warships, claiming they “are quite content to assume that every ship in 
each class will represent the last word of the naval science of the constructing Power 
upon the subject.”138  Now the Admiralty only sought verification of the numbers of 
ships of each class, and dates of launching and completion.  While not explicitly 
excluding verification of technical detail such as displacement, horsepower, and 
armament, these categories were not discussed in conjunction with verification.139  
Instead, a monetary account of the contract price allotted to hulls, armament, and 
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engines was proposed “. . . without trenching at all upon the peculiarities of 
construction, [which] would probably be found in practice to provide a much truer 
measure of the scale of naval preparation than any other which could be adopted.”140   
This shift was further confirmed by other alterations.  An early draft listed 
“displacement, horse-power, and armament” as details to be exchanged, armament 
being scratched out and subtly altered with “the number of guns constituting the 
main armament. . .”141  In this fashion, gun caliber was deftly excluded by the 
Admiralty through focusing on the number of cannons.  Additionally, the initial draft 
specified attaché verification by allowing a “walk through all the yards capable of 
constructing war vessels” while a later version modified this to the narrower “inspect 
the building slips. . .”  This possibly excluded a thorough inspection of the entire 
navy yard, including the attendant armor, turret, and gun-assembly works.142  Given 
the Admiralty’s initial desire to regain access to this information and conviction that 
these subsidiary industries formed a more precise index of warship construction, this 
exclusion is striking.143  
The process of naval revolution described by Nicholas Lambert provides a 
background to this shift.  The navy sought continuous improvements in fighting ships 
to outclass foreign counterparts.  What probably ended the Admiralty equivocation 
about exchanging technical details between August and December was the 
appointment of the new First Sea Lord Winston Churchill, who immediately 
determined upon an untried 15 inch gun for the next year’s naval program.  The 
Queen Elizabeth class, destined to carry these weapons, was designed before the 
naval ordnance had even been built.144  So intense was the secrecy surrounding the 
gun design, that it was even referred to as “the 14-inch experimental” in official 
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documents to hide its true characteristics.145  As the navy became more comfortable 
in its lead over Germany, the advantages of subterfuge outweighed openness.   
In spite of the Admiralty’s declining interest in exchanging technical ship 
data, its final list of terms in December 1911 included – for the first time – a request 
for information on merchant ships capable of transformation into auxiliary merchant 
cruisers.146  The inclusion of new terms suggests that the Admiralty still found ways 
in which an agreement could be useful, and thus did not abandon the project.  The 
Foreign Office communicated these terms to Germany in January 1912, but the 
matter receded after the Haldane mission.   
 
Exchange of Information and International Law 
Grey and the Foreign Office attached great value to an exchange of 
information agreement, not just as a prelude to an arms treaty.  An agreement could 
have dampened a qualitative arms race by reducing the imperative of “going one 
better in the dark.”147  Even after it became apparent that continued negotiations for a 
naval limit would only exacerbate relations with Germany, the Foreign Office 
continued to pursue an exchange of information.148  Moreover, during the early 
months of negotiations, the Admiralty conceded that Britain had more to gain from 
an agreement as British information was more publicly available than German 
data.149  The negotiations were also undertaken in the aftermath of the Dreadnought 
hoax, which humiliatingly demonstrated the Navy’s inability to maintain secrecy.150   
International law influenced expectations of what an exchange of information 
could achieve.  Law could have de-politicized the issue, regularizing the exchange 
without increasing ill-feelings that would have accompanied information requests 
made during crises.151  Statesmen believed a binding international agreement was 
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necessary to remove the scheduling of attaché visits from the purview of naval 
authorities, as well as to prevent evasion.152  Responding to a German desire to allow 
attachés to settle the details, Sir Eyre Crowe noted the German practice of 
“jockeying” Britain out of negotiated advantages, averring “[t]he only prudent and 
safe course is to have everything settled and agreed to before anything is signed.”153  
The Admiralty echoed these concerns.  When negotiating the exchange of technical 
details, the Admiralty advocated an annual submission of technical details with the 
following year’s program.154  An international legal agreement would crystallize the 
terms of an information exchange, reducing the risk of jockeying or non-compliance.   
Along with firm obligations, the Foreign Office and Admiralty pursued 
unambiguous terms to facilitate compliance.  The Admiralty stressed the need for 
“simple and easily verifiable facts. . .” and warned against the risk of confusion and 
recrimination if minute details needed to be conveyed and confirmed.155  To avoid 
the ambiguity surrounding the completion date of warships, the Admiralty suggested 
that the date of the public ceremony attendant with launching could be used as an 
easily confirmed benchmark.156   
 
Correspondence between the Foreign Office and Admiralty indicated that 
they anticipated a legally binding agreement.  Internal January 1911 discussions 
showed Admiralty concerns that the document be “sufficiently elastic to permit the 
inclusion of other items which. . . might hereafter acquire importance and special 
significance.”157  Further negotiations confirmed expectations that the parties 
contemplated a binding engagement.  The German reply in the spring of 1911 
suggested that once information had been exchanged, no alteration would be 
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155 Greene to Foreign Office, Dec. 12, 1911, in FO 412/103.   
 156 Draft Letter to Foreign Office, April 1911, attached to Periodical Exchange of Naval Information, 
Apr. 5, 1911, in ADM 1/8195.  After launching, ships underwent significant further construction, 
trials, and fitting out, which often ran over a year, making a firm date for when the ship was actually 
fit for naval service difficult to determine.   
157 Grey to Goschen, Jan. 27, 1911, FO 412/103.  See also Greene to Crowe, Jan. 11, 1911, and Crowe 
to Greene, Jan. 12, 1911, both in ADM 116/940B.   
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allowed.  While this would have prevented either party from exploiting the 
information by altering its shipbuilding program, it would also convert the agreement 
into an annual naval arms control limit.  The Admiralty and Foreign Office 
recognized the implications of such an arrangement and refused to convert the 
exchange of information into a naval arms agreement.158  British hesitation about 
converting an exchange of information into a naval arms treaty reflected fears about 
the repercussions of limiting Britain to a bilateral agreement while third parties 
continued to build.159  Consistent with an exchange of information, the British 
wished to allow alterations to the information, but only after disclosing the changes 
to the other party.160  Secretary of State Kiderlen had previously held that if either 
party needed to modify the details, these modifications would form the basis of “a 
friendly discussion” between the parties, and incorporated these provisions into the 
terms of the agreement.161  Ultimately, the parties contemplated a binding agreement, 
but the legal obligations only extended to exchanging information.   
While both German and British negotiators sought a simple document, 
favoring an exchange of notes over a more formal agreement,162 a binding treaty 
could have been created through an exchange of notes.  By reducing the formality, 
the parties could have reduced the public glare that would accompany an armaments 
agreement, reaching an arrangement that might otherwise have been politically 
impossible.  Similarly, the agreement was easier to complete than an arms limitation 
treaty, as it intruded less conspicuously into naval construction.    
 
Before the agreement was completed, the strategic context had shifted.  While 
Germany remained willing to complete the agreement, by late 1911, the Admiralty 
was no longer interested.  Stevenson has argued that the Anglo-German naval arms 
race peaked after 1909, and by 1912 the new relationship was being solidified, 
alleviating German fears of a Copenhagen-style pre-emptive strike.163  After the 
destabilizing introduction of the Dreadnought, Britain also gained confidence when 
the naval ratio stabilized.   
                                                 
158 Admiralty to Foreign Office, May 16, 1911, in FO 412/103.   
159 Notes attached to Goschen to Grey, Mar. 30, 1911, in FO 412/103.   
160 Grey to Goschen, June 1, 1911, in FO 412/103.   
161 Goschen to Grey, Mar. 30, 1911; De Salis to Grey, July 1, 1911, both in FO 412/103.   
162 Goschen to Grey, Feb. 7, 1911, in FO 412/103.   
163 Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 174-75.   
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 The exchange of information was most relevant in the 1909-1912 transition 
period.  While both states had fewer than ten dreadnoughts, the margin of superiority 
was a matter of one year’s construction program, and Britain feared that Germany 
might secretly close the gap in naval construction.  Once no single year’s program 
could undermine the British margin of superiority, Britain gained confidence, and the 
Admiralty lost interest in the exchange and again saw the advantages in secretive 
introduction of new technology, like the 15 inch gun.  Yet during that transition 
period, an exchange of information was sought in order to remove such issues as 
attaché visits from the hands of naval officials and setting them as a matter of course.  
International law brought regularity to the equation.  When attempting to maintain 
open, if not cordial, relations in the face of a series of international crises, the de-
politicization of armaments policy provided a means of removing one area of 
contention.   
 
The Naval Holiday and Informal Arms Control 
 
 In addition to treaty negotiations, Britain also sought an informal, non-
binding arrangement with Germany to limit naval armaments.  Advocacy of an 
informal agreement provides insight into the role of law, indicating where law was 
perceived as unnecessary or disadvantageous.  Conversely, the ambiguities of 
informal agreements highlights the contributions of law to arms control.  Throughout 
the years of Anglo-German negotiations, various statesmen questioned the utility of 
formal negotiations, believing that the quest for a treaty only worsened relations and 
added impetus to the arms race.164  During the visit of King Edward VII to Cronberg 
in 1908, Hardinge suggested an informal arrangement as an alternative to a binding 
treaty.  “Reverting to the general question of naval expenditure, I expressed the hope 
that moderate counsels would still prevail, and that although friendly discussion 
between the two Governments might as the Emperor insisted, be barred, still I was 
convinced that His Majesty’s Government would require no written formula nor 
verbal statement from the German Government but only a visible proof that the 
programme of naval construction had been modified or slackened, in order to make a 
                                                 
164 See, e.g. Lascelles to Grey, 14 August 1908; Goschen to Nicolson, 28 October 1910, both in Gooch 
and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VI, 181-82, 539; Minutes of Eyre Crowe, 18 February 
1913, in Goschen to Grey, 10 February 1913, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. 
IX, 669, 71.  The less Britain challenged German naval construction, the less political fuel would be 
fed to the German naval party.  Report by Captain Watson, enclosure no. 2 in Goschen to Grey, 15 
October 1913, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. IX, 710, 14.    
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similar modification or slackening in their own.”165  By making the offer, the Foreign 
Office hoped to circumvent the domestic disapproval in Germany that would be 
engendered by a formal renunciation of the Navy Law.   
 A non-binding agreement remained a possibility throughout subsequent 
negotiations, and was most squarely raised by Churchill’s naval holiday proposals in 
1912-1913.  He presented his first naval estimates as First Lord in March 1912, 
shortly after the unsuccessful Haldane mission indicated that formal arms control had 
reached an impasse.  When justifying the large naval claims, he linked expenditure 
squarely to Germany, openly admitting the 60% standard which had been in place 
since 1909, and seeking an informal solution.  He suggested a “naval holiday,” 
whereby neither party would commence construction of new warships, though 
without any formal obligation.  “Here, then, is a perfectly plain and simple plan of 
arrangement whereby without diplomatic negotiation, without any bargaining, 
without the slightest restriction upon the sovereign freedom of either Power, this 
keen and costly naval rivalry can be at any time abated.”166  Churchill coupled the 
offer with a threat to match any German capital ship construction beyond the current 
Navy Law at a rate of two to one.  As Germany was then debating expansion of the 
Navy Law, this would create a disincentive for further increases.  Finally, Churchill 
incorporated the standard caveat for third party construction, pledging Britain only 
“in the absence of any unexpected development in other countries.”167   
 One major difference between formal and informal agreements lay in the 
vagueness of informal terms, which could be both an advantage and a disadvantage.  
Misunderstanding or intentional misrepresentation could be exploited to build 
beyond the tacitly agreed levels.  During the Dreadnought Scare in 1909, vagueness 
increased mistrust, such as when Metternich assured Britain about the number of 
dreadnoughts Germany was building, but excluded battlecruisers from the figure.168  
Churchill’s offer of a ratio in 1912 not only contained the by-then standard caveat for 
third party construction, but also excluded dreadnoughts building for British colonies 
and dominions.  Australia and New Zealand had purchased battlecruisers in 1909, 
New Zealand presenting its vessel to the British Navy, while Malaya donated a 
                                                 
165 Emphasis Added.  Memorandum by Hardinge, Aug. 16, 1908, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British 
Documents, Vol. VI, 187.   
166 Emphasis added.  Churchill, Hansard, 5th ser., XXXV, 1558, Mar. 18, 1912.   
167 Id. 1556.   
168 Grey to Goschen, Mar. 17, 1909, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VI, 242-44.   
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super-dreadnought of the Queen Elizabeth class and the Admiralty courted the 
Canadian government for an order of three battleships.169  Grey exploited informal 
arms discussions in 1913 to avoid explaining the status of these colonial vessels 
under the 1.6 to 1 ratio.170  Britain could also exploit private industrial resources by 
purchasing dreadnoughts built for other nations in British yards.  Moreover, as 
Germany shifted funding from its navy to its army, Britain had less interest in tying 
itself to a formal ratio, while conversely Tirpitz’s interest increased.171   
 Both sides sought to circumvent the tacit naval balance through third party 
construction, Germany through Austria-Hungary and Italy, Britain through 
construction by dominions and colonies, and both utilized naval agreements with 
alliance and entente partners to alter the naval balance.172   Furthermore, when the 
Canadian Parliament refused plans to build dreadnoughts in the summer of 1913, the 
Admiralty sought British replacements, drawing complaints from Germany.173  The 
balance broke down even before the war, although diminishing German efforts in the 
naval arms race masked this breakdown.   
The Foreign Office had long-standing objections to informal arrangements, 
Crowe complaining in 1909 of “false and non-binding assurances,”174 and again 
opposing an informal understanding arising from the Haldane mission.   
Such a form of ‘understanding’ has of course no binding effect.  If a political 
incident intervened, or if merely the German gov[ernmen]t were to renew the 
press campaign against this country which they allowed to flourish during the 
last 6 months, they would be fully justified in saying that, in view of the state 
of public feeling, they could not, with the best intention, avoid going beyond 
their assurances.  Therefore an assurance, having no conventional force, is 
useless for the only purpose for which we should require it.175   
 
British opinion changed as it became apparent that formal arms control initiatives 
only worsened relations with Germany, and as the necessity for a limit was receding.   
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Agreements codified in treaties provided a stronger statement than an 
informal arrangement.  Law provided clearer statements to the international 
community, thereby increasing predictability.176  Foreign Office notes continuously 
indicated a belief that Germany would be less likely to breach a binding 
commitment.  A non-binding agreement provided a less certain alternative, which 




 By 1914, international legal thought on arms control had matured.  Academic 
writing had moved away from utopian projects and increasingly recognized a 
discrete and pragmatic role for law in reducing arms competition.  Knowledge of 
arms control precedents increased significantly, providing a broader range of models 
for treaty terms.  These developments were not confined to academia, but also 
influenced British thinking on arms control.  Thus when facing an arms race with 
Germany, the Foreign Office possessed a broad range of legal precedents which 
could be applied to naval arms limitation.   
 British arms control policy reflected a richer understanding of the 
opportunities and limits of international law.  In Anglo-German negotiations, 
statesmen recognized that treaties could restrain Germany more effectively than non- 
binding understandings, reducing the risk of the Wilhelmine government “jockeying” 
Britain out of agreed concessions.  Legal strategies could be integrated seamlessly 
with naval construction policy, allowing simple practices like attaché visits to 
increase predictability in international affairs.  Statesmen perceived that law could 
assist in depoliticizing the volatile topic of warship construction, providing space for 
the German government to rein in armaments while removing exchanges of 
information from the whims of admiralties.   
 Yet if law provided opportunities, statesmen acknowledged its limitations.  
The Foreign Office feared Germany might breach treaty obligations, but responded 
by seeking firm, clear terms.  For instance, when negotiating the exchange of 
information, the Admiralty repeatedly pursued simple and easily verifiable facts to 
prevent violations.  The inability of bilateral Anglo-German negotiations to respond 
                                                 
176 Alternatively, a secret treaty, as contemplated by Crowe, might also halt the arms race without 
causing a political uproar in Germany, although Britain would be reluctant to enter such an agreement. 
Id.   
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to a multilateral strategic situation impeded a deal.  In addressing a multilateral arms 
competition, diplomats refused to bind Britain to a bilateral agreement with Germany 
unless these third party concerns were addressed.  The Foreign Office explored 
creative legal strategies such as issuing a broad-reaching declaration or including an 
escape clause in a treaty.  Yet the inability to regulate a global environment through a 
bilateral treaty hindered Anglo-German negotiations.  While law had its limits, 
British official opinion generally recognized its utility.   
 Unfamiliarity with international law did not prevent statesmen from resolving 
the naval arms race by agreement prior to the First World War.  The British record 
indicates that the opportunities of law were clearly understood and incorporated into 
diplomacy.  In fact, Britain’s opposition to Latin American arms control indicated a 
clear belief that such a treaty was likely to succeed, rather than skepticism.  The 
Foreign Office recognized how law could contribute to national security and 
exploited the possibilities offered by treaties.  Negotiations foundered on other rocks, 
in particular, German insistence on a political treaty, and the resultant mistrust it 
engendered in Britain.  Had political will been present, international law would have 






 By 1914, Britain had significant experience employing international law as 
part of security planning.  Britain had been central in the framing of numerous 
precedents for arms limitation, indicating an understanding of the potential of law in 
this area.  The Anglo-French Declarations of 1787, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 
1817, the Black Sea Treaty of 1856, and the 1902 Chilean-Argentine Naval Arms 
Treaty had all been negotiated by British statesmen.  The 1868 St. Petersburg 
Declaration and the Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 all 
reflected British influence, while the 1897 Greco-Turkish negotiations and 1909-
1912 Anglo-German talks both exemplified a high degree of comfort working with 
legal arms limits.  Statesmen possessed and recognized the range of legal precedents 
for limiting armaments, and drew on these precedents when they advanced British 
interests.   
 Likewise, when statesmen disavowed the possibility of legal limits, they 
often did so for reasons of policy, not because of disbelief in the potential of law.  In 
1899, the legal impossibility of disarmament had been used to foil inconvenient arms 
limitation proposals that no great power wanted yet could not openly denounce.  
Salisbury’s true opinion can be gleaned from his secret naval arms limit proposal to 
Russia that year, as well as his representatives’ offer to accept a submarine ban at 
The Hague.  Legal qualms had a way of disappearing when the limit advanced 
British interests.  Similarly, Grey’s opposition to Latin American arms control after 
1908 reflected a cold calculation of Britain’s interests, not legal impossibility.  While 
the Foreign Office debated the usefulness and wisdom of treaties, and while not 
every politician grasped the nuances of international law, overall the government 
comprehended the opportunities offered by law.   
 By the decade prior to 1914, the terms of post-war naval arms control had 
already taken shape.  Before 1899, imprecise terminology conflated arms control 
with disarmament, but by 1914 the distinction between the two concepts had been 
established.  Legal terminology evolved as greater experience was gained, and as 
scholars increasingly circulated that knowledge after 1899.  Britain had incorporated 
or evaluated numerous methods for limiting armaments.  Ship numbers, particularly 
capital ships numbers, had long served as the preferred criteria, figuring in the 1817, 
1856, and 1902 agreements.  Numbers were easily verifiable and allowed simple 
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calculations of relative power, and at The Hague in 1907 and in the subsequent 
Anglo-German negotiations the Admiralty continued to prefer this form of 
regulation.  Technical details including ship weight, vessel dimensions, protection, 
speed, horsepower, and armament – both gun caliber and numbers – had all been 
proposed as limitation terms.  The Admiralty consistently sought terms that could be 
easily verified through existing diplomatic means, and steadfastly opposed forms of 
limitation that sacrificed British advantages, such as battleship size limits in 1907.  
Concepts such as naval construction holidays, expenditure limitations, exchanges of 
information, the role of naval bases in calculating relative naval strength, and linkage 
of naval and land armaments had all been debated.  These concepts all found their 
way into naval arms negotiations in the 1920s and 1930s, providing a framework for 
future discussions.  Pre-war naval arms control left an extensive legacy.1  Arms 
limitation was not a novelty in the pre-war Foreign Office.   
Several other larger themes also emerge from the pre-war experience.  First, 
to be properly understood, arms limitation negotiations from 1899-1914 need to be 
viewed in their nineteenth century context, rather than as the first steps in twentieth-
century developments.  The nineteenth-century precedents mentioned above served 
as the starting point for British arms control policy at The Hague and in Anglo-
German negotiations.  Moreover, in 1909 when Britain asserted the customary legal 
right of a state to demand assurances from a neighbor engaged in an arms buildup, it 
drew upon traditional diplomatic practice.  Britain had similarly sought assurances 
from Russia in 1833, and France in 1793 and 1840, and had also attempted to 
manage competition with France in the 1860s through diplomatic discussions.  The 
past provided a model for peacefully managing competition, with traditional 
international law serving as a framework for negotiations.   
When Britain prepared for the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, its 
representatives studied the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration and the 1874 Brussels 
Conference as models for the probable political dynamic at the gathering and the 
most likely form of a final agreement.  The Czar’s circular in 1898 was little 
different from earlier proposals by French Emperor Napoleon III or Czar Alexander 
I, and diplomats approached the conference with these inauspicious examples in 
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mind.  In later negotiations, like the Paris Aerial Navigation Conference of 1910, the 
Foreign Office also drew upon the political model of the 1874 Brussels Conference, 
attempting to unite the smaller states against the large continental military powers.  
Expectations at turn of the century conferences were greatly influenced by the results 
of similar initiatives in the past.   
One of the core assumptions of the international legal system, regarding state 
enforcement of obligations and war, revealed beliefs about future conflict.  War was 
the ultimate form of state enforcement, and statesmen predicated the international 
system on a belief in limited wars.  Britain expected rules of war to be enforced by 
neutral great powers.  Moreover, statesmen designed these rules of war to foster a 
rapid return to peaceful relations, hoping to minimize enmity by setting clear 
standards of expected behavior.  The expectations encapsulated in rules of war can 
only be explained in terms of the world before 1914, not what came afterwards.   
The tendency in historiography has been to obscure the nineteenth century 
roots of pre-war arms control.  Works have either consigned the Hague Conferences 
to a wistful footnote about a doomed counter-current before the deluge in 1914, or 
placed arms limitation in the context of the post-1919 evolution of international legal 
institutions.  The former view focuses on the peace movement, itself an ephemeral 
manifestation, while ignoring state interest.  The latter view tends to define law in 
terms of ever more-powerful international institutions, seeking precursors before 
1914.  This in turn overlooks how law functioned at the turn of the century, and tends 
to underestimate the influence of these earlier treaties.   
Second, British statesmen’s pragmatic approach to law remained constant 
over the nineteenth century.  In spite of terminological ambiguity surrounding 
disarmament before 1899, statesmen recognized how arms limitation would function.  
Diplomats recognized that treaties could not determine the behavior of competing 
states, but could influence actions as an “obstacle, rather than a barrier.”  In spite of 
technical violations, Britain maintained the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement after 
repeated internal debates from the 1890s to 1912.  These deliberations acknowledged 
small-scale American breaches, but held that the treaty prevented worse abuses, 
affirming that it was better “to let sleeping dogs lie.”  Similarly, Palmerston expected 
Russia to eventually abrogate the 1856 Black Sea Treaty.  His administration 
designed an agreement that could meet British interests in the roughly ten years it 
expected the treaty to last.  In the event, the treaty proved a significant obstacle:  
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Despite strenuous efforts by the czar, Russia required fourteen years to overturn the 
treaty.  This outlook towards law colored the overall British negotiating position at 
The Hague in 1907.  When discussing a renewal of the 1899 ban on aerial 
bombardment at the Second Hague Peace Conference, the Foreign Office recognized 
that law could never guarantee compliance.  However, the creation of a general norm 
would raise the political costs of violations, reducing the likelihood of this form of 
attack.  On repeated occasions, British diplomats crafted agreements that could 
advance national interests while recognizing the limitations of law.   
Nor were there major divides between Conservatives and Liberals in their 
approach towards legalized arms control.  While at times the parties differed on the 
necessity of arms limitation, they agreed on how treaty limits would function.  The 
great Liberal drive for economy after 1905 exaggerated the differences between the 
parties on arms limitation.  However, Conservatives also championed arms control 
when they viewed it as being in the national interest.  Balfour’s administration had 
led the push for a ban on naval mines, and had even contemplated calling a 
conference to ban these mines before the Second Hague Peace Conference was 
organized.  Even Salisbury, an apparent critic of arms limitation before the Hague 
Conference of 1899, secretly parlayed for a naval arms agreement with Russia in 
March of that year and publicly sought a ban on submarines at The Hague.  Despite 
outward differences, both parties perceived advantages in law and employed it in 
arms control strategies.   
Statesmen from both parties sought agreements that would be workable in the 
existing legal system.  Britain ruled out complex verification systems with France in 
1787 as impractical, whittled down the terms of the Black Sea neutralization in 1856 
to easily ascertainable warship characteristics, and rejected grandiose Austrian arms 
limitation projects for the Black Sea in 1871 as unworkable.  The exchange of 
information discussions featured a quest for “simple and easily verifiable facts” 
while exploiting traditional diplomatic procedures such as attaché visits.  Statesmen 
were untroubled by the lack of international organizations before 1914.  Rather than 
seeking impractical institutions to manage their security, they moved nimbly within 
the existing system.   
A third theme relates to the nature of that extant international system and the 
role of great powers within it.  In the nineteenth century, the central role played by 
the great powers in shaping international law became more overt.  This role had long 
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been justified as necessary in order to uphold a balance of power, and thus to 
maintain peace.  However, in the past, this precedence had been tacit, and diplomats 
still acknowledged the theoretical sovereign equality of states.  By the late nineteenth 
century, international lawyers sought to legitimize the de facto preeminence of the 
great powers, formally legitimizing their special capacity to make law.   
The small states’ desire for a legal system based on sovereign equality and 
great powers quest for an unfettered ability to resolve world questions led to 
tensions.  Small states sought greater representation at the Hague Conferences, while 
the great powers sought the ability to resolve questions among themselves 
unimpeded by unwieldy negotiations with dozens of states.  In response to this 
development, the British Foreign Office sought to limit invitations to the 1908-1909 
London Conference to the great powers.  The Foreign Office also anticipated that the 
resulting 1909 Declaration of London would be enforced by the International Prize 
Court against the small powers.  The Foreign Office expected rules crafted by the 
states most interested in naval warfare, the great powers, would bind the entire legal 
community without its consent.   
Similarly, the Foreign Office often sought only great power consensus in 
setting arms control norms.  In 1899, Goschen directed his naval reduction offer in 
Parliament to the other great powers.  At the 1899 Hague Conference, when Russia 
requested a unanimous ban on submarines, the British delegation replied that only 
great power adherence was necessary to make the rule effective.  In planning for the 
Second Hague Peace Conference, the key Foreign Office memoranda by Hurst 
contemplated an arms control system monitored by the great powers.  In 1909, in 
recommending an armament declaration to halt the dreadnought race, Hardinge 
probably advocated this type of instrument to allow enforcement of the new 
regulations against the smaller states.  The Foreign Office generally sought 
consensus among the great powers as a prerequisite, rather than universality, which 
was significantly more difficult to achieve.  While near-universal adherence to arms 
control norms placed added pressure on recalcitrant states to comply, security could 
more often be advanced through the participation of the largest naval powers.   
The great powers exploited their predominance in imposing arms limits.  
When the concert of the powers settled the 1897 Greco-Turkish War, they 
contemplated stripping the Greek Navy of its battleships.  Moreover, the great 
powers had stripped Montenegro of the right to maintain warships in the Treaty of 
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Berlin of 1878,2 theoretical though that right may have been.  The British role in the 
1902 Chilean-Argentine Naval Arms Treaty followed this pattern.  British financiers 
threatened to withhold funding for further warships, while British shipyards agreed 
not to deliver battleships destined for Chile, allowing the Foreign Office to monitor 
the terms of the agreement.  The 1856 Black Sea Treaty imposed by Britain, Austria, 
and France also falls into this category, as defeated Russia had no real choice about 
the terms of this agreement.  While the disparity in power between Russia and its 
adversaries was temporary, it nonetheless was real and decisively influenced the 
1856 negotiations.   
The role of the great powers in turn relates to a fourth theme.  Law was most 
effective when it took into account national interest and power.  The British 
government acknowledged this reality when discussing the fate of the Black Sea 
Treaty in 1871.  When confronted with the collapse of that treaty, Parliament debated 
two solutions – either create powerful international legal institutions or craft 
agreements that states could enforce.  The government accepted the latter solution, 
advocating the pragmatic enforcement of treaties through great power participation 
rather than world government.   
The creation of world government was unrealistic in 1871, but by 1918 
popular opinion supported the creation of powerful international institutions.  The 
breakdown of international order in the Great War led to the belief that inadequate 
legal institutions contributed to conflict, and that world government could prevent a 
recurrence of hostilities.  Historians interpreted pre-war arms limitation as being 
merely the first steps in progressive codification of international law, while 
overlooking the achievements of the old system.   
Pre-war lawyers often recognized that world government was a chimera.  The 
decision to work within the existing system of international law reflected as much a 
belief in the impracticality of world government as a recognition that states lacked 
support for powerful institutions.  Advocacy of world government came at a cost in 
the effectiveness of extant international law.   
Is it quite certain that if International Law is discredited now, we shall not 
need its help, before the Powers will be ready to replace the bâtons of their 
marshals by those of the Universal Constabulary?  Surely, to diminish the 
authority of an existing law by slighting allusions to it, made through 
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admiration of an alternative system which is entirely speculative and 
unpractical, is a course leading directly to anarchy.3   
 
The quest for world government after 1919 obscured the accomplishments in 
the pre-war era and failed to address a key element of the international legal system – 
state power.  Strong international institutions merely channeled state interest, and a 
system based on these institutions was still no stronger than the mutual interests of 
the great powers anchoring it.  Populations and politicians placed too great a faith in 
strong international institutions, and when these institutions also failed to prevent 
war, the failure undermined support for an older and more practical form of 
international law.  Only through understanding how international law functions as an 
element of diplomacy, can publics, politicians, and historians properly assess what 
law can and cannot achieve.  In order for law to play a role in world affairs, such a 
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